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ARTICLE 
ARTICLE II VESTS THE EXECUTIVE POWER, NOT THE 
ROYAL PREROGATIVE 
Julian Davis Mortenson∗ 
Article II of the United States Constitution vests “the executive power” 
in the President. For more than two hundred years, advocates of presi-
dential power have claimed that this phrase was originally understood 
to include a bundle of national security and foreign affairs authorities. 
Their efforts have been highly successful. Among constitutional original-
ists, this so-called “Vesting Clause Thesis” is now conventional wisdom. 
But it is also demonstrably wrong. 
Based on an exhaustive review of the eighteenth-century bookshelf, 
this Article shows that the ordinary meaning of “executive power” re-
ferred unambiguously to a single, discrete, and potent authority: the 
power to execute law. This enforcement role was constitutionally crucial. 
Substantively, however, it extended only to the implementation of legal 
norms created by some other authority. It wasn’t just that the executive 
power was subject to legislative influence in a crude political sense; rather, 
the power was conceptually an empty vessel until there were laws or 
instructions that needed executing. 
There was indeed a term of art for the Crown’s nonstatutory powers, 
including its various national security and foreign affairs authorities. 
But as a matter of well-established legal semantics, that term was “pre-
rogative.” The other elements of the prerogative—including those 
                                                                                                                           
 ∗  Professor of Law, Michigan Law School. Thanks to Kate Andrias, Nick Bagley, 
Mary Sarah Bilder, Curt Bradley, Josh Chafetz, Andrew Cecchinato, Bobby Chesney, 
Kristina Daugirdas, David Feldman, Martin Flaherty, Jean Galbraith, Jeff Goldsworthy, Tom 
Green, Monica Hakimi, Don Herzog, John Hudson, Aziz Huq, Rebecca Ingber, Andrew 
Kent, Adam Kleven, Gary Lawson, Marty Lederman, Thomas Lee, Michael McConnell, 
Conrad McRae, Gabe Mendlow, Henry Monaghan, Jefferson Powell, David Pozen, Richard 
Primus, Rebecca Scott, Matt Steilen, Jeremy Tellman, Matt Waxman, Ingrid Wuerth, and 
Ilan Wurman for helpful comments on this draft. Thanks also to participants in the ASIL 
International Law in Domestic Courts Workshop, Boston University Law Workshop, 
University of Cambridge Public Law Workshop, Michigan Legal Theory Workshop, and 
Yale–Duke Foreign Affairs Workshop for helpful discussions of various pieces of this 
project. Special appreciation goes to Seth Quidachay-Swain, Virginia Neisler, and the 
unsurpassed University of Michigan research librarians for their extraordinary support in 
making this project possible. 
1170 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:1169 
 
relating to national security and foreign affairs—were possessed in 
addition to “the executive power” rather than as part of it. 
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What would happen if the President had no qualms about violating 
the law? Suppose he is fighting terrorism and wants to deploy wiretaps 
prohibited by the statutory surveillance framework1 and an interrogation 
program that violates federal criminal law.2 Or imagine he wants to 
                                                                                                                           
 1. Cf. Offices of Inspectors Gen., Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance 
Program 11, 13 (2009), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7H5-SV29] 
(quoting an unreleased Office of Legal Counsel memo’s assertion that the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act “cannot restrict the President’s ability to engage in warrant-
less searches that protect the national security” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 2. Cf. Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to 
Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. 18–19 (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Office of Legal Counsel 
Torture Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/ 
memo-combatantsoutsideunitedstates.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ4A-VHSV] (contending 
that “if an interrogation method arguably were to violate” federal statutes criminalizing 
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conduct an unauthorized humanitarian intervention but runs into a 
statutory time limit requiring him to cease hostilities.3 What if a statute 
requires U.S. passports to include a diplomatically provocative term, but 
the President wants the State Department to leave it out?4 Different 
though the stakes and specifics of these questions may be, their under-
lying structure is identical. In each hypothetical, a presidential policy—to 
wiretap, torture, bomb, or scriven—is prohibited by existing legislation. 
In each hypothetical, the prohibition is too clear to be finessed by clever 
statutory interpretation. And in each hypothetical, lawyers have to decide 
what will give way. Does the statute constrain the President? Or does exec-
utive power trump the statute? 
A leading scholarly view—shared by at least one current member of 
the Supreme Court5 and asserted with increasing persistence by the exec-
utive branch itself6—is that cases like these often turn on the President’s 
                                                                                                                           
assault, maiming, and war crimes, then those statutes “would be unconstitutional as applied 
in this context”). 
 3. Cf. Dep’t of State & Dep’t of Def., United States Activities in Libya 25 (2011), 
https://fas.org/man/eprint/wh-libya.pdf [https://perma.cc/M53X-JW2N] (“The President 
is of the view that the current U.S. military operations in Libya are consistent with the War 
Powers Resolution . . . .”). 
 4. Cf. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2082–83, 2096 (2015) (permitting the 
Administration to ignore a statute that entitled a Jerusalem-born U.S. citizen to have his 
passport list his place of birth as “Israel”). 
 5. See id. at 2097–99 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Founding-era evidence reveals that the ‘executive Power’ included 
the foreign affairs powers of a sovereign State. . . . This view of executive power was 
widespread at the time of the framing of the Constitution.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel to Att’y Gen., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 2011 WL 
(OLC) 1459998, at *5–6 (Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Office of Legal Counsel Libya 
Memorandum] (arguing that the President has “independent authority” deriving from the 
President’s “‘unique responsibility,’ as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, for 
‘foreign and military affairs,’ as well as national security” (emphasis added) (quoting Sale 
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993))). The Obama Administration 
further argued that under the “historical gloss” on the executive power vested in Article II, 
the “President bears the ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign 
relations’” and accordingly holds “independent authority in the areas of foreign policy 
and national security.” Id. at *7 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414, 
429 (2003)). In Zivotofsky, the Administration grounded the President’s recognition power 
in the “assignment of the bulk of foreign-affairs powers to the President” and asserted that 
“Article II provides that ‘[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.’” Brief for the Respondent at 16, Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (No. 13-628), 
2014 WL 4726506 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, 
§ 1, cl. 1); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“The Solicitor General seeks the power of seizure in [the Article 
II Executive Power Clause]. Lest I be thought to exaggerate, I quote the interpretation 
which his brief puts upon it: ‘In our view, this clause constitutes a grant of all the executive 
powers of which the Government is capable.’”); Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Trump v. Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (No. 16-1436), 2017 WL 3475820 
(“‘The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty’ that both is an aspect of the 
‘legislative power’ and also ‘is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs 
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constitutional possession of “the executive power.” Usually called the 
Vesting Clause Thesis, this view is said to date to a post-ratification pam-
phlet written by Alexander Hamilton.7 It rests on a simple claim about 
the original understanding of the Constitution. Specifically: “[T]he execu-
tive power” was a term of art for a particular bundle of substantive 
powers held by the British Crown. In the same way that bestowing agency, 
guardianship, or bailment powers would convey a well-understood pack-
age of powers to an agent, guardian, or bailee, the vesting of “executive 
power” is said to have conveyed a bundle of authorities usually associated 
with kingship.8 
From that starting point, the Vesting Clause Thesis derives the fol-
lowing rule: The constitutional President was understood to possess the 
same powers and privileges as the eighteenth-century British Crown, 
except when specifically limited by other provisions of the Constitution.9 
In its strongest form—which suggests that any limitation or reassignment 
would require very clear constitutional text—the Vesting Clause Thesis 
yields a powerful presumption of indefeasible10 presidential authority in 
                                                                                                                           
of the nation.’” (emphasis added) (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 
338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950))). 
 7. See Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (1793), reprinted in 15 The Papers of 
Alexander Hamilton 33, 39 (Harold C. Syrett ed., digital ed. 2011) (“The enumeration [of 
specific presidential authorities later in Article II] ought rather therefore to be considered 
as intended . . . to specify and regulate the principal articles implied in the definition of 
Executive Power [in the Executive Power Clause]; leaving the rest to flow from the general 
grant of that power . . . .”). 
 8. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 561 n.69 (1994) (“‘[T]he executive Power,’ . . . is 
probably not so much a type of power as it is a grab bag of many specifically enumerated 
powers, all of which we think of as belonging to the Executive . . . .”). The standard title for 
this claim is unhelpful. The first sentence of Article II is definitely a “clause” that “vests” 
something. The question is what was vested. In the body of this Article, I will refer to the 
dominant view as the “Royal Residuum” Thesis, to differentiate it from other possible 
readings of the Executive Power Clause. 
 9. See infra notes 40–45 and accompanying text (discussing the Vesting Clause Thesis 
in greater detail). 
 10. This Article shows that the Executive Power Clause is incapable of giving rise to 
any substantive foreign affairs authority, much less an indefeasible one. I note that here 
because there are versions of the Vesting Clause Thesis that view the powers it conveys as 
defeasible by legislative action—treating them as valid only in Youngstown Zone Two. See 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (defining Zone Two as presidential 
action that has been neither authorized nor prohibited by Congress). But most modern 
Royal Residuum theorists view the suite of authorities as indefeasible—that is, valid even in 
Youngstown Zone Three. See id. at 637–38 (defining Zone Three loosely as presidential 
action that has been prohibited by Congress). This is not surprising: “If the President 
really has constitutional authority [under some express grant of power] to engage in 
certain conduct, it is very unclear why Congress should be allowed to limit its exercise, 
much less to make its exercise turn on the approval of other governmental actors.” Gary 
Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 375, 
393 (2008); see also, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama 
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take 
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the arenas of foreign affairs and national security. In a world where 
originalism is so influential, that’s a big deal—especially since executive 
branch interpretation often proceeds either out of sight or without a 
clear path to judicial review.11 Certainly the thesis loomed large in the 
real-world version of each controversy flagged above. 
This Article lays the foundation for demonstrating that, as a histori-
cal claim about the document adopted by the Founders, the Vesting 
Clause Thesis is wrong. Historically speaking, there was a term of art for 
the basket of nonstatutory powers held by the British Crown. But that term 
was “royal prerogative.” Article II’s reference to “the executive power,” by 
contrast, referenced only one specific item in a very long list of royal author-
ities. Specifically, it meant the narrow but potent authority to carry out 
projects defined by a prior exercise of the legislative power. As the lead-
ing English theorist of royal absolutism explained—with unmistakable 
disdain—the “executive power” was nothing more than “a power of put-
ting [the] laws in execution.”12 To be clear, even radical Whigs knew that 
the Crown had other powers besides the merely “executive.” But as a 
matter of well-established legal semantics, those powers were possessed in 
addition to “the executive power” rather than as part of it. For this reason, 
the first sentence of Article II simply cannot bear the weight of the Vesting 
Clause Thesis. It vests the executive power, not the royal prerogative. 
If this is right, then three conclusions follow: 
• First, the opening sentence of Article II vested exactly what it 
says: the power to execute the law, both by enforcing its neg-
ative prohibitions and by carrying out its affirmative projects. 
                                                                                                                           
Care Clause, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 781, 856 (2013) (arguing that the President is entitled to refuse 
to comply with a law that “would interfere materially with the exercise of [a] constitutional 
power of the President (such as that over foreign affairs and national security)”); 
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian 
Executive: A Defense, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1591, 1593 (2005) [hereinafter Prakash & Ramsey, 
The Jeffersonian Executive] (“[T]he President has unilateral control . . . of those 
executive foreign affairs powers that are not otherwise allocated or shared.”); Saikrishna 
Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 215, 227, 236 (2005) (review-
ing Harold J. Kent, Presidential Powers (2005)) (“[N]othing in the [Necessary and Proper 
Clause] even hints that executive powers derived from the general grant are more suscep-
tible of congressional regulation.”). For the most usefully rigorous classification of the 
clashing taxonomies in play here, see Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Taxonomy of 
Presidential Powers, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 327, 328 (2008). 
 11. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 
Colum. L. Rev. 1189, 1196–97 (2006) (noting that in “a great many instances” of executive 
branch interpretation, the “question of judicial review does not arise” because of justici-
ability issues or because the matters implicate foreign affairs or national security). 
 12. Robert Filmer, The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy (1648) [hereinafter 
Filmer, The Anarchy], reprinted in Patriarcha and Other Writings 131, 136 (Johann P. 
Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). Filmer elaborated: “By these words of 
legislative, nomothetical and architectonical power, in plain English, [is understood] a 
power of making laws. And by gubernative and executive, a power of putting those laws in 
execution by judging and punishing offenders.” Id. 
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This was a mighty charge for a majestic office, and the man-
ner of its delegation caused much anxiety. But it extended 
only to the implementation of substantive legal requirements 
and authorities that were created somewhere else. It wasn’t 
just that the use of executive power was subject to legislative 
influence in a crude political sense. Rather, the power itself 
was fundamentally derivative. It was incapable of providing 
even a defeasible source of independent substantive authority, 
let alone one that was immune from legislative revision. 
• Second, the Vesting Clause Thesis gets the original default 
rule of constitutional preeminence backward. Far from pre-
suming that law cannot bind the President on questions of 
national security and foreign affairs, the Founders’ Constitution 
presumed that the President must obey duly enacted statutes 
in those areas too—unless some other grant of Article II 
authority specifically rebutted that presumption. The con-
trary claim isn’t just wrong; it’s conceptually confused. 
• Third, arguments that the President possesses a free-floating 
and indefeasible foreign affairs power cannot rest on 
historical claims about the Founding. They must rest instead 
on some form of what originalists call living constitutional-
ism—and in particular on a meticulous demonstration that 
such powers have in fact emerged over time. 
Because the Vesting Clause Thesis is so entrenched in our consti-
tutional culture, we must uproot it systematically—first by examining the 
intellectual currents of the late eighteenth century, and then by attend-
ing to what the Founders actually said and did before, during, and after 
the ratification debates. This Article lays the foundation for that project. 
Left for another day is a discussion of how the standard understanding of 
executive power was reflected—as it demonstrably was—in discussion 
and debate throughout the Founding and early Republic.13 But the 
indispensable foundation for that forthcoming work is laid here: While 
the canonical commentators disagreed vigorously about how best to 
allocate the powers of government, the eighteenth-century grammar of 
their debate—both conceptually and semantically—was well established. 
Absent some evidence that the Founders ignored this background and 
adopted a basically unprecedented meaning of “executive power,” the 
first sentence of Article II would have been understood as vesting the 
wholly derivative authority to execute the laws, and nothing else. 
                                                                                                                           
 13.  See, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, U. Pa. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause] (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (showing that the conceptual framework explained in this Article 
was not just adopted but simply presumed by the Founders as they proposed, wrote, 
discussed, debated, and ratified the Constitution). 
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This Article is organized as follows. Part I outlines three competing 
views of the Executive Power Clause: the “Cross-Reference” theory, the 
“Law Execution” theory, and the “Royal Residuum” theory. Part II 
surveys the political and theoretical backdrop for eighteenth-century 
debates about the separation of powers. Part III turns to the legal seman-
tics of constitutional law proper. It shows that the standard term for the 
bundle of nonstatutory powers held by the Crown was “royal prerogative” 
and that “executive power” referred to one distinct branch of the prerog-
ative: the authority to execute the law. Part IV explores some reasons that 
Royal Residuum proponents have misunderstood the historical evidence. 
Part V concludes with a survey of Founding-Era dictionaries, showing that 
they offer unanimous support for reading “executive power” as “the 
power to execute.” 
I. THREE VIEWS OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER CLAUSE 
To a lay audience, the questions we started with may seem easy: Surely 
the President isn’t above the law? Under the U.S. Constitution, however, 
the legislative code only frames the question about legality; it doesn’t nec-
essarily answer it. Consider by contrast a jurisdiction where the answer 
really is that simple. In the United Kingdom, statutes control the Crown—
full stop. Whether courts trace the origins of the proposition to dictum 
from the Case of Proclamations,14  the statutory abrogation of royal 
suspension and dispensation,15 or the evolution of political conventions 
after the Glorious Revolution,16 the principle of legislative sovereignty 
has now been established for centuries: 
[T]he most fundamental rule of UK constitutional law is that 
the Crown in Parliament is sovereign and that legislation 
enacted by the Crown with the consent of both Houses of 
Parliament is supreme . . . . Parliament can, by enactment of pri-
mary legislation, change the law of the land in any way it chooses. 
There is no superior form of law than primary legislation . . . .17 
                                                                                                                           
 14. See R (Miller) v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, 
[44] (“In the early 17th century Case of Proclamations, Sir Edward Coke CJ said that ‘the 
King by his proclamation or other ways cannot change any part of the common law, or 
statute law, or the customs of the realm.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Case of Proclamations 
(1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, 1353; 12 Co. Rep. 74, 75 (KB))). Although Coke’s statement 
“may have been controversial at the time, it had become firmly established by the end of 
the century.” Id. 
 15. See id. at [40]–[47] (explaining that the prerogative powers of the Crown “were 
progressively reduced” in “a number of seminal events,” chief among which were “a series 
of statutes enacted in the twenty years between 1688 and 1707” that included the Bill of 
Rights, the Act of Settlement, the Claim of Right, and the Acts of Union). 
 16. See R (Miller) v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 
(Admin) 2768  [26], overruled by [2017] UKSC 5. 
 17. Id. at [20]. See also A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution 3–4 (Liberty Fund reprint 1982) (8th ed. 1915) (“Parliament . . . has, under 
the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that 
1176 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:1169 
 
There is thus no such thing as an indefeasible residuum of royal power 
that is immune from legislative interference: The Crown cannot act in defi-
ance of the statutory framework. 
It’s more complicated in the United States. American sovereignty is 
famously divided—first between the federal government and the states, 
and then among the branches of the federal government itself. It’s not 
just that no single entity possesses unitary authority over the coercive 
power of the state. Even if the political institutions were to act in perfect 
cooperative concert, they still couldn’t exercise genuinely plenary con-
trol—not even as a collective. That’s because all of them are bound by 
the U.S. Constitution, which puts some kinds of policy choices com-
pletely off limits—such that sovereignty (whatever exactly that means) 
resides not in any set of political institutions but “in” the American 
people (whoever exactly they are) on terms currently defined by the 
Constitution itself (whatever exactly that is). 
The point here isn’t the metaphysics of nationhood but the pragmat-
ics of turf wars. No American political entity possesses anything like 
Parliament’s plenary authority and legal supremacy. To the contrary, at 
the federal level, the Constitution parcels out discrete legal authorities—
and only those authorities—to the various players in the system. Like a 
corporation’s founding charter or an international organization’s consti-
tutive treaty, the Constitution conveys only those powers that the stake-
holders choose to convey. This gives rise to a foundational principle of 
American governance: Any federal action that cannot trace its authority 
to some constitutional grant of power is, by definition, ultra vires.18 
And that brings us back to the questions outlined above. Unlike the 
U.K. prime minister, the American President can’t figure out whether he 
gets to act without legislative authorization—much less in violation of a 
statute—by making grand inquiries about the locus of sovereignty. 
                                                                                                                           
no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set 
aside the legislation of Parliament.”). For the most part, scholars now really only debate 
the extent to which Parliament could revise its own internal “manner and form” rules to 
restrict its own future ability to enact legislation. Compare Ivor Jennings, The Law and the 
Constitution 152–53 (5th ed. 1959) (“[T]he ‘legal sovereign’ may impose legal limitations 
upon itself, because its power to change the law includes the power to change the law 
affecting itself.”), with Dicey, supra, at 24 n.48 (“[A] sovereign power cannot, while retain-
ing its sovereign character, restrict its own powers by any particular enactment.”). The U.K. 
courts do apply a clear-statement rule to these questions: Statutes do not bind the Crown 
unless that feature is either express or a necessary implication of their structure and 
function. R (Black) v. Sec’y of State for Justice [2017] UKSC 81 [36]–[37], [2018] AC 215. 
 18. That does not necessarily mean there must be some subjects the federal 
government can’t regulate. Compare Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 
534 (2012) (“The enumeration of powers is also a limitation of powers, because ‘[t]he 
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824))), with Richard Primus, The Limits of 
Enumeration, 124 Yale L.J. 576, 580 (2014) (“[W]hether the powers of Congress have as 
great a scope in practice as a general police power is a matter of contingency, not a matter 
of principle.”). 
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Instead, the conversation begins with a small-bore question: Is there 
some constitutional grant of presidential authority over this kind of 
wiretapping, torturing, bombing, or scrivening?19 If there isn’t, then he 
can’t.20 That conclusion follows necessarily: Either he has no legal author-
ity at all (and so lacks the power ab initio), or he has only statutory author-
ization (and so his power is necessarily limited by the statute’s restrictions). 
Either way, the President can’t ignore the law. 
So for questions like ours, the enumeration problem is central: What 
powers does the Constitution grant to the President? Well, it’s a grab 
bag—and not a terribly big one. Article II begins by vesting “the exec-
utive Power” in the President.21 After specifying the details of eligibility 
and election, the Constitution then names the President “Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States” and of the state militias 
“when called into the actual Service of the United States.”22 In the realm 
of foreign affairs, the President has the power to “make Treaties” if two 
thirds of the Senate concurs, to “receive Ambassadors and other public 
Ministers,” and to “nominate” and “appoint” U.S. diplomats with senato-
rial consent. 23  On “extraordinary Occasions,” the President has the 
authority to convene both houses of Congress.24 Finally, the President has 
an overarching obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed” and must take an oath to “preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States.”25 When it comes to the provisions of 
Article II plausibly bearing on the questions at issue, that’s more or less 
it.26 
This Article focuses on the first of these enumerations. Its text has all 
the romance of a human resources circular: “The executive power shall 
                                                                                                                           
 19. Note that even if the answer is yes, the power in question might still be subject to 
at least certain kinds of statutory restraint. But presidentialist claims about preclusive 
power over wiretapping, torturing, bombing, or scrivening don’t even get off the ground 
without at least pointing to a constitutional enumeration that starts the argument. 
 20. Of course, the statute might be unconstitutional for reasons other than that it 
interferes with an indefeasible power of the President. Perhaps it violates some provision 
of the Bill of Rights. Or perhaps it exceeds the legislative authority granted by Article I to 
the national government. 
 21. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. 
 22. Id. § 2. 
 23. Id. §§ 2–3. 
 24. Id. § 3. 
 25. Id. §§ 1, 3. 
 26. To focus analytical attention, I am including only those powers that could plausi-
bly be relevant to a presidential power to wiretap, torture, bomb, or scriven. Omitted from 
this list are the President’s pardon power; the President’s power to make various kinds of 
appointments of judges and other officers of the United States; and the President’s power 
to “require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive depart-
ments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.” Id. § 2. I also 
haven’t mentioned the veto, which is a legislative power granted in the President’s capacity 
as a participant in the legislative process. See id. art. I, § 7. 
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be vested in a President of the United States of America.”27 Yet this first 
sentence of Article II presents what Gary Lawson calls “one of the most 
important questions of any kind, on any subject, under the Federal 
Constitution.”28 That’s because “the executive power” is the last best 
hope of Presidents who want to take action without legislative author-
ization.29 (The other enumerations are of course relevant to—and possi-
bly preclusive of—statutes touching on the kinds of activities they 
authorize.30 But the universe of such activities is not large.) 
There are at least three ways to understand Article II’s reference to 
the executive power. The first is what I will call the “Cross- 
Reference” theory, which understands “the executive power” as a 
content-free referent to the rest of Article II. This thin reading of the 
Executive Power Clause has been embraced by Supreme Court Justices,31 
                                                                                                                           
 27. Id. art. II, § 1. 
 28. See Lawson, supra note 10, at 383; see also Michael W. McConnell, The President 
Who Would Not Be King 124 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (“[W]hether that Clause imparts any power to the President is one of the most 
contested questions in constitutional law.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1984, at 211 
(Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter Corwin, The President] 
(noting the tendency in constitutional interpretation to “regard[] the ‘executive power’ 
clause as an always available peg on which to hang any and all unassigned powers in 
respect to foreign intercourse”); Charles C. Thach, Jr., The Creation of the Presidency, 
1775–1789: A Study in Constitutional History 139 (1922) (“[W]hether intentional or not, 
[the Executive Power Clause] admitted an interpretation of executive power which would 
give to the President a field of action much wider than that outlined by the enumerated 
powers.”); Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The President and the Law, 67 Pol. Sci. Q. 321, 333 
(1952) (“[T]he defenders of residual power [argue that] . . . the President has been grant-
ed by the Constitution itself a legal power to act in emergencies. If it be asked where in the 
Constitution this power is to be found, the questioner is referred to the opening sentence 
of Article II . . . .”). 
For originalists, the practical importance of this escape valve has only increased since 
work by Marty Lederman, David Barron, and Ingrid Wuerth has demonstrated that the 
Commander in Chief power was historically subordinate to legislative instructions on 
military policy, strategy, and tactics alike. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The 
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original 
Understanding, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 696 (2008); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International 
Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 
106 Mich. L. Rev. 61, 65–66 (2007). 
 30. Take a statute prohibiting presidential nomination of ambassadors. Most people 
would think the President legally entitled to ignore that statute and nominate ambassadors 
to his heart’s content. It should be noted that—strangely to modern ears, and at obvious 
odds with our assumptions about constitutional textualism—a persistent thread in the 
Founding debates suggests that at least some of the President’s textual powers could be 
eliminated by statute. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 73, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian 
Shapiro ed., 2009) (“Without [a veto], . . . [h]e might gradually be stripped of his authori-
ties by successive resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote.”). 
 31. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (“I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceiv-
able executive power but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic 
powers thereafter stated.”); id. at 632–33 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Article II which vests 
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legislators,32 and a number of academics.33 On this view, the term is a 
convenient lexical handle for a grab bag of powers. The full contents of 
that grab bag are set out in the remainder of Article II. And nothing else 
goes in the bag. While this approach reads the Executive Power Clause as 
substantively prefatory, it does leave the clause with one significant job: 
clarifying that the listed powers belong to the President and no one else. 
That specification is more significant than it might seem. Repulsed by 
even the suggestion of kingship, some early state constitutions vested 
such powers in a committee rather than in one individual34—producing 
exactly the kinds of indecision, ineffectiveness, and delay that you would 
expect. And so on the Cross-Reference theory, a muscularly centralizing 
Constitution responded by using the Executive Power Clause to preclude 
the possibility of devolution to governance by committee. 
                                                                                                                           
the ‘executive Power’ in the President defines that power with particularity.”). The 
majority opinion in INS v. Chadha gestures at this view as well: “When the Executive acts, 
he presumptively acts in an executive or administrative capacity as defined in Art. II.” 462 
U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 32. See Daniel Webster, Speech on the Appointing and Removing Power (Feb. 16, 
1835), in 4 The Works of Daniel Webster 179, 187 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 18th ed. 
1881) (“By the executive power conferred on the President, the Constitution means no more 
than that portion which it itself creates, and which it qualifies, limits, and circumscribes.”). 
 33. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 
94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 49–52 (1994) (arguing that the President’s constitutional powers do 
not extend beyond Article II’s explicit provisions); Robert G. Natelson, The Original 
Meaning of the Constitution’s “Executive Vesting Clause”—Evidence from Eighteenth-
Century Drafting Practice, 31 Whittier L. Rev. 1, 35 (2009) (concluding that historical 
evidence suggests that Article II, like Article I, was a mere designation clause rather than a 
conferral of power); Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 
259, 263–64 (2009) (“This Article rejects the position that the Vesting Clause is a residual 
source of plenary presidential powers beyond those enumerated in Article II.”); see also 
Corwin, The President, supra note 29, at 177. 
 34. See, e.g., Md. Const. of 1776, art. XXVI, reprinted in 3 The Federal and State 
Constitutions Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and 
Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 1686, 1695–701 
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter Federal and State Constitutions] (creat-
ing an executive council with veto power over many of the governor’s executive functions); 
N.H. Const. of 1784, pt. II, reprinted in 4 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 2453, 
2465–66 (adding a council to the existing legislature, but no chief magistrate); Pa. Const. 
of 1776, § 3, reprinted in 5 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 3081, 3084 (“The 
supreme executive power shall be vested in a president and [twelve-person] council.”); Vt. 
Const. of 1777, ch. II, §§ 3, 17, reprinted in 6 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 
3737, 3742, 3744 (“The supreme executive power shall be vested in a Governor and 
[twelve-person] Council.”); see also, e.g., Del. Const. of 1776, art. 7, reprinted in 1 Federal 
and State Constitutions, supra, at 562, 563 (establishing a chief magistrate elected by 
legislature); Ga. Const. of 1777, art. II, reprinted in 2 Federal and State Constitutions, 
supra, at 777, 778 (creating a governor selected by legislature); S.C. Const. of 1776, art. III, 
reprinted in 6 Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 3241, 3243 (providing for the 
chief magistrate’s election by legislature); cf. N.Y. Const. of 1777, art. XXIII, reprinted in 5 
Federal and State Constitutions, supra, at 2623, 2633–34 (vesting appointment power in a 
council). 
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The second understanding, which I will call the “Law Execution” 
theory, gives the opening clause its own independent substantive content. 
On this view—which has found support among Presidents,35 Supreme 
Court Justices,36 and scholars37—“the executive power” is exactly what it 
sounds like: the power to execute the law. The executive power thus author-
izes the President to bring that law—which before execution exists only 
on paper—into effect in the real world. Sometimes this might mean 
coercing obedience from private parties, like ticketing jaywalkers. Other 
times it might mean implementing an affirmative project of the legis-
lature, like picking up the garbage. Either way, the executive power enables 
the President to spearhead the project of connecting legal imperative to 
physical reality: “Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement 
the legislative mandate,” the Supreme Court tells us, “is the very essence 
of ‘execution’ of the law.”38 And no other provision of the Constitution 
gives it to the President as an affirmative enforcement authority rather 
than as a Take Care compliance obligation.39 
                                                                                                                           
 35. Cf. William Howard Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers 139–40 (1916) 
(“The true view of the Executive functions is . . . that the President can exercise no power 
which cannot be . . . traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied . . . within 
such express grant as . . . necessary to its exercise. . . . There is no undefined residuum of 
power which he can exercise . . . .”). 
 36. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (equating the executive power with “energetic, vigorous, decisive, and speedy 
execution of the laws”). 
 37. See, e.g., Wilmerding, supra note 29, at 334 (arguing that the Founders intended 
Article II’s Executive Power Clause to confer only the limited power to carry into 
execution Congress’s laws); cf. Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in 
Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 309, 314, 344–59 (2006) (discussing the 
“executive Power” vested in the President and concluding that “the Constitution does not 
vest in the president a general, independent lawmaking power in foreign affairs”). For 
some legal historians who appear to embrace this view, see, for example, William B. Gwyn, 
The Meaning of the Separation of Powers 5 (1965) (“[S]eparation of powers  . . . distin-
guishes between law-making and the implementation of the law in particular instances.”); 
M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 32 (1998) (citing several 
seventeenth-century sources in support of the claim that contemporaries understood exec-
utive power to mean “the machinery by which the law was put into effect”); Francis Wormuth, 
The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism 61–62 (1949) (finding that a binary legislative–
executive separation of powers doctrine—with the judicial function acting as a subset of 
the latter—persisted through the middle of the eighteenth century); cf. Curtis A. Bradley 
& Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 
545, 581 n.146 (2004) (“[W]e do not necessarily disagree . . . that the term ‘executive 
power’ might have been understood by the Founders to refer generically to the authority to 
implement the laws.”). 
 38. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732–33 (1986). Michael McConnell draws a nice 
distinction between “executing a law and executing a power.” McConnell, supra note 28, at 
27. As he puts it, “[t]he former entails carrying into effect policies set by the lawmaker, 
and the latter entails both the making of policy and its execution.” Id. 
 39. For a terrific examination of the historical meaning of the Take Care Clause, see 
Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article 
II, 132 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming June 2019) (manuscript at 9) (on file with the Columbia 
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The third understanding is what I will call the “Royal Residuum” 
Thesis.40 (It’s often called the Vesting Clause Thesis, but that is an 
unhelpful description. All three theories have a Thesis about what is 
Vested by the Clause.) As described above, this understanding takes “the 
executive power” as a term of art referring to a well-understood bundle 
of authorities that went well beyond the specific enumerations elsewhere 
in Article II. “Because supreme executives in other countries had a simi-
lar basket of powers,” Royal Residuum theorists argue, “it became com-
mon to speak of an ‘executive power’ that encompassed an array of powers 
commonly wielded by monarchs.”41 Here’s a typical modern description of 
what went in the basket: 
Traditionally, the “executive power” was understood at the time 
of the framing as including the power of war and peace, and all 
external relations of the nation. . . . 
But the President was left with whatever remained of the 
traditional “executive power” in matters of war, peace, and 
foreign affairs, diminished to a significant extent, but not com-
pletely, by the re-allocation of some very important, traditionally 
executive, powers to Congress.42 
Leaning heavily on two eighteenth-century writers to whom I will return 
below,43 Royal Residuum theorists conclude that “[b]y using a common 
phrase infused with that meaning, the Constitution establishes a pre-
sumption that the President will enjoy those foreign affairs powers that 
were traditionally part of the executive power.”44 For judges who sub-
scribe to these claims, the doctrinal implications are straightforward: “[T]he 
                                                                                                                           
Law Review) (“Our history  . . . supports readings of Article II that tend to subordinate 
presidential power to congressional direction . . . .”). 
 40. I am open to other names for this third understanding. On one hand, Royal 
Residuum proponents may feel mine stacks the deck by associating their position with 
monarchy. On the other hand, its royal roots are literally the only theory on which the 
President possesses such power, such that objectively this title is a simple descriptive obser-
vation about a necessary logical step in the claim. I welcome suggestions for an alternative 
that is distinctive, substantively significant, and accurate. 
 41. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning: The Constitution 
of the Original Executive 31 (2015). Royal Residuum theorists often note that law 
execution is among the authorities conveyed by the Executive Power Clause. See, e.g., 
Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 701, 
701–04 [hereinafter Prakash, Essential Meaning] (“[T]he phrase ‘executive power’ comes 
from the principal or essential power of an executive—the power to execute the law.”). 
 42. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 Const. Comment. 215, 237–
38 (2002) (footnote omitted); see also John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace 19 (2005) 
(citing “political theory” and “Anglo-American constitutional history” to claim that “the 
executive power was understood at the time of the Constitution’s framing to include the 
war, treaty, and other general foreign affairs powers”). 
 43. See infra section IV.B (discussing how modern Royal Residuum theorists have 
misunderstood Montesquieu and Thomas Rutherforth). 
 44. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231, 234 (2001) [hereinafter Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over 
Foreign Affairs]. 
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‘executive Power’ vested in the President by Article II includes the resid-
ual foreign affairs powers of the Federal Government not otherwise allo-
cated by the Constitution.”45 
The Royal Residuum Thesis has been remarkably successful. Besides 
support from Supreme Court Justices,46 prominent federal legislators,47 
leading executive branch officials,48 and at least one President,49 it is easily 
the dominant historical account among modern commentators.50 Certainly, 
                                                                                                                           
 45. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2099 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 46. See id.; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 680–84 (1952) 
(Vinson, J., dissenting) (rejecting proposition that “[t]he broad executive power granted 
by Article II . . . cannot, it is said, be invoked to avert disaster”); cf. United States ex rel. 
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (“The exclusion of aliens is a fundamen-
tal act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is 
inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.”). 
 47. See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. S2640 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Kyl) 
(“[T]he President’s powers include inherent executive authorities that are unenumerated 
in the Constitution. Thus, any ambiguities in the allocation of a power that is executive in 
nature—particularly in foreign affairs—should be resolved in favor of the executive 
branch.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Exercising Congress’s Constitutional Power to End a War: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 73 (2007) (statement of Bradford 
Berenson, former Associate Counsel to the President) (“The Vesting Clause provides the 
President a vast reserve of implied authority to do whatever may be necessary in executing 
the laws and governing the nation.”); cf. Memorandum from Bill Barr to Rod Rosenstein, 
Deputy Att’y Gen. & Steve Engle, Assistant Att’y Gen. 13 (June 8, 2018) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (“The authority to . . . remove principal Executive officers . . . [is] 
quintessentially Executive in character and among the discretionary powers vested exclu-
sively in the President by the Constitution.”). 
 49. See Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography 357 (1903) (discussing Roosevelt’s 
belief that “the executive power was limited only by specific restrictions” in the Constitution 
or “imposed by Congress” and that it was both the President’s “right” and “duty” to do 
anything demanded by the nation unless the “action was forbidden by the Constitution or 
by the laws”). Roosevelt elaborated that “[u]nder this interpretation of executive power, I 
did and caused to be done many things not previously done.” Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional Monarch? 
6 (1989) (“The international powers of the nation are . . . to be deduced . . . from their 
matrix in international law . . . . In this [area] . . . , Congress is entrusted with specified 
legislative powers and the President with ‘the’ executive power of the United States, save 
for a number of exceptions noted in the document itself . . . .”); Phillip R. Trimble, 
International Law: United States Foreign Relations Law 21 (2002) (“[T]he Framers well 
understood the concept of executive power in British practice, [and] they . . . parcelled 
out its components to different branches of the new government, but they retained the 
residual executive power in the President. Unless the Vesting Clause is meaningless it 
incorporates the unallocated parts of Royal Prerogative.”); Robert F. Turner, Repealing the 
War Powers Resolution 54–56 (1991) (“[T]he Founding Fathers intended to grant the 
president exclusive control over foreign affairs, subject only to certain very important but 
limited exceptions spelled out in the text of the Constitution.”); Charles J. Cooper et al., 
What the Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 165, 177 (1988) 
(explaining that “the founding generation understood executive power as conferring a 
broad authority that extended beyond the mere execution of the laws” and that the 
Founders believed Article II to include “the conduct of foreign relations”); Gary Lawson & 
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the historical claim is expressed with sufficient frequency and confidence 
that, particularly in the wake of its seminal modern summation by 
Saikrishna Prakash and Michael Ramsey,51 I had long assumed at least 
some version of it to be correct. The consequences of that success are 
stark, at least for originalists willing to stick with the full logical conse-
quences. If the Executive Power Clause really is a royal residuum, then 
the President is endowed—it would seem indefeasibly—with those aspects 
of kingly authority that have not been reallocated to other actors. 
Take, for example, the now-retracted memo in which the Office of 
Legal Counsel advised George W. Bush’s Defense Department that it was 
legally entitled to torture suspected terrorists. The first sentence of Article 
II was front and center in explaining why the relevant criminal statutes 
would be unconstitutional as applied to torture by federal officials: 
First, we discuss the constitutional foundations of the President’s 
power, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, to conduct 
military operations during the current armed conflict. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . The decision to deploy military force in the defense of 
U.S. interests is expressly placed under Presidential authority by 
the Vesting Clause and by the Commander-in-Chief Clause. . . . 
[T]he structure of the Constitution demonstrates that any power 
traditionally understood as pertaining to the executive—which 
includes the conduct of warfare and the defense of the nation—
unless expressly assigned to Congress, is vested in the President. 
Article II, Section 1 makes this clear by stating that the “exec-
utive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America.”52 
                                                                                                                           
Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 41 (“[T]he ‘executive 
Power’ also includes foreign affairs powers that are not otherwise allocated to specific 
institutions by the Constitution.”); Michael D. Ramsey, The Textual Basis of the President’s 
Foreign Affairs Power, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 141, 141 (2006) (“[T]he eighteenth-
century meaning of ‘executive’ power included foreign affairs powers as well as the more 
familiar power to execute the law. Thus, Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution . . . 
grants, in eighteenth-century terms, the power to execute the law plus foreign affairs 
powers.”); John C. Yoo, Rejoinder, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of 
Delegation, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1305, 1309 (2002) (“Article II’s Vesting Clause establishes a 
rule of construction that any unenumerated executive power, such as that over treaty 
interpretation, must be given to the President.”); McConnell, supra note 28, at 43 
(“‘[E]xecutive’ power in the British system was whatever governmental power was left after 
subtracting the powers of the Parliament and of the courts.”); cf. Gordon S. Wood, The 
Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787, at 155 (2d ed. 1998) (“[F]unctions that in 
the English constitutional tradition [were] executive [included] the proroguing and 
adjourning of the assembly, the declaring of war and peace, the conduct of foreign rela-
tions, and . . . the exclusive right of pardon.”). 
 51. See Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 44, at 
252–56. 
 52. Office of Legal Counsel Torture Memorandum, supra note 2, at 2, 4–5 (footnote 
omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 1). The memorandum devoted 
most of the first paragraph of a section titled “Commander-in-Chief Authority” to arguments 
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In the same vein, the Office of Legal Counsel later advised the Attorney 
General that, because of the President’s “‘unique responsibility,’ as 
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, for ‘foreign and military af-
fairs’ as well as national security,” Barack Obama had constitutional 
authority to initiate the use of force against Libya without congressional 
approval.53 And Justice Thomas argued that the Executive Power Clause, 
standing alone, justified presidential defiance of a statute that required 
the United States to issue a passport listing “Israel” as the place of birth for 
a young boy born in Jerusalem.54 
To be sure, the Royal Residuum Thesis has met strong resistance as a 
basis for modern doctrine—certainly it has never commanded a majority 
on the Supreme Court. The principal textual criticism has been the redun-
dancy it creates within Article II.55 Other resistance has focused either on 
disputing the size of the historical bundle or contesting its methodologi-
cal relevance today. As a historical matter, there are ongoing disputes 
even among proponents of the Royal Residuum Thesis about just how far 
the package of powers was understood to extend.56 There is likewise at 
least some disagreement among advocates of the theory about whether 
the royal residuum sits in Youngstown Zone Two or Zone Three—that is, 
whether its contents were defeasible by an otherwise appropriate act of 
                                                                                                                           
grounded in the Executive Power Clause. Id.; see also id. at 11 (“Because both ‘[t]he exec-
utive power and the command of the military and naval forces is vested in the President,’ 
the Supreme Court has unanimously stated that it is ‘the President alone [] who is 
constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile operations.’” (alterations in original) 
(quoting Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 87 (1874))). 
 53. Office of Legal Counsel Libya Memorandum, supra note 6, at 6 (quoting Sale v. 
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993)) (citing U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; 
id. § 2, cl. 2). 
 54. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2097–98 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 55. If “the executive power” presumptively includes the military and diplomatic 
authorities of the king, for example, then why should the Constitution specify the 
President’s role as the Commander in Chief or his authority to receive ambassadors? 
Residuum theorists have responses to some, but not all, of these surplusage concerns. For 
example, they explain Article II’s specific reference to the President’s treaty power and 
appointments power (both of which were included in the royal prerogative) as being 
instances not of redundancy but of qualification. I’m not sure how much this back and 
forth is worth; either way it seems unlikely that the Framers were the superhumanly 
“fastidious draftsmen” of our fondest imaginings. See Raoul Berger, The Presidential 
Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1972). 
 56. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 8, at 569 n.108 (“Professor 
Calabresi . . . emphasizes that any constitutional residuum that exists is very limited in 
scope and reflects the fact that the President’s powers are necessarily something of a his-
torical grab bag of anomalies that could not be given to anyone else.”); cf. Harold Hongju 
Koh, The National Security Constitution 76 (1990) (discussing “that nebulous grant” of 
executive power); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1, 22 (1993) (“[D]efenders of the ‘residuum’ position must be awarded the palm. . . . 
The real question, however, is the size of the palm.”). 
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Congress.57 And as a methodological matter, some critics deny that the 
original understanding (even where discernible) should decide modern 
separation of powers controversies. They emphasize, with strong support 
in Supreme Court doctrine, that considerations like functionalism and 
evolving historical practice also play an important role.58 
Among constitutional originalists, however, the Royal Residuum 
Thesis remains dominant. At most, criticism of the historical claim—
exemplified by the work of Martin Flaherty and Curt Bradley59—chal-
lenges particular bits of evidence offered by Royal Residuum theorists 
and contends that the Founders had more amorphous and varying views 
than the Thesis recognizes.60 The real mistake of the Royal Residuum 
                                                                                                                           
 57. As noted in the introduction, this Article focuses on the content of the powers 
conveyed by the Executive Power Clause, rather than the subsequent question of whether 
any such powers are defeasible. If the President has no inherent power to wiretap, bomb, 
torture, or scriven, it follows a fortiori that he can’t do so in violation of a statutory 
prohibition. For Royal Residuum theorists who appear to view at least some Executive 
Power Clause authorities as defeasible, see Monaghan, supra note 56, at 23–24 (“[A]n 
acceptable residuum argument . . . provides no basis for a claim that the President can dis-
regard the will of Congress . . . .”); McConnell, supra note 28, at 164 (“The defeasible 
character of this power follows from its status as residual: [O]nly authority not otherwise 
allocated is left to the President, so when Congress exercises one of its enumerated 
powers, it displaces presidential authority.”); see also Roosevelt, supra note 49, at 357 
(“[T]he executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions 
appearing in the Constitution or imposed by Congress under its Constitutional powers.”). 
 58. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 2076 at 2086; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 
688 (1981); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued 
to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a 
gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”); Taft, supra note 35, at 
135 (“Executive power is sometimes created by custom, and so strong is the influence of 
custom that it seems almost to amend the Constitution.”); cf. Robert Scigliano, The 
President’s “Prerogative Power,” in Inventing the American Presidency 236, 247 (Thomas 
E. Cronin ed., 1989) (“This is not the place to settle the dispute between Hamilton and 
Madison over the scope of the executive power—whether it relates to the execution of the 
laws . . . [or] also to foreign affairs. [But] Hamilton’s conception has largely won out in the 
practice of American government . . . .”). 
Note here, however, that even the Supreme Court’s discussion of evolving practice 
appears to lash that practice to the textual hook of “executive power”: “[T]he historical 
gloss on the ‘executive Power’ . . . has recognized the President’s ‘vast share of responsibility 
for the conduct of our foreign relations.’” Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 
(2003) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 59. E.g., Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 37, at 551–52 (rejecting “executive power 
essentialism,” defined as “the proposition that the Founders had in mind, and intended 
the Constitution to reflect, a conception of what is ‘naturally’ or ‘essentially’ within execu-
tive power”); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1729 
(1996) [hereinafter Flaherty, Most Dangerous Branch] (seeking “to construct a narrative 
of constitutional development based not solely or even principally on primary materials, 
but rather on the wealth of historical scholarship that has recently been devoted to the 
Founding”). 
 60. See, e.g., Natelson, supra note 33, at 35 (arguing that a structural comparison to 
power-granting charters from the Founding Era supports the Cross-Reference theory of 
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Thesis, Flaherty and Bradley argue, is what they consider an ahistorical 
decision to seek an “essential” definition of executive power in the first 
place. In their view, that whole enterprise is misconceived from the get-
go, partly because of “complexity within eighteenth-century political 
theory” and partly because “the constitutional Founders were [demon-
strably] functionalists, willing to deviate from pure political theory and 
essentialist categories.”61 As Flaherty has written elsewhere, “the sweep of 
events [following the American Revolution] belies the assumption that 
the formalist conception was a constant and renders improbable the notion 
that it became the consensus.”62 It verges on law-office history to suggest 
otherwise. 
In practice, this fundamentally equivocal criticism reduces to a cau-
tion flag of uncertainty, contingency, and historical contestation—a sort 
of standard historian’s warning that likely underwhelms executive branch 
lawyers and judges who must reach a binary yes-or-no decision. As Aziz 
Huq explains in his generally sympathetic account of the arguments 
advanced by scholars like Bradley and Flaherty as well as Peter Strauss, 
Lawrence Lessig, and Cass Sunstein: 
[T]he leading work [criticizing the Royal Residuum thesis and 
associated theories] finds the text inescapably ambivalent. Such 
work instead situates the Constitution in what is described as a 
fluid, contested, and unstable eighteenth-century debate about 
the appropriate internal organization of government . . . . In 
consequence, [these scholars] decline to draw a strong con-
clusion from the Constitution’s text, preratification practice, or 
                                                                                                                           
executive power); Reinstein, supra note 33, at 307–09 (arguing that the Constitution’s 
explicit textual allocation of other royal prerogatives supports the Cross-Reference theory 
of executive power). Given the lead their work takes in challenging the affirmative evi-
dence offered by Residuum theorists, I am especially grateful to Curt and Marty for their 
close engagement with earlier drafts of this Article. While this Article suggests that they 
have erred in some important respects, they have the “music” of the Founding right—our 
bottom line on the separation of powers framework is quite close—and I have immense 
respect for the precision and care of their work. 
 61. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 37, at 551–52. This commitment frames their 
work as a careful series of engagements with individual elements of evidence previously 
offered by Royal Residuum theorists, seeking in each instance to show how that evidence 
does not necessarily bear the weight of Residuum theorists’ argument. Bradley and Flaherty 
aim, in other words, to negate or at least problematize the affirmative evidence offered by 
Royal Residuum theorists, and in particular to reject “a conception of ‘executive power’ as 
a defined category that can be distinguished from legislative powers.” See id. at 592; see 
also Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 70–71 (enlarged 
ed. 1992) (“The clarity of modern assumption of a tripartite division of the functions of gov-
ernment into legislative, executive, and judicial powers did not exist for the colonists . . . .”). 
 62. Flaherty, Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 59, at 1774; see also id. at 1734 
(“Formalist catechism posits three discrete branches, each exercising one of three distinct 
powers. . . . No less importantly, formalist precepts consider legislative, executive, and judi-
cial powers, which mark the proper domains of their respective branches, to be readily 
identifiable.”). 
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Founding-era interpretative conventions about the precise con-
tours of each branch’s authority.63 
This Article goes beyond previous work in two ways: first, in the scope 
and systematic treatment of the evidence reviewed. In contrast to a brief 
engagement with four or five works of early modern political theory, this 
Article relies on more than a thousand contemporaneous published texts 
by hundreds of commentators, with a research methodology that involved 
reviewing every instance of the word root “exec-” and reading most of 
the texts cover to cover with the topic of presidential power squarely in 
mind. That immersion in the evidence enables the second distinctive 
feature of this project: the confidence with which this Article can not only 
refute the Royal Residuum Thesis, but also offer an affirmative 
replacement theory that is both historically and theoretically coherent—
and that cannot be caricatured as so much carping about a thicket of 
contestation and uncertainty. 
To be clear, this Article does not engage nonoriginalist arguments 
for an Article II residuum. The thesis defended here rests neither on the 
mistaken textualist premise that the Constitution must be read to avoid 
surplusage, nor on a contestable methodological commitment to custom 
and tradition as a source of constitutional meaning. Instead, the Article 
                                                                                                                           
 63. Aziz Z. Huq, Separation of Powers Metatheory, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 1517, 1530–31 
(2018) (reviewing Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the 
Separation of Powers (2017)) (footnotes omitted); see also Lawson & Seidman, supra note 
50, at 41 (“[T]he term ‘executive Power’ clearly did not have a single, well-defined, univer-
sally understood meaning in the founding era . . . .”); id. at 42 (“[But] [a]t the risk of 
engaging a 144-page discussion in a few sentences: it does not suffice to say, as Professors 
Bradley and Flaherty convincingly say, that ‘executive Power’ was a messy, contested 
concept in the late eighteenth century.”); Victoria F. Nourse & John P. Figura, Toward A 
Representational Theory of the Executive, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 273, 290 n.118 (2011) 
(reviewing Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential 
Power from Washington to Bush (2008)) (endorsing Bradley and Flaherty’s thesis “that 
executive-power essentialism ‘errs . . . in its presumption that America’s constitutional 
practitioners mechanically applied European political and legal theory’” (quoting Bradley 
& Flaherty, supra note 37, at 572)). For better or worse, Prakash and Ramsey put it more 
pointedly: “[W]hile Bradley and Flaherty devote much energy to the Constitution’s 
creation, . . . [o]n the most important points they either concede our view, make only 
conclusory statements, or say nothing.” Prakash & Ramsey, The Jeffersonian Executive, 
supra note 10, at 1661. 
As I will show, Bradley and Flaherty seem wrong in concluding that the Founders had 
contested, uncertain, or otherwise difficult-to-pin-down views on the conceptual content of 
“the executive power” as a specific authority of government. But the effective substance of 
what could be read as their ultimate (though unsubstantiated) conclusion—namely, that 
Royal Residuum theorists have not amassed enough evidence to dislodge what would 
otherwise appear to be the meaning of a word whose root is “execut-”—is certainly 
consistent with the meaning that I affirmatively establish here. See Bradley & Flaherty, 
supra note 37, at 581 n.146 (“[W]e do not necessarily disagree with Professor Prakash that 
the term ‘executive power’ might have been understood by the Founders to refer 
generically to the authority to implement the laws.”). But see Flaherty, Most Dangerous 
Branch, supra note 59, at 1778 (“[T]he Vesting Clause should not be read to grant the 
executive branch a prepackaged set of powers.”). 
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targets the Royal Residuum Thesis where it lives: as a descriptive 
historical assertion about the semantic content of a standard eighteenth-
century legal concept. In that respect, the piece begins by agreeing with 
Royal Residuum theorists—thereby diverging sharply from Bradley and 
Flaherty—that the Founders did “ha[ve] in mind, and intend[] the 
Constitution to reflect, a conception of what is ‘naturally’ or ‘essentially’ 
within executive power.”64 This project will show, however, that the mean-
ing was unambiguously limited to law execution. And it will offer a fully 
worked-out explanation of how that authority operated in an integrated 
constitutional context. 
II. POLITICAL THEORY 
The Article’s methodology is motivated by a metaphor: standing in 
front of James Madison’s bookshelf and pulling texts off the wall to ask, 
what was the foundation on which the Founders were building? First, 
normatively: What did the canonical works of political, philosophical, 
and legal theory have to say about the functions and powers of govern-
ment, particularly its head magistrate? Second, semantically: What words 
did the canonical authors use when talking about these various functions 
and powers? 
I have not, of course, literally identified every book in Madison’s 
possession or limited myself to the holdings of one man. Rather, the man 
and his bookshelf stand in for the educated American public and the 
corpus of materials from which its understandings were drawn. That said, 
the bookshelf conceit is not entirely metaphorical. We know a lot about 
what the Founders were reading, partly from statistical analysis of cita-
tions in political debates and the contemporary press,65 and partly from 
inventories of real bookshelves, often in the form of library catalogs, pro-
bate records, and purchase orders. 66  On the background of such 
                                                                                                                           
 64. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 37, at 551–52 (rejecting this claim); see also id. at 
685 (“There are a number of weaknesses in Madison’s analysis [as Helvidius]. . . . First, 
Madison, atypically for him, relies on essentialist reasoning . . . . Madison talks as if there 
are pure categories of executive and legislative power, and he simply disagrees with 
Hamilton about what those categories should look like.”). I’m with Madison here in two 
ways. I too think there were pure categories of executive and legislative power. And I too 
simply disagree with the Royal Residuum theorists about what those categories should look 
like. 
 65. See Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late 
Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 189, 190–92 (1984) 
(analyzing 916 American political writings published during the Founding Era between 
1760 and 1805). 
 66. See Trevor Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual 
Origins of the American Revolution 11–24 (Liberty Fund 1998) (1966) (surveying library 
catalogs during the eighteenth century); David Lundberg & Henry F. May, The Enlightened 
Reader in America, 28 Am. Q. 262, 262–64 (1976) (detailing the reception in America of 
major European Enlightenment authors); Minor Myers, Jr., A Source for Eighteenth-
Century Harvard Master’s Questions, 38 Wm. & Mary Q. 261–62 (1981) (analyzing the 
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evidence—as processed by decades of painstaking work by archivists and 
intellectual historians—American historian Jack Rakove sketches the 
scholarly consensus about “those intellectual sources of influence that 
shaped the mental world of the revolutionary generation”: 
There is no question that politically articulate eighteenth-century 
Americans—and certainly members of the political elite—were 
eclectically conversant with the works of luminaries like Hobbes, 
Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, and Blackstone. They were also 
well-versed in the richly polemical literature of seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century English politics; the moral philosophy and 
faculty psychology of the Scottish enlightenment; the disquisi-
tions on public law of such European authorities as Grotius, 
Pufendorf, and Delolme; and, one might add en passant, the 
inheritance of English jurisprudence. American thinking about 
politics was no doubt also shaped by reading in the classics, the 
legacy of Newtonian science, and even the emphasis on sympa-
thy in eighteenth-century philosophy and literature (which 
resonates strongly in their notions of representation). All of 
these writings shaped the intellectual context in which the 
Framers and Ratifiers acted. Whether we think of these ideas as 
big concepts whose evolution can be traced in a classic history-
of-ideas mode, or as elements of ideologies like republicanism 
or liberalism, or as competing Foucauldian discourses, it seems 
evident that they were essential elements of the original lan-
guage of American constitutionalism.67 
The consequence for any intellectually serious version of originalism is clear. 
Confronted by a question about the Founders’ constitutional arrangement, 
                                                                                                                           
sources of the master’s quaestiones at Harvard College as a barometer of political 
sentiment); see also, e.g., Eldon Revare James, A List of Legal Treatises Printed in the 
British Colonies and the American States Before 1801, at 5–6 (1934); Herbert A. Johnson, 
Imported Eighteenth-Century Law Treatises in American Libraries 1700–1799, at ix–xiv 
(1978); Loren E. Smith, The Library List of 1783: Being a Catalogue of Books, Composed 
and Arranged by James Madison, and Others, and Recommended for the Use of Congress 
on January 24, 1783, with Notes and an Introduction 1–6 (Jan. 30, 1969) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School), https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1089&context=cgu_etd [https://perma.cc/KQ3J-8V5R]. 
 67. See Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1587, 
1598–99 (1997) [hereinafter Rakove, Fidelity Through History] (footnotes omitted). For 
two classic accounts of intellectual influences on the Founders, see generally Bailyn, supra 
note 61; J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton Classics ed. 2016) [hereinafter Pocock, 
Machiavellian Moment]. For two excellent recent treatments of executive authority in the 
American political tradition, see generally Clement Fatovic, Outside the Law: Emergency 
and Executive Power (2009); Benjamin A. Kleinerman, The Discretionary President: The 
Promise and Peril of Executive Power (2009). For a good summary of the tradition 
surrounding the legal treatises relied on so heavily in this Article, see generally A.W.B. 
Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal 
Literature, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 632 (1981). For a marvelously detailed survey of key 
Founding-Era sources, including some of the sources relied on in this project, see 
generally William Baude & Jud Campbell, Early American Constitutional History: A Source 
Guide (Oct. 31, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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we must start by turning to material like this to “reconstruct the 
underlying assumptions and concerns and the manifest events and expe-
riences that presumably explain both authorial intentions and Ratifier 
understandings.”68 
None of this will necessarily lead to a straightforward interpretive 
conclusion in any case. Madison’s bookshelf was stocked with wildly vary-
ing visions of political legitimacy and good government. And that varia-
tion was well suited to the tumult and uncertainty faced by the Founders 
themselves. They had shattered their relationship with the English 
sovereign. They had experimented with a variety of new forms of govern-
ance. And they were facing the challenge of writing a new constitutional 
charter that would both empower and constrain a national government 
in a way never before achieved. Forget the vexations of federalism, the 
Founding generation was profoundly uncertain even about how to struc-
ture the national entities in their own right—and how best to allocate 
responsibilities and authorities among them once created. 
This Article does not resist that standard picture of contestation and 
uncertainty.69 There is no question that—like the intellectual legacy to which 
they were heir—the colonists, revolutionaries, Philadelphia drafters, 
ratification polemicists, and state ratifiers expressed radically diverging 
views on the best allocation of national power. There is no question that 
the Constitution’s terms are abstract and incomplete in most respects, 
and nowhere more so than the allocation of foreign affairs powers. And 
                                                                                                                           
 68. See Rakove, Fidelity Through History, supra note 67, at 1598. Rakove describes 
some of the “fairly obvious” bodies of evidence that “set the intellectual and political back-
ground upon which the Framers and ratifiers acted.” Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman 
Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 San Diego L. 
Rev. 575, 581–82 (2009). These included “the sources that shaped the vocabulary and 
grammar of political discussions, or the traditions and texts that historians sometimes 
describe as political languages.” Id. Rakove identifies Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, 
Harrington, Montesquieu, Hume, Blackstone, and other authorities as having “their 
place” among these sources, as do “other modes of reasoning associated . . . with classical 
learning or the Commonwealth or Real Whig Tradition for which Trenchard and Gordon 
remain the most representative figures.” Id. 
 69. As Martin Flaherty has argued, we should be skeptical of any account that would 
require us to set aside the professional historical consensus about the Founders’ legal–
political culture. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American 
Constitutionalism, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 523 (1995) (citing canonical work by, inter alia, Willi 
Paul Adams, Bernard Bailyn, Edward Corwin, Jack P. Greene, Forrest McDonald, J.G.A. 
Pocock, Jack Rakove, John Philip Reid, and Gordon Wood). On this score, Flaherty is 
clearly correct that the historiography “reveals . . . people groping as best they could 
toward a workable conception of government from which only broad purposes can safely 
be inferred.” See Flaherty, Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 59, at 1755. He is also 
surely right that “the complex, messy, and at times contradictory ferment in constitutional 
thinking renders it unlikely at best that, by 1787, Americans had reached a consensus on 
the doctrine in anything like the precise, thoroughgoing manner that modem formalists 
prescribe.” See id.; see also id. at 1775 (“What strikes anyone who examines the era in any 
depth, especially those historians who have devoted years to the exercise, is its complexity, 
contradictions, and, at times, confusion.”). 
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it is obviously the case that both the ratifiers themselves and the politi-
cians of the early Republic disagreed on a great many particular prob-
lems of application—if and when those problems even occurred to them 
in the first place. 
And yet. 
Even amidst this intellectual chaos-slash-ferment, some things were 
clear. If the Founders’ goals were often irreconcilable, the words they used 
to describe and debate their proposals, criticisms, and counterproposals 
were—at least on some points—strikingly consistent. Of particular rele-
vance here is how their disputes about institutional structure were con-
sistently framed around what they often called the “complete” or “perfect” 
triad of legislative, executive, and judicial power as three conceptual 
phases in the life cycle of law.70 This Article shows that formulation to 
have been a straightforward reflection of standard eighteenth-century 
understandings. If that’s right, then the negotiated settlement of the 
Executive Power Clause did have a clear meaning. That meaning is the 
one that leaps off the face of the text: “[T]he executive power” meant “the 
power to execute.” My hope is that even unsympathetic readers will wind 
up finding this hard to unsee. 
A. The Historical Background 
The Founders came of age in the aftermath of a long constitutional 
struggle in the mother country. It is a fool’s errand to offer even the most 
apologetically caveated summary of England’s multicentury wobble 
toward parliamentary supremacy. But the political imaginary of that 
struggle was deeply entrenched in the Founders’ minds, by way of school-
rooms, the political press, and widely published histories from authors 
across the political spectrum.71 So we should begin by chalking out some 
                                                                                                                           
 70. See, e.g., James Wilson, Remarks at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention: 
Summary of Objections to the Constitution (Dec. 4, 1787) [hereinafter Wilson, Summary 
of Objections to the Constitution], reprinted in 2 The Documentary History of the 
Ratification of the Constitution 465, 468 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., digital ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter Documentary History] (“This is not a federal government, but a complete 
one, with legislative, executive, and judicial powers. It is a consolidating government.”); see 
also infra note 302 and accompanying text. For an in-depth exploration of the Founder’s 
conception of “complete government,” see Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, supra 
note 13, at 33–39. 
 71. Histories and memoirs of the great struggle abounded. For some of the most 
important accounts available to the Founders, see generally 3–4 Oliver Goldsmith, The 
History of England, from the Earliest Times to the Death of George II (London, printed 
for T. Davies et al. 1771); 5–6 David Hume, The History of England, from the Invasion of 
Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688 (Liberty Fund 1983) (1778) [hereinafter Hume, 
History of England]; Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and 
Civil Wars in England (Oxford, printed at the Theater 1704); Catherine Macaulay, The 
History of England, from the Accession of James I to That of the Brunswick Line (London, 
printed for J. Nourse et al. 1763–1783); Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, Remarks 
on the History of England (London, printed for R. Francklin 1743) [hereinafter 
Bolingbroke, Remarks on the History of England]. 
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rudimentary context for the legal and political concepts that are 
discussed in depth below.72 
The American Founders told themselves a story of English consti-
tutionalism in which Parliament (and especially the Commons) led the 
struggle to wrest individual freedom from increasingly oppressive mon-
archs.73 The path to that outcome was winding. While many Americans 
followed the English Whigs in imagining that Parliament’s institutional 
identity was central to the “ancient constitution” of England,74 it is now 
understood that English parliaments emerged not so much as institutions 
in their own right as ad hoc gatherings summoned by the Crown, 
especially when approval for taxation was needed.75 During the long 
                                                                                                                           
 72. For some seminal accounts of the historical emergence of parliamentary 
sovereignty over the Crown, see generally J.W. Allen, English Political Thought: 1603–1660 
(1938); Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution (1993); Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament (1999); Margaret Judson, Crisis of the 
Constitution (1949). 
 73. Hamilton’s Federalist 71 offers a typical summary: 
[The] British House of Commons, from the most feeble beginnings, 
from the mere power of assenting or disagreeing to the imposition of a new tax, 
have, by rapid strides, reduced the prerogatives of the crown and the 
privileges of the nobility within the limits they conceived to be 
compatible with the principles of a free government; while they raised 
themselves to the rank and consequence of a coequal branch of the 
legislature; . . . [T]hey have been able, in one instance, to abolish both 
the royalty and the aristocracy, and to overturn all the ancient establish-
ments, as well in the Church as State . . . . 
The Federalist No. 71, supra note 30, at 364 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 74. See J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of 
English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century 47–53 (2d ed. 1987) (“[A]s the 
century progressed[,] assertions that the law was immemorial tended to be replaced by 
assertions that parliament, and especially a house of commons representing the property 
owners, was immemorial.”); see also Burgess, supra note 72, at 60–76 (agreeing that 
these arguments had rhetorical traction, but challenging Pocock’s readings of specific 
commentators). 
 75. Thus, the famous words of Magna Charta: 
No scutage nor aid shall be imposed in our kingdom, unless by com-
mon counsel of our kingdom . . . . 
. . . . 
And for obtaining the common counsel of the kingdom [before] 
the assessing of an aid . . . or of a scutage, we will cause to be summoned 
the archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and greater barons . . . . 
Magna Carta ch. 12, 14 (1215), reprinted in William Sharp McKechnie, Magna Carta: A 
Commentary on the Great Charter of King John 274, 291 (1905). For an excellent recent 
account of how the medieval English parliament evolved, see generally J. R. Maddicot, The 
Origins of the English Parliament 924–1327 (2010); F. W. Maitland, The Constitutional 
History of England 177–90 (1920); K.B. McFarlane, England in the Fifteenth Century: 
Collected Essays 1–20 (1981). For a classic though now disfavored “Whig history” account 
sketching a more institutionally cohesive view of medieval parliaments—one that more 
closely matches the Founders’ sense of historical development than the modern 
historiography sketched in main text—see 2–3 William Stubbs, The Constitutional History 
of England: In Its Origin and Development (Oxford, Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1877–1878). 
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transition to modernity, a complicated variety of economic, religious, and 
political developments led parliamentary elections and debate to chan-
nel larger and more systematic ideological disputes among members of 
the British political elite.76 And Parliament—or at least, significant fac-
tions within Parliament—began to develop a more particularized sense of 
institutional identity once assembled. With the arrival of the Stuarts in 
1603, tensions between the Crown and Parliament as such increasingly 
crystallized around suspicion of the new dynasty’s Catholic sympathies; 
dissatisfaction with the costs of court, government, and military adven-
tures; and anxiety about the new King’s pretensions to a divine-right 
absolutism.77 
The end of the resulting struggle is well known. Certainly by the middle 
of the eighteenth century, the legislative institution of “the King-in-
Parliament” had been recognized as conceptually sovereign and legally 
supreme over all competing institutions, and the Crown’s direct partic-
ipation in statutory enactment had been reduced to an empty formality.78 
                                                                                                                           
 76. For a good review of some of the social, economic, cultural, and religious pres-
sures during this period, see generally Conrad Russell, The Crisis of Parliaments: English 
History 1509–1660 (1971). Historians disagree on the extent to which Parliament devel-
oped a genuinely oppositional identity during the Tudor period. For works emphasizing 
the cooperative nature of Parliament’s relationship with the Tudor Crown, see generally 
G.R. Elton, The Parliament of England, 1559–1581 (1986); J.S. Roskell, Perspectives in 
English Parliamentary History, in 2 Historical Studies of the English Parliament 296 (E.B. 
Fryde & Edward Miller eds., 1970). For works giving more emphasis to an emerging 
sensibility of institutional conflict, see generally Jennifer Loach, Parliament Under the 
Tudors (1991); J.E. Neale, Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments 1584–1601 (1957); Josh 
Chafetz, “In the Time of a Woman, Which Sex Was Not Capable of Mature Deliberation”: 
Late Tudor Parliamentary Relations and Their Early Stuart Discontents, 25 Yale J.L. & 
Human. 181 (2013). 
 77. For a classic account of the interwoven causes, see generally Conrad Russell, The 
Causes of the English Civil War (1990). For accounts focusing on the religious element, 
see generally David Cressy, England on Edge: Crisis and Revolution, 1640–1642 (2006); 
England’s Wars of Religion, Revisited (Charles Prior & Glenn Burgess eds., 2011). For 
accounts emphasizing the politics of nationhood and state formation, see, for example, 
Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in 
European Context (2000); Austin Woolrych, Britain in Revolution: 1625–1660 (2002). 
For accounts exploring socioeconomic change as a principal factor, see, for example, 
Lawrence Stone, The Causes of the English Revolution 1529–1642, at 26–41 (ARK Publ’g 
Co. 1986) (1972). For a dated but still classic account emphasizing the institutional–
constitutional features typical of “Whig history,” see generally Samuel Rawson Gardiner, 
The First Two Stuarts and the Puritan Revolution 1603–1660 (New York, Charles Scribner’s 
Sons 1893). 
 78. Recall that under English constitutional theory the Crown was itself “a constitu-
ent part of the supreme legislative power.” See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *261. 
By the Founding, the royal negative was absolute in theory but defunct in practice—1708 
marked the last time it was used against a bill that had passed both houses of Parliament. 
See 18 HL Jour. 504, 506 (Mar. 11, 1708) (recording Queen Anne’s withholding of royal 
assent to the Scottish Militia Bill); see also Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution 48 
(Paul Smith ed., Cambridge Texts 2001) (1867) (“[The Queen] must sign her own death-
warrant if the two Houses unanimously send it up to her. It is a fiction of the past to 
ascribe to her legislative power.”). For a terrific account of key legal conflicts between 
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The intermediate steps were complicated.79 Over the course of the 1600s, 
the king clashed with (some) judges and (many) parliamentarians over 
royal interference with parliamentary privileges; over the promulgation 
of proclamations purporting to have the force of law; over judges’ 
authority to interpret the law differently from the Crown; and over 
Parliament’s power to restrict the operations of the Crown and its 
apparatus of government.80 It took a civil war, a republican interregnum, 
and a tentative royal Restoration before the Glorious Revolution of 
1688—involving the flight of James II and Parliament’s installment of 
William and Mary in his place—led to a formal settlement that entailed 
(it quickly became clear) the total capitulation of any claim to consti-
tutionally indefeasible royal authority.81 
Certainly by the Founding period, it was well-settled that English law 
had no separation of powers doctrine in the sense that American lawyers 
understand it today. The Crown simply had no powers that the legislature 
was bound to respect.82 The analogy to common law is almost exact. For 
instance, eighteenth-century students of English law learned, correctly, 
that “the law” required contracts to include at least a peppercorn in con-
sideration.83 But—notwithstanding aggressive statutory interpretation and 
occasional vague rumblings of judicial review84—they also learned that if 
“the common law and a statute differ, the common law gives place to the 
statute.”85 William Blackstone, whose landmark treatise on English law 
probably influenced the Founders more than any other single source,86 
                                                                                                                           
Parliament and the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English Crown, see generally Josh 
Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution (2017). 
 79. For a recent survey of this period, see generally Peter Ackroyd, Rebellion: The 
History of England from James I to the Glorious Revolution (2014). 
 80. See id. at 147–48 (parliamentary privileges); id. at 37–38, 175–77 (royal proclama-
tions); id. at 23–25 (judicial authority); id. at 243, 288 (parliamentary restrictions on the 
Crown). 
 81. See id. at 453–70. 
 82. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 83. Compare Pillans & Rose v. Van Mierop & Hopkins (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 
1038; 3 Burr. 1663, 1669–70 (KB) (challenging the doctrine), with Rann v. Hughes (1778) 
2 Eng. Rep. 18, 21; 4 Bro. PC 27, 30–31 (HL) (reaffirming it). 
 84. Closely related to the problem of parliamentary sovereignty vis-à-vis royal 
prerogative is the problem of parliamentary sovereignty vis-à-vis natural law. But with some 
exceptions, see Goldsworthy, supra note 72, at 6–21 & passim, the two issues are typically 
explored as separate questions. For a concise discussion of the historiography of the rela-
tionship between Parliament and natural or fundamental law, see Thomas C. Grey, Origins 
of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 
Stan. L. Rev. 843, 849–65 (1978); see also T.R.S. Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal 
Foundations of British Constitutionalism 135–62 (1993); J. W. Gough, Fundamental Law 
in English Constitutional History 80–97 (1955). 
 85. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *89. 
 86. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“Blackstone . . . constituted 
the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation . . . .”); Baude & 
Campbell, supra note 67, at 22 (listing Blackstone’s Commentaries among the “most 
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generalized the point: “[T]here is no court that has power to defeat the 
intent of the legislature, when couched in such evident and express 
words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the legislature or 
no.”87 Indeed, the English treatises taught that not just common law but 
all of English constitutional law existed only at the continued sufferance of 
Parliament: “[Parliament] can change and create afresh even the consti-
tution of the kingdom and of parliaments themselves . . . .”88 
                                                                                                                           
important English legal treatises” used by Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries); see also infra notes 188–189 and accompanying text.  
 87. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *91. For expressions of this view from both sides 
of the Founding debates, see, for example, Wilson, Summary of Objections to the 
Constitution, supra note 70, at 471 (“It has not been, nor, I presume, will it be denied, that 
somewhere there is, and of necessity must be, a supreme, absolute and uncontrollable 
authority. . . . Blackstone will tell you, that in Britain it is lodged in the British 
Parliament . . . .”); Agrippa XII, Mass. Gazette, Jan. 15, 1787, reprinted in 5 Documentary 
History, supra note 70, at 720, 722 (“A legislative assembly has an inherent right to alter 
the common law, and to abolish any of its principles, which are not particularly guarded in 
the constitution.”). For a concise discussion of both the original sources and the modern 
debate about Blackstone’s views on parliamentary supremacy, see John M. Finnis, Note, 
Blackstone’s Theoretical Intentions, 12 Nat. L.F. 163, 163 (1967) (“The methodology of 
the Commentaries has been ignored in recent discussion. But reflection on it establishes, 
contrary to received interpretations, both that Blackstone’s interest in natural law was real 
and sustained, and that his definition of municipal law was free from any reference to 
natural law.” (emphases omitted) (footnote omitted)). 
 88. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *161 (“[Parliament] can, in short, do every thing 
that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call it’s power, by 
a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament. True it is, that what the 
parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo.”); see also Henry Finch, A 
Description of the Common Laws of England bk. II, ch. I, at 59 (London, printed for A. 
Millar 1759) (offering a similar observation). See generally Julian Hoppit, A Land of 
Liberty?: England 1689–1727, at 50 (2000) (“[E]very political society had to have a final 
arbiter. Few dissented that in the English case absolute authority resided only in legislative 
action, that is the agreed deliberations of Crown, Peers . . . and Commons.”); Paul Langford, 
A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727–1783, at 704 (2010) (“It would be difficult 
to exaggerate the overwhelming importance of Parliament in eighteenth-century England, 
hackneyed though it is as a historical theme.”). 
This all led some commentators to conclude that England didn’t actually have a con-
stitution in any legally significant sense. See, e.g., Letter IV, in Four Letters on Interesting 
Subjects 18 (Philadelphia, Styner & Cist 1776) (“The truth is, the English have no fixed 
Constitution. . . . [T]he legislative power, which includes king, lords and commons, is 
under [no restrictions]; and whatever acts they pass are laws, be they ever so oppressive or 
arbitrary.”); Thomas Paine, Rights of Man 97–98 (Gregory Claeys ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 
1992) (1791) (arguing that the British political arrangement is “merely a form of govern-
ment without a constitution”); A Countryman II, New Haven Gazette, Nov. 22, 1787, 
reprinted in 3 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 471, 472 (“The famous English 
Magna Charta is but an act of Parliament, which every subsequent Parliament has had just 
as much constitutional power to repeal and annul as the Parliament which made it had to 
pass it at first.”); James Wilson, Speech at Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 24, 
1787) (Thomas Lloyd version), reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 350, 
361 (“The British constitution is just what the British Parliament pleases.”). 
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By the time of the American Revolution, this had long since been 
true of royal authority in particular.89 The previously sacrosanct jus regium 
of “dispensing with penall Lawes”90 was the first item in the crosshairs of 
the Bill of Rights that defined the Glorious Revolution.91 Starker still was 
the 1701 Act of Settlement’s dictation of succession92 and marriage 
rights,93 which even many pre–Civil War parliamentarians had under-
stood as “inseparable prerogatives of the Crown and king.”94 The seismic 
                                                                                                                           
 89. See, e.g., David Lieberman, The Mixed Constitution and the Common Law, in 
The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought 319 (Mark Goldie & 
Robert Wokler eds., 2006) (noting the persistence of Jacobitical dissent, but emphasizing 
the “near complacency mid-[eighteenth-]century commentators displayed in treating 
once fiercely contested issues concerning the nature and authority of England’s monarch 
and parliament”); see also Peter Jupp, The Governing of Britain 1688–1848, at 83–102 
(2006) (discussing the organic emergence of conventions around parliamentary suprem-
acy in the decades following the Glorious Revolution). 
 90. See Edward Bagshaw, The Rights of the Crown of England, as It Is Established by 
Law 114 (London, printed for Simon Miller 1660); cf. Case of Non Obstante, or 
Dispensing Power (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 1300, 1300; 12 Co. Rep. 18, 18 (KB) (“No Act can 
bind the King from any prerogative which is sole and inseparable to his person, but that 
he may dispense with it by a non obstante; . . . this solely and inseparably is annexed to his 
person; and this Royal power cannot be restrained by any Act of Parliament . . . .”). 
 91. See An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the 
Succession of the Crown (Bill of Rights) 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 2 (Eng.) (stating as its first 
substantive provision that “the pretended Power of Suspending of Laws or the Execution 
of Laws by Regall Authority without Consent of Parlyament is illegal”). In a discussion of 
the controversial approval in Godden v. Hales of James II’s Test Act dispensations, Sir 
Robert Atkyns noted that: 
[S]everal Acts of Parliament have been made in divers Cases, with 
express Clauses inserted in those Acts, to make void all Non obstante’s to 
the contrary of those Laws (which one would have thought would have 
been strong enough) and yet they all came to nothing: for the Judges 
heretofore have resolv’d that if the King grant a Dispensation from such 
Laws, with a Special Non obstante to any such Special Law, mentioning 
the very Law, that presently the force of that Law vanishes. 
Robert Atkyns, An Enquiry into the Power of Dispensing with Penal Statutes 5 (London, 
printed for Timothy Goodwin 2d ed. 1689). 
 92. See An Act for the Further Limitation of the Crown and Better Securing the 
Rights and Liberties of the Subject (Act of Settlement) 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2, § 1 
(Eng.) (“That the most Excellent Princess Sophia[,] Electress and Dutchess Dowager of 
Hannover . . . be and is hereby declared to be the next in Succession in the Protestant 
Line to the Imperiall Crown . . . .”). 
 93. See id. § 2 (prohibiting “all and every Person and Persons . . . who shall profess 
the Popish Religion or shall marry a Papist” from ascending the throne). 
 94. See Edward Coke, Speech in Parliament (Dec. 3, 1621), reprinted in 3 The 
Selected Writings of Sir Edward Coke 1213, 1213 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) [hereinafter 
Selected Writings of Coke] (“[I]nseparable prerogatives of the Crown and king. Marriage 
and leagues, war and peace, they are arcana imperii and not to be meddled with. If they 
were a petition of right that required an answer, I would never prefer it or give my consent 
to the preferring of it . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also Edward Coke, Conference with 
the Lords in the Painted Chamber (Mar. 8, 1621), reprinted in 3 Selected Writings of 
Coke, supra, at 1201, 1201 (“I will not meddle with the King’s prerogative, which is 
twofold: 1, absolute, as to make war, coin money, etc.; 2, or in things that concern meum et 
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implications of stripping such “prerogatives absolute” were well under-
stood; earlier generations’ search for a theory to justify and describe 
some essential core of indefeasible royal authority simply ended.95 This 
radical reworking of English parliamentary theory was thoroughgoing.96 
The prerogative was demystified.97 It was no longer subdivided into 
aspects that were indefeasible (“prerogative absolute,” “prerogative 
indisputable,” or “jus majestatis”) and those that were not (“prerogative 
disputable” or “jus praerogativae”).98 And it was shorn of its extralegal 
                                                                                                                           
tuum, and this may be disputed of in courts of parliament.” (footnote omitted)). It’s possi-
ble that the ambiguity of Coke’s formulations—“not to be meddled with” and “I will not 
meddle with”—was no accident. 
 95. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hall (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1047–48; 1 Cowp. 204, 
208–09 (KB) (recognizing full defeasibility of the king’s foreign affairs prerogative); see 
also, e.g., David Hume, Essay VI: Of the Independency of Parliament (1777) [hereinafter 
Hume, Independency of Parliament], reprinted in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary 42, 
44 (Eugene F. Miller ed., 1987) (“The share of power, allotted by our constitution to the 
house of commons, is so great, that it absolutely commands all the other parts of the gov-
ernment.”). Hume further explained that “though the king has a negative in framing 
laws[] . . . this, in fact, is esteemed of so little moment, that whatever is voted by the two 
houses, is always sure to pass into a law, and the royal assent is little better than a form.” Id. 
 96. Compare, e.g., Robert Filmer, The Free-holders Grand Inquest (1679) 
[hereinafter Filmer, The Free-holders Grand Inquest], reprinted in Patriarcha and Other 
Writings, supra note 12, at 100 (resting claims about the king’s powers on “invincible 
reason from the nature of monarchy itself, which must have the supreme power alone”), 
and Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 113–14 (dividing “Jus Regium” into “Jus Majestatis,” which 
“is that which belongs to him as King, common to him, with other Princes, by the Law of 
Nature and Nations” and “Jus Praerogativae,” which “is that which belongs to him as King 
of England, and given to him by that Law alone”), with Edward Coke, Speech in the 
Committee of the Whole House (Apr. 26, 1628), reprinted in 3 Selected Writings of Coke, 
supra note 94, at 1266, 1267–68. Coke dismissed of the concept of “intrinsical” preroga-
tive, which was, ostensibly, “entrusted [to the king] by God,” due “jure divino,” and was 
thus indefeasible by law: “[Those who use it] mean[] that intrinsical prerogative is not 
bounded by any law, or by any law qualified. [They say] we must admit this intrinsical 
prerogative an exempt prerogative, and so all our laws are out.” Id. (cautioning that “[w]e 
cannot yield to this”). For similar skepticisim of the divine right of kings, see Philip 
Hunton, A Treatise Of Monarchy pt. I, ch. I, § 1, at 3–4 (London, printed for Richard 
Baldwin 1689) [hereinafter Hunton, A Treatise of Monarchy] (denying a divine “scriptum 
est” for “the endowing this or that person . . . with Soveraignty over a Community”); 
Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government ch. I, § 1, at 4 (London, n. pub. 
1698) (describing the royalist position that the “[p]rerogative” was “[t]he Royal Charter 
granted to Kings by God”). 
 97. For more on the mystical aspects of the prerogative, see generally Ernst H. 
Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (1997); 
Francis Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant, and Order (1984); Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward 
White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American 
Implications, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 600–03 (2008). 
 98. See, e.g., Case of Non Obstante, or Dispensing Power (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 1300, 
1300–01; 12 Co. Rep. 18, 18–19 (KB) (“No [Act] can bind the King from any Prerogative 
which is sole and inseparable to his person . . . . [B]ut in things which are not incident 
solely and inseparably to the [King], but belong to every subject, and may be severed, an 
Act of Parliament may absolutely bind the King . . . .”); Case of Penal Statutes (1605) 77 
Eng. Rep. 465, 465; 7 Co. Rep. 36, 36 (KB) (“[T]his confidence and trust is so inseparably 
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pretensions.99 Following the lead of the parliamentarian jurist Edward 
Coke, English law had worked its way from the milder proposition that 
“the Common law hath so admeasured the prerogatives of the King, that 
they should not take away, nor prejudice the inheritance of any [man]”100 
                                                                                                                           
joined and annexed to the [King] in so high a point of sovereignty . . . for it was 
committed to the King by all his subjects for the good of the commonwealth.”); Edward 
Coke, Speech in the Committee of Grievances (Feb. 19, 1621) [hereinafter Coke, Speech 
in the Committee of Grievances], reprinted in 3 Selected Writings of Coke, supra note 94, 
at 1199 (“There is prerogative indisputable, and prerogative disputable. Prerogative indis-
putable, is that the king hath to make war: disputable prerogative is tied to the laws of 
England; wherein the king also hath divers prerogatives as nullum tempus.”); 2 Henry de 
Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England 166–67 (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel 
E. Thorne trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (“Those connected with justice [and] peace 
belong to no one save the crown alone and the royal dignity, nor can they be separated 
from the crown, since they constitute the crown . . . . [P]rivileges, . . . though they belong 
to the crown, may nevertheless be separated from it and transferred to private per-
sons . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). See generally Burgess, supra note 72, at 115–44, 161–62 
(describing Jacobean consensus regarding a “duplex view of kingship” grounded in the 
distinction between “legal (or ordinary) prerogative” and “absolute (or extraordinary) 
prerogative”). 
 99. Locke struck confusion into generations of American constitutional commenta-
tors by using the English legal term “prerogative” to name the discretionary conceptual 
space wherein governing magistrates under any system of social organization might 
sometimes need to go beyond the laws. See John Locke, The Second Treatise: An Essay 
Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government (1690) [hereinafter 
Locke, Second Treatise], reprinted in Two Treatises of Government and A Letter 
Concerning Toleration ch. XIV, §§ 159–168, at 171–75 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 
2003).  
In this regard, compare the Tory politician Bolingbroke’s narrowing of the Lockean 
formulation to include only unauthorized (rather than prohibited) action: “Q. What do’st 
thou mean by the Royal Prerogative? A. A Discretionary Power in the King to act for the Good 
of the People where the Laws are silent, never contrary to Law, and always subject to the 
Limitations of Law.” Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, The Freeholder’s Political 
Catechism 6 (London, printed for J. Roberts 1733) (second emphasis added). Locke, by 
contrast, had famously included both unauthorized and prohibited action within his 
definition. See Locke, Second Treatise, supra, § 160, at 172 (“This power to act according 
to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even 
against it, is that which is called prerogative . . . .”). Compare also the Earl of Strafford’s 
formulation when defending himself against charges of treason, in particular by arguing 
that he had been following the king’s command. See The Tryal of Thomas, Earl of 
Stafford: The Fourth Article (Mar. 26, 1641), in 8 John Rushworth, Historical Collections 
of Private Passages of State, Weighty Matters in Law, Remarkable Proceedings in Five 
Parliaments, 1618–1648, at 175, 182 (London, printed for John Wright & Richard Chiswell 
1680) (statement of the Earl of Strafford) [hereinafter Historical Collections] (“[T]he 
Prerogative, as long as it goes not against the Common Law . . . is the Law of the Land, 
and binds, as long as it transgresses not the Fundamental Law of the Land, being made 
provisionally for preventing . . . a Temporary Mischief, before an [Act] can give a 
Remedy.”). 
 100. See Case of Proclamations (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, 1353; 12 Co. Rep. 74, 75 
(KB) (“[T]he King by his Proclamation or other ways cannot change any part of the 
common law, or statute law, or the customs of the realm.”); see also Edward Coke, The 
Second Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England (1642), reprinted in 2 Selected 
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to the more radical conclusion that “the King hath no prerogative, but 
that which the law of the land allows him.”101 
Never again could a king say “you neither mean [to] nor can hurt 
My Prerogative.”102 To the contrary, William and Mary recognized the 
full implications of the Glorious Revolution by “solemnly Promis[ing]” at 
their coronation to “[g]overne the People of this Kingdome of England 
and the Dominions thereto belonging according to the Statutes in 
Parlyament Agreed on and the Laws and Customs of the same.”103 
Eighteenth-century legal commentators followed suit, contrasting the 
king’s “divers Prerogatives which the Law gives unto him” with the sover-
eign supremacy of Parliament’s “absolute Power in all Cases . . . to make 
Laws,” noting that “if the Parliament itself err, as it may, this may not be 
                                                                                                                           
Writings of Coke, supra note 94, at 745, 886 (“[T]he best inheritance that the Subject 
hath, is the Law of the Realme.”). 
 101. See Case of Proclamations, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1354; 12 Co. Rep. at 75. Even before the 
Glorious Revolution, Matthew Hale—no mild proponent of royal authority—was cau-
tiously but unmistakably embracing the point: 
[T]hose rights which the king hath are in him absolutely, perpetually 
and hereditarily, whereby as he or his issues inheritable cannot, upon 
any pretence whatsoever either of abuse in him or public good of the 
state, either be deprived of the whole power regal, which is a deposition, 
or of any spark of that gem, any prerogative or power which he hath in 
right of his regality, without his consent. 
Matthew Hale, The Prerogatives of the King 15 n.1 (D.E.C. Yale ed., Selden Soc’y 1976) 
[hereinafter Hale, Prerogatives of the King] (emphasis added). In other words, the king 
could not be deprived of his prerogative unless Parliament enacted a statute without his 
veto. See id. In his preface to the 1736 edition of Hale’s History of the Pleas of the Crown, 
legal writer Sollom Emlyn noted that upon Charles II’s reinstatement as monarch, Hale—
who was “no inconsiderable promoter” of the Restoration—was “not for making a surren-
der of all, and receiving the king without any restrictions; on the contrary he thought this 
an opportunity not to be lost for limiting the prerogative, and cutting off some useless 
branches, that served only as instruments of oppression.” Sollom Emlyn, Preface to 1 
Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae: The History of the Pleas of the Crown, at ii 
(London, E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 1736) [hereinafter Hale, History of the Pleas of the 
Crown]. 
The royalist Edward Bagshaw was to the same effect: “That this Kingly Government be 
according to the Laws of the Land, . . . by legal, not by arbitrary power.” See Bagshaw, 
supra note 90, at 101. Bagshaw argued that because the Crown was so “encircled with good 
Laws,” it was “scarce possible for a King of England to fall into Tyranny, for he neither 
speaketh, nor acteth, nor judgeth, nor executeth, but by his Writt, by his Laws, by his 
Judges, and Ministers, and both these sworne to him . . . to execute justice to his People.” 
Id. at 105. Accordingly, it was plain that the king—“in respect of his Duty and Office, in 
respect of his Oath, in respect of the Dignity and Honour of his Crown, and the good of 
his People”—would govern his people “by the Laws of the Land.” Id. at 122. 
 102. See Charles I, Response to the Petition of Right, 3 HL Jour. 841, 844 (June 7, 
1628) (emphasis added); see also HC Jour. 622 (Nov. 1601) (statement of Sir George 
Moore) (“We know the power of her Majesty cannot be restrained by any Act, why 
therefore should we thus talk? Admit we should make this Statute with a Non obstante, yet 
the Queen may grant a Patent with a Non obstante, to cross this Non obstante.”). 
 103. See An Act for Establishing the Coronation Oath 1688, 1 W. & M. c. 6, § 3 (Eng.). 
Thanks to Andrew Kent for this reference. 
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reversed in any Place but in Parliament.”104 Even political theorists who 
were generally sympathetic to monarchy felt no need to hedge: 
[T]hough in [the King’s] political capacity of one of the con-
stituent parts of the Parliament, that is, with regard to the share 
allotted to him in the legislative authority, the King is undoubt-
edly Sovereign, and only needs alledge his will when he gives or 
refuses his assent to the bills presented to him; yet, in the 
exercise of his powers of Government, he is no more than a 
Magistrate, and the laws, whether those that existed before him, 
or those to which, by his assent, he has given being, must direct 
his conduct, and bind him equally with his subjects.105 
This hard-won legacy of subjecting the Crown to the rule of law was 
key to the Founders’ self-image as heirs to a revolutionary tradition of lib-
erty, seized by “that patriotic spirit which prompted the illustrious English 
barons to extort Magna Charta from their tyrannical king, John.”106 How-
ever much the Founders otherwise disagreed, they tended to share the 
                                                                                                                           
 104. See Finch, supra note 88, bk. II, ch. I, at 57, 59 (footnote omitted). Oliver 
Goldsmith’s vision of the Long Parliament choosing which elements of prerogative to keep 
and which elements to chuck was typical: 
Hitherto we have seen the commons in some measure the patrons 
of liberty and of the people; boldly opposing the stretches of illegal 
power, or repressing those claims which, tho’ founded on custom, were 
destructive of freedom. . . . Had they been contented with resting here, 
after abridging all those privileges of monarchy which were capable of 
injuring the subject, and leaving it all those prerogatives that could 
benefit, they would have been considered as the great benefactors of 
mankind, and would have left the constitution pretty nearly on the same 
footing on which we enjoy it at present. 
3 Goldsmith, supra note 71, at 239. 
 105. Jean de Lolme, The Constitution of England bk. I, ch. IV, at 71 (London, printed 
for G. Robinson & J. Murray 4th ed. 1784) [hereinafter de Lolme, The Constitution of 
England]. In the original French, de Lolme wrote: 
Mais, au lieu qu’en sa capacité politique de l’un des ordres du 
parlement, c’est-à-dire, par rapport à la portion qui lui compète de la 
puissance législative, il est souverain, & n’allegue que sa volonté lorsqu’il 
donne ou refuse son consentement; chargé de l’administration publique, 
il n’est que magistrat, & les loix, soit celles qui existoient avant lui, soit 
celles auxquelles par son assentiment il a donné l’existence, doivent 
diriger sa conduite, & l’obligent aussi bien que ses sujets. 
1 Jean de Lolme, Constitution de l’Angleterre 65 (Geneva, Barde, Manget & Co. 1789) 
[hereainfter de Lolme, Constitution de l’Angleterre]. On Genevan and British political 
theorist Jean de Lolme’s monarchical sympathies, see Iain McDaniel, Jean-Louis DeLolme 
and the Political Science of the English Empire, 55 Hist. J. 21, 30–38 (2012). For typically 
stirring American rhetoric on this point, see Patrick Henry’s speech to the Virginia 
Ratifying Convention: “[I]f the King of England attempted to take away the rights of 
individuals, the law would stand against him.—The acts of Parliament would stand in his 
way—The Bill, and Declaration of Rights would be against him. The common law is 
fortified by the Bill of Rights.” Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention 
(June 19, 1788), reprinted in 10 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 1387, 1394. 
 106. See Tar and Feathers, Indep. Gazetteer (Philadelphia), Oct. 2, 1787, reprinted in 
2 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 152, 153. 
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view that the spirit of parliamentary liberty was less corrupted in the New 
World than in the home country and to think any new government would 
be measured by its ability to embody and protect that spirit.107 
B. The Execution Problem 
On this historical backdrop, the legal and political theory on Madison’s 
bookshelf was as varied and quarrelsome as the Founding generation 
itself. Within the array of contested values and competing priorities, it is 
hard to identify any single concern as dominant. But the need for vigor-
ous execution of the law loomed especially large. That was certainly true 
in the ineffective politics of the post-revolutionary Confederation. And it 
was every bit as central to the writings on Madison’s bookshelf. 
A longstanding challenge for governance theorists was the problem 
of closing the gap between law and reality. Like the classical philoso-
phy108 and Christian theology109 on which it drew, English jurisprudence 
                                                                                                                           
 107. See Bailyn, supra note 61, at 122–43; Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, supra note 
67, at 506–47; Wood, supra note 50, at 91–124. For an account emphasizing the Founders’ 
interest in establishing an independent executive branch, see Eric Nelson, The Royalist 
Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding 184–203 (2014). 
 108. E.g., Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea bk. X, in 9 The Works of Aristotle 1172a, 1179a 
(W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (“[A]rguments . . . are not able to encourage the 
many to nobility and goodness. For these do not by nature obey the sense of shame, but 
only fear, and do not abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but through fear of 
punishment . . . . What argument would remould such people?”); Plato, Laws bk. III, in 5 
The Dialogues of Plato 676, 689 (London, B. Jowett trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 
1892) (“[W]hen the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or reason, . . . that I call 
folly, just as . . . when the multitude refuses to obey their rulers and the laws; or, . . . in the 
individual, when fair reasonings have their habitation in the soul and yet do . . . the 
reverse of good.”). 
 109. Punishment for violating God’s law was a central concern in the first Anglo-American 
Great Awakening. See, e.g., Jonathan Edwards, God’s Sovereignty in the Salvation of Men, 
in 8 The Works of President Edwards with a Memoir of His Life 105, 110 (New York, S. 
Converse 1830) [hereinafter Works of Edwards] (“The justice of God requires the punish-
ment of sin.”); Jonathan Edwards, Safety Fullness, and Sweet Refreshment, to Be Found in 
Christ, in 8 Works of Edwards, supra, at 355, 359 (“Every jot and tittle of the law must be 
fulfilled, heaven and earth shall be destroyed, rather than justice should not take place; 
there is no possibility of sin’s escaping justice.”); John Wesley, Upon Our Lord’s Sermon 
on the Mount: Discourse 1, in 5 The Works of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M. 247, 247–48 
(London, John Mason 3d ed. 1829) (“[T]he Lord our Governor, whose kingdom is from 
everlasting, and ruleth over all; the great Lawgiver, who can well enforce all his laws, being 
‘able to save and to destroy,’ yea, to punish . . . .”). 
Relatedly, the uncertain relationship between sin and consequence was one of the 
oldest and hardest problems of Judeo–Christian theology: 
According to the Will of a Legislator God cannot permit Sin: For that would be, 
as if he should declare Sin to be Lawful, which implies a Contradiction. 
But God as Decreeing Events does at least permit Sin; that is, he does not 
do all he can to hinder it from being. . . . [A]ll Laws are about possible 
things. But God that he may execute his Decreeing Will, prepares and sets in 
order the Means. 
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had long marked a distinction between law’s content in theory and its 
enforcement on the ground. By the Founding Era, the classic English 
formulation was summarized in Matthew Hale’s pathbreaking treatise: 
[W]e must observe a threefold effect of law. (1) The obligation 
on conscience. (2) The penalty. (3) The irritation or making 
void of an act done contrary to the direction of the law. The first 
proceeds from the directive power of the law; the two latter from 
the coercive power of the law.110 
This distinction between directive and coercive (or “coactive”) power 
had long been central to discussions of governance and administra-
tion.111 Directive power was understood as that quality of rules which 
makes them legally binding on their objects. But both in theory112 and in 
                                                                                                                           
Samuel Pufendorf, The Divine Feudal Law: Or, Covenants with Mankind, Represented 
§ 71, at 159–63 (Simone Zurbuchen ed., Theophilus Dorrington trans., 2002) (1695) 
(quoting Pierre Jurieu, De Pace inter Protestantes ineunda consultatio (Utrecht, 1688)); 
see also St. Augustin, The City of God bk. 1, ch. 8, in 2 A Select Library Of The Nicene and 
Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church 1, 5 (Buffalo, Philip Schaff ed., Marcus Dods 
trans., Christian Literature Co. 1887) (“For if every sin were now visited with manifest 
punishment, nothing would seem to be reserved for the final judgment; on the other hand, 
if no sin received now a plainly divine punishment, it would be concluded that there is no 
divine providence at all.”); Job 38:2, 4 (King James) (“Who is this that darkeneth counsel 
by words without knowledge? . . . Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? 
[D]eclare, if thou hast understanding.”). 
 110. Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 176; see also id. at 14 (“There are 
three powers in laws, (1) Potestas coercens or coactiva. (2) Potestas directiva, [and (3) Potestas] 
irritans actus contrarios.” (alterations in original)). The “irritans” power included the ability 
of courts to refuse to give effect to unlawful acts, including those of the Crown. See, e.g., 
Henry Parker, Observations upon Some of His Majesties Late Answers and Expresses 44 
(n.p., n. pub. 1642) (“[I]n all irregular acts where no personall force is, Kings may be diso-
beyed, their unjust commands may be neglected, not only by communities, but also by 
single men sometimes.”). While Hale’s works on royal power appear not to have been 
published until the twentieth century, they were kept in the library at Lincoln’s Inn where 
they served as a standard teaching and research reference for many, including Blackstone, 
who cited Hale extensively. See Introduction to Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 
101, at ix–xi, lvix–lxi. Their influence might be analogized to that of the Hart & Wechsler 
teaching materials before their publication. 
 111. Thomas Aquinas was a standard referent in the English discourse: 
The sovereign is said to be “exempt from the law,” as to its coercive 
power; since[] . . . law has no coercive power save from the authority of the 
sovereign. . . . [This does not mean that] the sovereign is . . . exempt from 
the law, as to its directive force; but [that] he should fulfil it to his own 
free-will and not of constraint. 
See Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica pt. I-II, question 96, art. 5, Reply to 
Objection 3, at 2327 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. ed. 
1947), digitized in Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Christian Classics Ethereal 
Library n.d.). 
 112. The classic example was the Crown. Henry Parker observed that “[t]he King as to 
His own person, is not to be forcibly repelled in any ill doing, nor is He accountable for ill 
done, Law has only a directive, but no coactive force upon his person . . . .” Parker, supra 
note 110, at 44. Similarly, Hale noted that the king was regularly “bound in conscience to 
observe all such laws as either by the common law or statutes extend[ed] to him.” Hale, 
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practice,113 not all rules can be enforced against the people to whom they 
are directed. As the leading seventeenth-century theorist of royal power 
put it, “[g]overnment as to coactive power was after sin, because coaction 
supposeth some disorder, which was not in the state of innocency.”114 The 
problem of disobedience thus required government to have not only the 
power to formulate rules directing people’s behavior but also the power 
to force people to comply. 
In addition to a power of making rules, then, any not-perfectly-virtuous 
society required a power of enforcing rules—a power of execution. 
Bracton, the great medieval English treatise, was unequivocal: “[I]t is 
useless to establish laws unless there is someone to enforce them.”115 The 
immensely influential Coke exhorted similarly in his much-admired 
Charge at the Norwich Assizes: “The life and strength of the Laws, 
consisteth in the execution of them: For in vaine are just lawes Inacted, if 
not justly executed.”116 This observation became a standard opening move 
for virtually any ambitious discussion of law and government.117 Prolific 
                                                                                                                           
Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 176. However, the king was “not subject to the 
penalty of law, at least where the penalty [was] personal” and so “acts by him done or 
omitted contrary to the tenor of those laws or customs” made him “not liable to any per-
sonal loss or damage.” Id. at 177. 
 113. See, for example, your local highway. 
 114. Filmer, The Anarchy, supra note 12, at 145. As for the directive power, Filmer 
observed that “the condition of human nature requires it, since civil society cannot be 
imagined without power of government.” Id. As long as “men continued in the state of 
innocency,” they might not “need the direction of Adam in those things which were 
necessarily and morally to be done, yet things indifferent—that depended merely on their 
free will—might be directed by the power of Adam’s command.” Id. 
From the opposite end of the political spectrum, Parker invoked a similarly Christian 
theological framework to make the same point: 
Man being depraved by the fall of Adam grew so untame and uncivill a 
creature, that the Law of God written in his brest was not sufficient to 
restrayne him from mischiefe, . . . and therefore without some magis-
tracy to provide new orders, and to judge of old, and to execute accord-
ing to justice, no society could be upheld, without society men could not 
live, and without lawes men could not be sociable, and without authority 
somewhere invested, to judge according to Law, and execute according 
to judgement, Law was a vaine and void thing . . . . 
Parker, supra note 110, at 13. 
 115. 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 166; see also id. at 19 (“[I]f laws fail, justice will be 
extirpated . . . .”); id. at 304 (“Nor does it suffice [for a judge] to have jurisdiction unless 
he has the power of coercion . . . .”). For a terrific overview of the historiography on the 
treatise known as Bracton, see Thomas McSweeney, English Judges and Roman Jurists: The 
Civilian Learning Behind England’s First Case Law, 84 Temp. L. Rev. 827, 831–36 (2012). 
 116. Edward Coke, Speech and Charge at the Norwich Assizes (1607) [hereinafter Coke, 
Speech and Charge at the Norwich Assizes], reprinted in 2 Selected Writings of Coke, supra 
note 94, at 523, 554. 
 117. See, e.g., Cesare Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments 5 (London, printed 
for J. Almon 1767) (“Laws are the conditions, under which men, naturally independent, 
united themselves in society.”); id. at 6 (“But it was not sufficient only to establish [laws]; it 
was also necessary to defend [them] . . . . Some motives . . . were necessary[] to prevent 
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writer Daniel Defoe’s formulation serves well as a précis of conventional 
eighteenth-century wisdom: “[T]he Vigour of the Laws consists in their 
Executive Power; Ten thousand Acts of Parliament signify no more than 
One single Proclamation, unless the Gentlemen, in whose hands the 
Execution of those Laws is placed, take care to see them duly made use 
of . . . .”118 
Metaphors for the point were varied and colorful: the motion of bod-
ies, the speaking of thoughts, and the voicing of melodies. The famous 
cartoon Leviathan on the frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes’s masterwork 
drew on a long tradition of such corporeal imagery, 119  its author 
describing “Publique Ministers . . . that have Authority . . . to procure the 
Execution of Judgements given” as providing “service, answerable to that 
of the Hands in a Bodie naturall.”120 Other commentators deployed more 
                                                                                                                           
the despotism of each individual from plunging society into its former chaos. Such 
motives are the punishment established against the infractors of the laws.”); 2 Jean Jacques 
Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law pt. III, ch. IV, at 416–17 (Peter 
Korkman ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2006) (1748) (“[T]he right of execut-
ing . . . [laws], and . . . punishing [violators], belongs originally to society in general, and 
to each individual in particular; otherwise . . . laws, which nature and reason impose on 
man, would be entirely useless . . . if no body had the power of putting them in execution, 
or of punishing [their] violation.”); John Cowell, The Institutes of the Lawes of England 2 
(London, Tho. Roycroft 1651) [hereinafter Cowell, Institutes] (“[I]t is requisite likewise, 
[t]hat there be Magistrates ordained, [so that] the Lawes may be put in execution; for it 
were to little purpose that there should be Lawes, if there were not some to govern by 
those Lawes.”); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 147–48 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1996) (1651) (“Lawes are of no power to protect them, without a Sword in the hands 
of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution.”); Henry Home, Lord 
Kames, The Hereditary and Indefeasible Right of Kings, in Essays upon Several Subjects 
Concerning British Antiquities 193 (Edinburgh, printed for A. Kincaid 1747) (“A Society 
of any Extent cannot be without Government. The Members must have Laws to determine 
their Differences, and they must have Rulers to put their Laws in Execution.”); Samuel von 
Pufendorf, De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem bk. II, ch. XI, at 122 
(James Brown Scott ed., Frank Gardner Moore trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1927) (1682) 
[hereinafter Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen] (“[I]t is in vain that laws are 
passed, if the rulers allow them to be violated with impunity, it is accordingly their duty to 
have charge of the execution of the same . . . .”); Samuel Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature 
and of Nations in Eight Books bk. VII, ch. 4, reprinted in The Political Writings of Samuel 
Pufendorf 93, 223 (Craig L. Carr ed., Michael J. Seidler trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) 
[hereinafter Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations] (“[P]assing laws which you are 
unable to put into effect is a hollow exercise . . . .”). 
 118. Daniel Defoe, The Poor Man’s Plea 23 (London, printed for A. Baldwin 2d ed. 
1698). Defoe further argued that without the “[c]oncurrence” of the English gentry, 
which had an important role in the execution of law, all “the Laws, Proclamations, and 
Declarations in the World [would] have no Effect.” Id. 
 119. See Hobbes, supra note 117, at 2 fig.2. 
 120. Id. at 169. For more examples of prominent treatise writers using corporeal meta-
phors for both law and government, see Jean Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonweale 7 
(London, Richard Knolles trans., printed for G. Bishop 1606) (“[A] commonweale cannot 
long stand if it be . . . destitute of those . . . things necessary for the life of man; no more 
than can a man long live whose mind is so strongly ravished with the contemplation of 
high things, that he forgetteth to eate or drinke . . . .”); John Davies, A Report of Cases and 
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musical analogies, observing that “lawes without execucion, be no more 
profitable, than belles without clappers,”121 or that “the Law . . . is indeed 
an excellent Instrument to make harmony and concord in the 
Commonwealth: but the best Lute that ever was made could never make 
musick of it self alone, without the learned hand of the Lute-player.”122 
The point was visceral: The laws must “follow every subject, as the shadow 
follows the body”123—for “what a livelesse fond thing would Law be, 
without any judge to determine it, or power to enforce it . . . ?”124 
The legal and political writings inherited by the Founders were fairly 
obsessed with execution. The treatise known as Bracton returned metro-
nomically to the pairing of judgment and execution—in both practical125 
and jurisdictional126 terms. Later authors likewise framed their inquiries 
                                                                                                                           
Matters in Law, Resolved and Adjudged in the King’s Courts in Ireland 23–24 (Dublin, 
printed for Sarah Cotter 1762) [hereinafter Davies, Report of Cases in Ireland] (“Again, 
the Law is nothing else but a Rule which is made to measure the actions of men. But a 
Rule is dead, and measures nothing, unless the hand of the Architect do apply it.”); Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract bk. III, ch. 11, at 135 (Maurice Cranston trans., 
Penguin Books 1968) (1762) (“The legislative power is the heart of the state, the executive 
power is the brain, which sets all the parts in motion. The brain may become paralysed 
and the individual still live[] . . . but as soon as his heart stops functioning, the creature is 
dead.”). 
 121. John Ponet, A Shorte Treatise of Politike Power 6 (n.p., n. pub. 1556); see also 
Johannes Althusius, Politica 177 (Frederick S. Carney ed. & trans., Liberty Fund 1995) 
(1617) (“Law should be accurately and precisely executed. For law without execution is 
like a bell without a clapper. It would be as if the magistrate were mute or dead.”). 
 122. Davies, Report of Cases in Ireland, supra note 120, at 23–24. 
 123. Beccaria, supra note 117, at 147. 
 124. Parker, supra note 110, at 13–14. Theologian John Bramhall also described the 
operation of laws in a Hobbesian state of nature when he wrote that Hobbes: 
maketh the laws of nature to be laws and no laws: Just as a man and no 
man, hit a bird and no bird, with a stone and no stone, on a tree and no tree: 
not laws but theorems, laws which required not performance but endeavours, 
laws which were silent, and could not be put in execution in the state of 
nature. 
John Bramhall, The Catching of Leviathan, or the Great Whale, in Castigations of Mr. 
Hobbes: His Last Animadversions in the Case Concerning Liberty and Universal Necessity 
449, 569 (London, E.T. 1658). 
 125. See 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 308 (“[Justice’s] jurisdiction is extended to all 
matters necessary to determine the suit, so far as judgment and the execution of judgment 
are concerned . . . .”); 4 Bracton, supra note 98, at 278 (“In civil causes . . . it seems that 
clerks may not save themselves from answering in the secular forum in pleas which belong 
to the crown and dignity of the king, because the king can order execution of the judg-
ment without prejudice to the ecclesiastical dignity . . . .”). 
 126. See 3 Bracton, supra note 98, at 46 (“The plaint ought to be made to him who 
has jurisdiction, as the prince, and not to everyone who has jurisdiction unless he also has 
coertion, so that he may order execution of his judgment.”). However, “ecclesiastics,” 
according to Bracton, “though they have jurisdiction in some matters . . . have neither cog-
nisance nor coertion with respect to lay fee.” Id. If ecclesiastics “demanded execution [by 
the sheriff], the sheriff would disobey them with imputiny . . . .” Id. (alteration in origi-
nal); see also 4 Bracton, supra note 98, at 249 (“Of spiritual and temporal things and their 
accessories . . . which must be determined in the ecclesiastical forum . . . and in the same 
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as an exploration of administrative mechanisms for putting parchment 
law into effect. The introduction to the jurist and politician John Davies’s 
seminal work on Irish common law celebrated the king, not so much for 
his majesty’s gracious gift of English law to the lucky nation of Ireland as 
for creating an administrative apparatus to implement it.127 Coke pref-
aced the first volume of his Reports by explaining that its publication was 
prompted “when [he] considered how by her Majesties princely care and 
choice, her Seates of Justice have beene ever for the due execution of her 
Lawes.” 128  And Francis Bacon’s Elements of Common Law was framed 
around an appeal to a set of royal reforms—compared by the author to 
those of the Byzantine emperor Justinian129—aimed at facilitating the 
execution of law.130 This idea recurs persistently in legal treatises,131 
                                                                                                                           
way if a plea is sued in the secular forum . . . cognisance of the principal matter will not . . . 
belong to the ecclesiastical judge.”); 4 Richard Burn, The Justice of the Peace and Parish 
Officer 42 (London, W. Strahan & W. Woodfall 15th ed. 1785) [hereinafter Burn, Justice 
of the Peace and Parish Officer] (offering a similar observation on the pairing of judg-
ment and execution). 
 127. See Davies, Report of Cases in Ireland, supra note 120, at 1 (“King John made the 
first division of Counties in Ireland, published the Laws of England, . . . commanded the 
due execution thereof[,] . . . [and] erected the courts of justice . . . .”). To that end, and to 
“put English Laws in execution [in Ireland],” the King “brought with him many learned 
persons in the law, and other Officers and Ministers of all sorts . . . .” Id. 
 128. Edward Coke, Preface to Part One of the Reports (1660), reprinted in 1 Selected 
Writings of Coke, supra note 94, at 5; see also Edward Coke, Preface to Part Nine of the 
Reports (1613) [hereinafter Coke, Preface to Part Nine of the Reports], reprinted in 1 
Selected Writings of Coke, supra note 94, at 291 (describing the constitutional law of 
England as structured around the goal “[t]hat the Subject might be kept from offending, 
that is, that Offences might be prevented both by good and provident Laws and by the due 
Execution thereof”). 
 129. See Francis Bacon, The Elements of the Common Laws of England (1630) 
[hereinafter Bacon, The Common Law], reprinted in Lord Bacon’s Law Tracts 24–25 
(London, printed for D. Browne 2d ed. 1741) (“The same desire long after did spring in 
the Emperor Justinian . . . who[,] having peace in the heart of his Empire . . . chose it for a 
monument and honour of his government[] to revisit the Roman lawes from infinite vol-
umes . . . into one competent and uniform corps of laws.”). 
 130. See id. at 26 (“Your Majesty’s reign having been blessed from the highest with 
inward peace, and falling into an age, wherein if science be increased, conscience is rather 
decayed, and if mens wits be great, their wills be greater, and wherein also laws are 
multiplied in number, and slackened in vigour and execution . . . .”). Bacon’s constitu-
tional survey of English government focuses on the various actors’ power “to execute” law 
and justice. See id. at 109–63 (explaining the powers and duties of the sheriffs, hundreds, 
justices of the peace, and judges of the assizes); see also Francis Bacon, New Atlantis 
(1627) [hereinafter Bacon, New Atlantis], reprinted in Francis Bacon: A Selection of His 
Works 417, 439 (Sidney Warhaft ed., Macmillan Publ’g Co. 1985) (“The governor assisteth, 
to the end to put in execution by his public authority the decrees and orders . . . .”). 
 131. See, e.g., John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae 80 (Cambridge, A. Amos 
ed., Cambridge University 1825) (1775) (“[T]he King’s Sheriff . . . executes within his 
county all mandates and judgments of the King’s Court of Justice . . . .”); cf. 3 Burn, Justice 
of the Peace and Parish Officer, supra note 126, at 1–35 (“Justices of the peace are 
judges of record, appointed by the king . . . for the conservation of the peace, and for the 
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reported case law,132 and theoretical writings,133 and eighteenth-century 
statute books were dotted with provisions aimed at “the more effectual 
execution of . . . Laws.”134 
C. Execution: The King’s Defining Role 
The practical need for a constitutional cudgel was obvious. Luckily 
for the English, they had one ready at hand: the king.135 The standard 
formulation emphasized that “[t]o rule well a king requires two things, 
arms and laws, that by them both times of war and of peace may be right-
ly ordered. For each stands in need of the other.”136 The English treatise 
writers tended understandably to focus on the second: 
For this is true freedome in a Prince, to be loved at home, and 
feared abroad, to be able to defend his own people at home 
from oppression and violence by his Laws, without the help of 
an Army; to keep and conserve all his Subjects in happy peace, 
by a sword made of Parchment and Paper in his Laws, and not 
by a Sword made up of Iron and Steel in his Armies.137 
                                                                                                                           
execution of divers things comprehended within their commission, and within divers 
statutes committed to their charge.”). 
 132. See, e.g., Calvin’s Case, or the Case of the Postnati (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 391; 
7 Co. Rep. 1 a, 12 a (KB) (“So in our usual commission of assise, of gaol delivery, of oyer 
and terminer, of the peace, &c. power is given to execute justice . . . .”); The Chamberlain 
of London’s Case (1590) 77 Eng. Rep. 150, 151; 5 Co. Rep. 62 b, 63 a (KB) 
(“[O]rdinances, constitutions, or by-laws are allowed by the law, which are made for the 
true and due execution of the laws or statutes of the realm, or for the well government 
and order of the body incorporate.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Helvetius, Essays on the Mind and its Several Faculties 139 (London, n. 
pub. 1759) (“[L]aws made for the happiness of all would be observed by none, if the 
magistrates were not armed with the power necessary to put them in execution.”). 
 134. E.g., 1773, 13 Geo. 3 c. 31, § 4 (Gr. Brit.) (expanding personal jurisdiction in 
larceny cases); see also 1786, 26 Geo. 3 c. 82, § 6 (Gr. Brit.) (revising standards of proof in 
tax-evasion cases). 
 135. Or Queen, faute de mieux. 
 136. 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 19 (“If arms fail against hostile and unsubdued ene-
mies, then will the realm be without defense; if laws fail, justice will be extirpated; nor will 
there be any man to render just judgment.”); see also Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince 51 
(Daniel Donno ed. & trans., Bantam Books 1966) (1513) [hereinafter Machiavelli, The 
Prince] (“The two most essential foundations for any state, whether it be old or new, or 
both old and new, are sound laws and sound military forces.”). Thanks to John Hudson for 
pointing out that this formulation appears to date at least to Justinian’s Institutes, still well 
known in the eighteenth century. See D. Justiniani, Institutionum bk. IV, at 1 (George 
Harris trans., London, printed for C. Bathurst & E. Withers 1756) (“The imperial dignity 
should be supported by arms, and guarded by laws, that the people, in time of peace as 
well as war, may be secured from dangers and rightly governed.”). 
 137. Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 104; see also Fortescue, supra note 131, at 2–3 (“[A]s 
you divert and employ yourself so much in feats of arms, so I could wish to see you zeal-
ously affected towards the study of the laws; because, as wars are decided by the sword, so 
the determination of justice is effected by the laws . . . .”) (footnote omitted); Ranulf de 
Glanville, A Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Kingdom of England, at xxxvi 
(London, J. Beames trans., A.J. Valpy 1812) (“The Regal Power should not merely be 
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The king’s role in creating and interpreting law was one of seventeenth-
century England’s most hotly disputed constitutional controversies.138 But 
when it came to its execution, everyone agreed that the king—or some-
one like him—was indispensable:139 
[Y]our Majesty is in a double respect the life of our Laws; once, 
because without your authority they are but litera mortua; and 
again because you are the life of our peace, without which laws 
are put to silence, and as the vital spirits do not only maintain 
and move the body, but also contend to perfect and renew it; so 
your sacred Majesty, who is anima legis, doth not only give unto 
your laws force and vigour but also hath bin careful of their 
amendment and reforming . . . .140 
As Chief Justice of the King’s Bench Thomas Billing explained in the 
fifteenth century, “[I]t pertains to every king by reason of his office to do 
justice and grace, justice in executing the laws, &c, and grace in granting 
pardon to felons . . . .”141 To suggest otherwise was to misunderstand the 
office: “[W]hat is the King himself, but the clear Fountain of Justice? 
[A]nd what are the Professors of the Law but the Conduit-pipes deriving 
and conveying the streams of his Justice to all the subjects of his several 
Kingdoms?”142 
                                                                                                                           
decorated with Arms to restrain Rebels and Nations making head against it and its realm, 
but ought likewise to be adorned with Laws for the peaceful governing of its Subjects and 
its People.”). Of course, the reality didn’t always live up to the aspiration. See, e.g., Jupp, 
supra note 89, at 6 (noting the spotty nature of law enforcement as actually exercised at the 
local level). 
 138. See, e.g., Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 76 (“[N]ever any Bill passed in Parliament 
for a Law (the King being within the Realme) by the Lords and Commons alone, without 
the Kings personall assent in Parliament to the Bill, as he that gave life and being to the 
Law . . . .”). 
 139. See, e.g., Althusius, supra note 121, at 177 (“[C]ommonwealths thrive only so 
long as good laws, which are the soul of a commonwealth, are respected in them. The 
magistrate has been constituted for the sake of executing law, and in this sense he is a liv-
ing law . . . .”); John Milton, A Defence of the People of England (1692) [hereinafter 
Milton, Defence of the English People], reprinted in 2 The Prose Works of John Milton 5, 
106 (Philadelphia, John W. Moore 1847) (“[T]he parliament is the supreme council of the 
nation, constituted and appointed by a most free people, and armed with ample power 
and authority . . . to consult together upon the most weighty affairs of the kingdom; the 
king was created to put their laws in execution.”); William Camden, Discourse Concerning 
the Prerogative of the Crown (1617), in Frank Smith Fussner, William Camden’s “Discourse 
Concerning the Prerogative of the Crown,” 101 Proc. Am. Phil. Soc’y 204, 213 (1957) 
(“Next to the making of laws the execution of them is the most material, which wholly 
dependeth upon the king, no man having any authority to put any thing into execution 
but as his deputy . . . .”). 
 140. Bacon, The Common Law, supra note 129, at 23–24. 
 141. 1 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, supra note 101, at 102 (quoting Chief 
Justice Thomas Billing in In re Bagot’s Case, YB 9 Edw. 4, fol. 1b (1469) (Eng.)). 
 142. Davies, Report of Cases in Ireland, supra note 120, at 21; see also Bagshaw, 
supra note 90, at 56 (noting that “the regard the Law hath to the person of the Supreame 
Governour, esteeming him the Head of the Law, and the Fountain of Justice”); 2 Bracton, 
supra note 98, at 167 (“For to do justice, [give] judgment and preserve the peace is the 
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The king’s centrality to the execution of law was practical, to be sure. 
But it had significant theoretical consequences too—reflected in a num-
ber of legal doctrines that turned on the Crown’s institutional role in 
“giving life to law.” For one thing, to be out of the king’s protection was 
to be legally defenseless: 
[F]or the law and the king’s writs be the things[] by which a 
man is protected and holpen; and so, during the time that a 
man in such case is out of the king’s protection, he is out of 
helpe and protection by the king’s Law, or by the king’s writ.143 
This was true not only for those who physically departed the realm but also 
for anyone expelled from the body politic in a metaphorical sense, as by 
a praemunire facias.144 Even ritual formulations (“The King is dead; long 
live the King!”) recognized that interregnum meant the death of law: “[I]t 
is a general uncontested Rule, That upon the Death of a King in actual 
Possession of the Crown, his Heir is a King . . . before his Coronation[,] 
for without a King to execute the Laws, Justice must fail[,] and therefore 
it is a Maxim[,] that the King never dies.”145 
                                                                                                                           
crown[,] without which it can neither subsist nor endure.” (first alteration in original)); 
Coke, Speech and Charge at the Norwich Assizes, supra note 116, at 530–31 (“To Kings, 
Rulers, Judges, and Magistrates, this sentence is proper: Vos Dii estis; you are Gods on 
earth: when by your execution of Justice and Judgement, the God of heaven is by your 
actions represented . . . .”). For a colonial example distinguishing “the executive power” 
from other branches of prerogative and noting of the king that “possessing the executive 
power of the laws, it is his peculiar duty to see such act carried into execution,” see, for 
example, Godwin v. Lunan, Jeff. 96 (Gen. Ct. Va. 1771) (recording counsel’s argument in 
a  case brought by churchwardens and vestrymen against a licentious minister). 
 143. 1 Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England; or, a 
Commentary upon Littleton bk. 2, ch. 11, § 199, at 129b (Francis Hargrave & Charles 
Butler eds., London, Luke Hansard & Sons 16th ed. 1809) (1628) [hereinafter Coke on 
Littleton]. Hobbes gave this formulation a nasty twist, at least from the king’s perspective: 
“The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, 
than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.” Hobbes, supra note 117, at 
153. For an even more daring version, see the doctrinally-sound-but-common-sense-
deficient treason convict quoted in Hale’s The History of the Pleas of the Crown: “[T]he king 
being convicted by the pope may be lawfully slaughtered by any whatsoever, for this is the 
execution of the supreme sentence of the pope, as the other is the execution of the law.” 1 
Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, supra note 101, at 117 (emphasis omitted). 
 144. See 1 Coke on Littleton, supra note 143, bk. 2, ch. 11, § 199, at 130a (“The judge-
ment in a praemunire is[] that the defendant shall be . . . out of the king’s protection, and 
his lands and tenements, goods and chattels forfeited to the king, and that his body shall 
remaine in prison at the king’s pleasure.”). The praemunire facias offense was “[s]o 
odious” that “[an attained man] might have bin slaine . . . without danger of law.” Id. 
 145. 1 William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown: Or a System of the 
Principal Matters Relating to That Subject, Digested Under Their Proper Heads ch. 17, 
§ 19, at 36 (London, Eliz. Nutt 1716) [hereinafter Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown]; see also 
Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England: Concerning High 
Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown, and Criminal Causes (1644), reprinted in 2 
Selected Writings of Coke, supra note 94, at 944, 963–64 (“[T]he Crown descend to the 
rightfull heire, he is Rex before Coronation: for by the Law of England there is no 
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The king’s role as the executor of law was so conceptually central to 
his identity that it was literally criminal to disrespect it. Thus, to refuse a 
royal request for assistance with the execution of law was to commit a 
misprision contempt against the king’s prerogative.146 It was also a crime, 
not only to accuse the king of failing to execute the law but even simply 
to suggest that he might not be doing so with sufficient vigor.147 It was no 
accident that the first item in Parliament’s Grand Remonstrance com-
plained about King Charles I’s failure to provide for “the due execution 
of those good laws which have been made for securing the liberty of your 
subjects.”148 
D. Toward a Separation of Powers 
Whatever the virtues of kingship as a solution to the execution prob-
lem, it didn’t take a spitefully anti-Catholic legislature to notice that the 
Crown came with some serious problems as well. One was the possibility 
that the king might be too hasty. Energy was good, but it had to be 
bridled, and its enthusiasms tamed—or at least carefully directed. In a 
carefully abstract vein, the politically conservative Bacon cautioned: 
[B]oldness is ever blind; for it seeth not dangers and 
inconveniences. Therefore it is ill in counsel, good in execu-
tion; so that the right use of bold persons is that they never 
command in chief, but be seconds and under the direction of 
others. For in counsel it is good to see dangers, and in execu-
tion not to see them, except they be very great.149 
                                                                                                                           
interregnum: . . . for by the law there is alwayes a King, in whose name the lawes are to be 
maintained, and executed, otherwise Justice should faile.”). 
 146. See Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 268–70 (“[T]he king 
hath . . . [a] power of commanding the person of any man  . . . [i]n reference to the public 
service of the kingdom, . . . [either] (1) In point of advice, (2) In point of office or service, 
[or] (3) In point of defence or safety.”); 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, supra note 145, 
ch. 22, § 1, at 59 (explaining that misprisions not amounting to “misprision of treason” 
include “[r]efusing to assist the King for the Good of the Public[]” and “[d]isobeying the 
King’s lawful Commands”). 
 147. See 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, supra note 145, ch. 23, §§ 1–2, at 60 (explaining 
that it was a “contempt[] against the King’s Person or Government” to “charg[e] the 
Government with . . . weak Administration”). 
 148. See The Grand Remonstrance, with the Petition Accompanying It (Dec. 1, 1641), 
reprinted in The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625–1660, at 202, 
205 (Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1906). The Grand Remonstrance 
offered the King some two hundred bits of constructive criticism. See id. at 202–32. 
 149. Francis Bacon, Of Boldness (1625), reprinted in Francis Bacon: A Selection of 
His Works, supra note 130, at 74, 74–75; see also John Locke, An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding bk. II, ch. 30, § 4, at 373–74 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon 
Press 1979) (1690) [hereinafter Locke, On Human Understanding] (“For a Man to be 
undisturbed in Danger, sedately to consider what is fittest to be done, and to execute it 
steadily, is a mixed Mode, or a complex Idea of an Action which may exist.”); id. ch. 31, § 3, 
at 376 (offering a similar view). This distinction between counsel and execution carried 
through to The Federalist Papers. See The Federalist No. 70, supra note 30, at 357 
(Alexander Hamilton) (“In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than 
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Bracton—at least as inherited by eighteenth-century readers—often re-
turned to an equestrian metaphor for the same point: “[S]ince the heart 
of a king ought to be in the hand of God, let him, that he be not unbri-
dled, put on the bridle of temperance and the reins of moderation, lest 
being unbridled, he be drawn toward injustice.”150 
Commentators also worried about other human frailties to which even 
God’s lieutenant might be subject. The most candid urged realism: “[N]o 
advantage in moral policy can be lasting, which is not founded on the 
indelible sentiments of the heart of man. Whatever law deviates from this 
principle will always meet with a resistance, which will destroy it in the 
end . . . .”151 Sometimes they acknowledged that the king himself could 
be wicked; popular tropes about Bad King John and humpbacked 
Richard were often tolerated or even cultivated by subsequent dynastic 
coalitions.152 More often, though, these worries were framed in terms of 
bad advice from “Evil Counsellors, and Corrupt and Arbitrary Ministers 
of State”153 who were themselves malicious or just ignorant. Other writers 
                                                                                                                           
a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department . . . 
often promote deliberation and circumspection . . . .”). Hamilton elaborated that the 
legislature “constantly counteract[s] those qualities in the Executive, which are the most 
necessary ingredients in its composition—vigour and expedition, and this without any 
counterbalancing good.” Id. 
 150. 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 305. In a similar vein was Cesare Beccaria’s anxiety—
in work that generally celebrated vigorous execution—about “the unbounded licentious-
ness of ill-directed power, which has continually produced so many authorized examples of 
the most unfeeling barbarity.” Beccaria, supra note 117, at 3–4. 
 151. Beccaria, supra note 117, at 8. Discussing the sovereign’s right to punish, Beccaria 
observed that “[n]o man ever gave up his liberty[] merely for the good of the public. Such 
a chimera exists only in romances.” Id. Machiavelli, as usual, was more blunt: “I deem it 
best to stick to the practical truth of things rather than to fancies. . . . [I]t is necessary that 
a prince who is interested in his survival learn to be other than good . . . .” Machiavelli, 
The Prince, supra note 136, at 61–62; see also id. at 69 (“[I]t is often necessary to act 
against mercy, against faith, against humanity, against frankness, against religion in order 
to preserve the state.”). 
 152. See, e.g., William Shakespeare, Richard III act 3, sc. 1, ll. 130–31 (Gary Taylor et 
al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (“Because that I am little, like an ape, He thinks that you 
should bear me on your shoulders.”); An Excellent Ballad of King John and the Abbott of 
Canterbury, English Broadside Ballad Archive, http://ebba.english.ucsb.edu/ballad/ 
32487/xml [https://perma.cc/VUK9-GH95] (last visited Feb. 1, 2019) (“I Will tell you a 
Story, a Story anon, Of a noble Prince and his Name was King John; For he was a Prince, 
and a Prince of great Might, He held up great Wrongs and he put down great Rights.”). 
 153. See William Penn, England’s Great Interest in the Choice of This New 
Parliament: Dedicated to All her Free-Holders and Electors (1679), reprinted in The 
Political Writings of William Penn 384, 384 (Andrew R. Murphy ed., Liberty Fund 2002) 
(emphasis omitted). Penn argued that it was the work of Parliament to remove counselors 
who had “giv[en] the King Wrong Measures” and “[a]lienat[ed] his Affections from his 
People.” Id. The Grand Remonstrance likewise ritually forswore “the least intention to lay 
any blemish upon [the King’s] royal person, but only to represent how [his] royal 
authority and trust have been abused.” The Grand Remonstrance, supra note 148, at 203. 
Parliament went on to describe “those evils under which we have now many years suffered, 
are fomented and cherished by a corrupt and ill-affected party” made up of “[t]he 
Jesuited Papists,” “[t]he Bishops,” and various “Councillors and Courtiers [who] for 
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focused on society at large and the factions to which it gave rise, whether 
religious, regional, socioeconomic, or otherwise.154 
But this left them on the horns of a dilemma, since even the most 
ardent parliamentarians recognized the need for a magistracy to execute 
the law vigorously and predictably. The parliamentarian Henry Parker, 
summarized the problem: 
[After the origin of civil society,] it was soon therefore provided 
that lawes agreeable to the dictates of reason should be ratified 
by common consent, and that the execution and interpretation 
of those Lawes should be intrusted to some magistrate, for the 
preventing of common injuries betwixt Subject and Subject[.] 
[B]ut when it after appeared that man was yet subject to 
unnaturall destruction, by the Tyranny of intrusted magistrates, 
a mischiefe almost as fatall as to be without all magistracie, how 
to provide a wholsome remedy therefore, was not so easie to be 
prevented. . . . [Even] if it be agreed upon, that limits should be 
prefixed to Princes, and judges appointed to decree according 
to those limits, yet an other great inconvenience will presently 
affront us; for we cannot restraine Princes too far, but we shall 
disable them from some good, as well as inhibit them from 
some evill, and to be disabled from doing good in some things, 
may be as mischievous, as to be inabled for all evils at meere 
discretion. Long it was ere the world could . . . finde out an 
orderly meanes whereby to avoid the danger of unbounded 
prerogative on this hand, and too excessive liberty on the other: 
and scarce has long experience yet fully satisfied the mindes of 
all men in it.155 
                                                                                                                           
private ends have engaged themselves to further the interests of some foreign princes.” Id. 
at 206–07. 
 154. See, e.g., Niccoló Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy 211–12 (Harvey C. Mansfield & 
Nathan Tarcov trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1996) (1517) [hereinafter Machiavelli, Discourses 
on Livy] (“But as to sects, these renewals are also seen to be necessary by the example of 
our religion, which would be altogether eliminated if it had not been drawn back toward 
its beginning . . . brought back into the minds of men what had already been eliminated 
there.”); Parker, supra note 110, at 23 (“The composition of Parliaments . . . takes away all 
jealousies, for it is so equally, and geometrically proportionable, and all the States . . . con-
tribute their due parts therein, that [none] can be of any extreame predominance, the 
multitude loves Monarchy better then Aristocracy, and the Nobility . . . prefer it as much 
beyond Democracy . . . .”); Mons. de Voltaire, A Commentary on the Book of Crimes and 
Punishments, in An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, supra note 117, at 182 [hereinafter 
Voltaire, Commentary] (“Would you prevent a sect from overturning the state . . . . The 
only methods . . . to be taken with a new sect, are, to put to death the chief and all his 
adherents . . . or to tolerate them . . . . The first method is that of a monster; the second of 
a wise man.”). 
 155. Parker, supra note 110, at 13–14. Hamilton picked up this thread in the New York 
Convention debates: 
There are two objects in forming systems of government—Safety for 
the people, and energy in the administration. When these objects are 
united, the certain tendency of the system will be to the public welfare. 
If the latter object be neglected, the people’s security will be as certainly 
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How indeed to “restraine Princes” from tyranny without “disabl[ing] 
them” from the vigorous execution of law—which was the whole point of 
having them in the first place? 
The start of an answer came as more of a (hotly disputed) assertion 
than a solution as such: The king was said to be subject to law. This point 
goes back to Bracton:156 
[While the] king has no equal within his realm  . . . [he] must not 
be under man but under God and under the law, because law 
makes the king, . . . for there is no rex where will rules rather 
than lex. . . . And that he ought to be under the law appears 
clearly in the analogy of Jesus Christ, whose vicegerent on earth 
he is, . . . [and who] willed himself to be under the law that he 
might redeem those who live under it.157 
Both the manuscript lineage and the best reading of this portion of 
Bracton are disputed; it is at least debatable whether it was an exhortation158 
                                                                                                                           
sacrificed, as by disregarding the former. Good constitutions are formed 
upon a comparison of the liberty of the individual with the strength of 
government: If the tone of either be too high, the other will be weak-
ened too much. 
Alexander Hamilton, Remarks at the New York Convention Debates (June 25, 1788), 
reprinted in 22 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 1877, 1890. 
 156. Reading Bracton this way probably involved some degree of wishful thinking about 
Merrie England—not to mention genuine ignorance about what we now know about the 
text’s authorship and repeated revisions. Compare J.L. Barton, The Mystery of Bracton, 14 
J. Legal Hist. 1 (1993) (defending the “traditional” view crediting royal judge Henry de 
Bracton with authorship of the core elements of the treatise), with Paul Brand, ‘The Age 
of Bracton,’ 89 Proc. of the Brit. Acad. 65 (1996) (arguing that Bracton was more likely a 
reviser rather than the author of the treatise). 
 157. 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 33 (footnotes omitted). Bracton was an authoritative 
citation even in the early United States: 
Did the people of the United States intend to bind the several States by 
the Executive power of the national Government? The affirmative answer 
to the former question directs, unavoidably, an affirmative answer to this. 
Ever since the time of Bracton, his maxim, I believe, has been deemed a 
good one “Supervacuum esset leges condere, nisi esset qui leges tueretur.” “It 
would be superfluous to make laws, unless those laws, when made, were 
to be enforced.” 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 464–65 (1793) (Wilson, J.) (quoting Bracton); 
see also A Farmer I, Balt. Md. Gazette, Feb. 15, 1788 [hereinafter A Farmer I], reprinted in 
11 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 306, 311 (“Henry Bracton a cotemporary 
lawyer and judge, who has left us a compleat and able treatise on the laws of England, is 
thus clear and express—Omnes quidem sub rege, ipse autem sub lege, all are subject to the 
King, but the King is subject to the law . . . .”). For more on the republication and early 
modern influence of Bracton, see, for example, Ian Williams, A Medieval Book and Early-
Modern Law: Bracton’s Authority and Application in the Common Law c. 1550–1640, at 79 
Legal Hist. Rev. 47 (2011). 
 158. See 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 305 (“[H]e is a king as long as he rules well but a 
tyrant when he oppresses by violent domination . . . . Let him . . . temper his power by law . . . 
that he may live according to the laws, for the law of mankind has decreed that his own 
laws bind the lawgiver . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 306 (“Nothing is more fitting for a 
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or a doctrinal statement of present legal obligation.159 Either way, the 
notion of a king subject to law persisted. Quoting Bracton without 
citation, Richard Hooker—one of England’s first systematic constitu-
tional theorists and in general an enthusiastic monarchist160—put it 
simply: “[S]o is the power of the [English] king over all and in all lim-
ited, that unto all his proceedings the law itself is a rule.”161 On Hooker’s 
account, this was England’s great boon: 
Happier that people whose law is their king in the greatest 
things, than that whose king is himself their law. Where the king 
doth guide the state, and the law the king, that commonwealth 
is like an harp or melodious instrument, the strings whereof are 
tuned and handled all by one, following as laws the rules and 
canons of musical science.162 
Certainly counternarratives existed; the relationship between municipal 
law and the king was a central point of disagreement between Crown and 
Parliament during the seventeenth century.163 By the Founding Era, 
                                                                                                                           
sovereign than to live by the laws, nor is there any greater sovereignty than to govern 
according to law, . . . for the law makes him king.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 159. See 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 110 (“The king has a superior, namely, God. Also 
the law by which he is made king. Also his curia, namely, the earls and barons, because if 
he is without bridle, that is without law, they ought to put the bridle on him.” (footnotes 
omitted)); id. at 305–06 (“[S]ince he is the minister and vicar of God on earth, [the king] 
can do nothing save what he can do de jure . . . .”). Bracton further noted that the king 
could not do “anything rashly put forward of his own will” but only what had been “rightly 
decided with the counsel of his magnates, deliberation and consultation having been had 
thereon, the king giving it auctoritas.” Id. 
 160. For a typical sentiment, see, for example, Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of 
Ecclesiastical Polity bk. VII, ch. ii (1593), reprinted in 3 The Works of Richard Hooker 
140, 345–46 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 7th ed. 1874) (“Unto kings by human right, 
honour by very divine right, is due; man’s ordinances are many times presupposed as 
grounds in the statutes of God . . . . So God doth ratify the works of that sovereign author-
ity which kings have received by men.”). 
 161. Id. bk. VIII, ch. ii, at 353. 
 162. Id. at 352. Hooker emphasized that this meant “not only the law of nature and of 
God, but [the] very national or municipal law consonant thereunto.” Id.; see also, e.g., 
Fortescue, supra note 131, at 26 (“A King of England cannot, at his pleasure, make any 
alterations in the laws of the land, for the nature of his goverment is not only regal, but 
political.”). Machiavelli’s commentary on republics did not focus on England, of course, 
but it nicely crystalized this celebration of legally limited magistracy. See Machiavelli, 
Discourses on Livy, supra note 154, at 118 (“[T]he states of princes have lasted very long, 
the states of republics have lasted very long, and both have had need of being regulated by 
the laws. For a prince who can do what he wishes is crazy; a people that can do what it 
wishes is not wise.”). Note that Machiavelli’s defense of the Roman dictatorship relied 
largely on its legalized nature: “[A] republic will never be perfect unless it has provided 
for everything with its laws and has established a remedy for every accident and given the 
mode to govern it.” Id. at 74–75; see also id. at 75 (“[T]hose republics that in urgent 
dangers do not take refuge either in the dictator or in similar authorities will always come 
to ruin in grave accidents.”). 
 163. Compare, e.g., Robert Filmer, Patriarcha (1680), reprinted in Patriarcha and 
Other Writings, supra note 12, at 1, 43–44 (asserting that “in effect the king doth swear to 
keep no laws but such as in his judgment are upright” and that “the prerogative of a king 
2019] ARTICLE II VESTS THE EXECUTIVE POWER 1215 
 
however, there was no question: The Crown was subject to law—or at least, 
to its directive force.164 
But that only displaced the question. We can tell the king he is sub-
ject to law. But what if he doesn’t listen? As Parker observed: “‘Twas not 
difficult to invent Lawes, for the limitting of supreme governors, but to 
invent how those Lawes should be executed or by whom interpreted, was 
almost impossible, nam quis custodiat ipsos custodes . . . ?”165 For that, the 
writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century began to explore the 
idea of separate government powers in the well-ordered commonwealth. 
There were two steps to this thought. 
The first step was recognizing a matter of empirical fact: Debates 
about political legitimacy aside, governance in any moderately sophisti-
cated state requires institutional specialization. In the chain of events 
that bring law from a thought to an enacted rule to a lived reality, differ-
ent institutions typically play different roles. The philosopher John Locke’s 
taxonomy of legislative, executive, and federative (in other words, for-
eign affairs and national security) powers of the government was the 
Founders’ most important referent.166 But the descriptive point long pre-
dated Locke. Already in the thirteenth century, Bracton was groping 
toward the distinction between a legislative power167 and an implement-
ing power in its executive and judicial guises.168 By the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the commentary had long since found greater 
                                                                                                                           
is to be above all laws, for the good only of them that are under the laws”), and The Grand 
Remonstrance, supra note 148, at 215 (contending that “[t]he most public and solemn 
sermons before His Majesty were . . . to advance prerogative above law” and to urge that 
“[t]he government must be set free from all restraint of laws concerning our persons and 
estates”), with, e.g., John Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649), reprinted 
in The Major Works 273, 278 (Stephen Orgel & Jonathan Goldberg eds., 1991) (“[A]ll 
kings and magistrates at their first instalment to do impartial justice by law: who, upon 
those terms and no other, received allegiance from the people, that is to say, bond or 
covenant to obey them in execution of those laws which they . . . had themselves made or 
assented to.”). 
 164. See Finch, supra note 88, bk. I, ch. III, at 32 (“Statutes to suppress Wrong, or to 
take away Fraud, bind the King [although] he is not named.”); Hale, Prerogatives of the 
King, supra note 101,at 14 (“[A]s to the directive power of the law, the king is bound by 
it . . . (1) [b]y his office . . . [and] (2) [b]y his oath at his coronation.”); see also supra 
section II.A (discussing the emergence of parliamentary sovereignty). For one example of 
Founding citations to Bracton on this exact point, see A Farmer I, supra note 157, at 311. 
 165. Parker, supra note 110, at 13–14. 
 166. See Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, §§ 143–148, at 164–65. 
 167. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing Bracton’s commentary on 
the king as subject to the laws). 
 168. See 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 26 (“The public interest also requires that there be 
magistrates appointed in the state, for through such persons, men pre-eminent in the doing 
of justice, the law is given effect. For it is of little value that law exists in the state if there 
are none to administer it.”); see also id. at 22 (“We must see what law is. Law is a general 
command, the decision of judicious men, the restraint of offences knowingly or unwit-
tingly committed, the general agreement of the res publica.”). 
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precision. Davies, for example, explained in the preface to his treatise 
that: 
[I]n every Commonwealth, when it once begins to flourish, and 
to grow rich and mighty, the people grow proud withall, and 
their pride makes them contentious and litigious, so as there is 
need of many Laws to bridle them, and many Officers to exe-
cute those Laws, and many Lawyers to interpret those Laws, and 
all little enough: as when a body grows full and gross, it needs 
more physick then when it was lean.169 
Coke’s classic commentary on Littleton used a similarly corporeal meta-
phor in distinguishing between law’s three phases—-announcement, inter-
pretation, and enforcement: “The law is the rule, but it is mute. The king 
judgeth by his judges, and they are the speaking law, lex loquens. The 
processe and the execution, which is the life of the law consisteth in the 
king’s writs.”170 Hale likewise distinguished between “jurisdictio or potestas 
legem ferendi, or jurisdictio nomothetica” and “jurisdictio legem dicendi or 
distribuendi,”171 and Hobbes noted that “the two arms of a Commonwealth, 
are Force, and Justice; the first whereof is in the King; the other deposited in the 
hands of the Parlament.”172 Many others were to the same effect.173 
                                                                                                                           
 169. Davies, Report of Cases in Ireland, supra note 120, at 16. 
 170. 1 Coke on Littleton, supra note 143, bk. 2, ch. 11, § 199, at 130a. 
 171. Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 169. The crucial distinction was 
between the nomothetical creation of a new forward-looking rule and the executory 
application of existing rules to past action: “The supreme jurisdiction of parliament acts 
either deliberative where it makes laws or judicative when it gives judgment. The first 
respects the future . . . . The second respects the past and is not properly qua tale a law but 
a supreme judgment unexaminable.” Id. at 181. Hale further divided jurisdictio legem 
dicendi or distribuendi into the judicial power (“[a] power to give judgment”) and the exec-
utive power (“[a] power to compel the parties to come to judgment and to execute the 
judgment given”). Id. at 179. 
 172. Hobbes, supra note 117, at 186. The reference to “Justice” here is to creating laws 
pursuant to the social compact, not merely to their adjudication, for which Hobbes tended 
to use the more specific word “judicature” and which he tended to divide from 
“execution” of rulings. See, e.g., id. at 125 (defining “the Right of Judicature” as the right 
“of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise concerning Law, either Civill, 
or Naturall, or concerning Fact”). 
 173. For other examples of this distinction between prescription and execution, see 
Geoffrey Gilbert, The Law of Evidence 254 (London, printed for J.F. & C. Rivington et al., 
4th ed. 1777) (distinguishing between officers with power to render judgment and officers 
with power to execute warrants issued thereunder); Helvetius, supra note 133, at 162 
(“[M]ankind . . . will enter into conventions with each other, and these conventions will be 
their first laws; when they have formed laws, they will entrust some persons with the care of 
seeing them put in execution, and those will be the first magistrates.”); Hunton, A Treatise 
of Monarchy, supra note 96, pt. I, ch. I, § 3, at 5–6 (“In respect of its degrees [govern-
ment] is Nomothetical or Architectonical, and Gubernative or Executive. And in respect of the 
subject of its residence, there is an ancient and usual distinction of it into Monarchical, 
Aristocratical and Demeocratical.”); Parker, supra note 110, at 13 (using the standard tripar-
tite formula to discuss society’s need for at least three institutions: “some magistracy to 
provide new orders, and to judge of old, and to execute according to justice,” without 
which “no society could be upheld”); Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, supra 
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The second step was prescriptive, and it was at least initially far more 
controversial. On this account, not only were the powers of government 
in fact distributed among various institutions; they actually should be so 
separated, with each institution at least somewhat independent from the 
other. The Enlightenment philosopher Cesare Beccaria captured the 
basic idea: 
The sovereign, who represents the society itself, can only 
make general laws, to bind the members; but it belongs not to 
him to judge whether any individual has violated the social 
compact, or incurred the punishment in consequence. For in 
this case, there are two parties, one represented by the 
sovereign, who insists upon the violation of the contract, and 
the other is the person accused, who denies it. It is necessary 
then that there should be a third person to decide this contest; 
that is to say, a judge, or magistrate, from whose determination 
there should be no appeal; and this determination should 
consist of a simple affirmation, or negation of fact.174 
This prescriptive assertion had been fiercely contested both in 
theory175 and in practice.176 But by the late eighteenth century, it was 
received wisdom—certainly among the commentators and legal 
theorists on whom the Founders most relied, with Blackstone, 177 
                                                                                                                           
note 117, bk. I, ch. II, at 14 (“[T]he power to oblige, that is, to impose an inward necessity, 
and the power to force or compel by penalties to observe the law, resides exclusively in the 
lawgiver, and in him to whom has been committed the maintenance and execution of the 
laws.”). 
 174. Beccaria, supra note 117, at 11–12. The Founders were much impressed by 
Cicero as a classical antecedent in this respect. See, e.g., An Impartial Citizen VI, 
Petersburg Va. Gazette, Mar. 13, 1788, reprinted in 8 Documentary History, supra note 70, 
at 492, 493, 502, 503 n.14 (“Cicero, the most learned, and perhaps the wisest of the 
ancient Romans . . . expresses his detestation of [special bills affecting individuals only] in 
the most nervous and energetic language.”). 
 175. See, e.g., Hobbes, supra note 117, at 225 (“There is a Sixth doctrine, plainly, and 
directly against the essence of a Common-wealth; and ‘tis this, That the Soveraign Power may 
be divided. For what is it to divide the Power of a Common-wealth, but to Dissolve it; for 
Powers divided mutually destroy each other.”); see also, e.g., Bodin, supra note 120, at 
159–60 (“[T]he first and chiefe marke of a soveraigne prince . . . [is] to give lawes to all his 
subjects . . . without consent of any other . . . . For if a prince be bound not to make any 
law without consent of [any other] . . . hee is then no soueraigne.”). 
 176. See, e.g., Darnel’s Case (or the Case of the Five Knights) (KB 1627), in 3 Cobbett’s 
Complete Collection of State Trials 1, 51–59 (London, T. C. Hansard 1809) (“[I]f a man 
be committed by the commandment of the king, he is not to be delivered by a Habeas 
Corpus in this court . . . .”). 
 177. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *154 (“It is . . . necessary for preserving the 
ballance of the constitution, that the executive power should be a branch, . . . not the whole, 
of the legislature. The total union of them . . . would be productive of tyranny . . . .”); id. at 
*155 (“[E]very branch of our civil polity supports and is supported, regulates and is regu-
lated, by the rest; for . . . they mutually keep each other from exceeding their proper 
limits.”); id. at *269 (“In this . . . separate existence of the judicial power, in a peculiar 
body of men, nominated . . . but not removable at pleasure, by the crown, consists one 
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Locke,178 and Montesquieu179 being the standard referents.180 The Anglo-
Irish essayist Jonathan Swift was typical in criticizing Hobbes for “con-
found[ing] the [e]xecutive with the [l]egislative power”: “[A]ll well-
instituted [s]tates,” Swift argued, “have ever placed them in different 
hands.”181 Even treatises on rather banal topics of private law would signal 
their intellectual bona fides by reciting the standard point. 182  And 
                                                                                                                           
main preservative of . . . liberty; which cannot subsist long . . . unless the administration of 
common justice be . . . separated both from the legislative and . . . the executive power.”). 
 178. See Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, § 143, at 164 (“[I]t may be too great a 
temptation . . . for the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have . . . 
power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to [those] 
laws . . . and suit the law, both in its making, and execution, to their own private 
advantage.”). 
 179. See 1 M. de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws bk. XI, ch. VI, at 
222 (Thomas Nugent trans., London, printed for J. Nourse & P. Vaillant 5th ed. 1773) 
[hereinafter Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws] (“When the legislative and executive powers 
are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no 
liberty . . . lest the same monarch enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical 
manner.”); id. (“[T]here is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the 
legislative and executive.”). For the original French, see 1 M. de Secondat, Baron de 
Montesquieu, De l’esprit des Lois bk. XI, ch. vi, at 312 (London, n. pub., new ed. 1768) 
[hereinafter Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois] (“Lorsque dans la même personne ou 
dans le même corps de magistrature, la puissance législative est réunie à la puissance 
exécutrice, il n’y a point de liberté; parce qu’on peut craindre que le même monarque ou 
le même sénat ne fasse des lois tyranniques, pour les exécuter tyranniquement.”); id. (“Il 
n’y a point encore de liberté si la puissance de juger n’est pas séparée de la puissance 
législative et de l’exécutrice.”). 
 180. Genevan legal and political theorist Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, for example, 
argued that one way to secure “the most perfect liberty” was to “invest the person, who 
enjoys the honours and title of sovereignty, with only a part of the supreme authority” and 
to “lodge the other in different hands, [such as in] in a council or parliament.” 2 
Burlamaqui, supra note 117, pt. II, ch. II, at 346. He contended that, “with regard to 
[m]onarchies,” the “military and legislative powers, together with that of raising taxes,” 
should be “lodged in different hands, to the end that they may not be abused.” Id. 
Similarly, de Lolme observed that: 
[T]he English Constitution has not only excluded from any share in the 
Execution of the laws, those in whom the People trust for the enacting 
of them, but it has also taken from them what would have had the same 
pernicious influence on their deliberations—the hope of ever invading 
that executive authority, and transfering it to themselves. 
De Lolme, The Constitution of England, supra note 105, bk. II, ch. X, at 281; see also 2 de 
Lolme, Constitution de l’Angleterre, supra note 105, at 28 (“Et il ne suffisoit pas d’ôter 
aux législateurs l’exécution des loix, par conséquent l’exemption, qui en est la suite 
immédiate; il falloit encore leur ôter ce qui eût produit les mêmes effets, l’espoir de jamais 
s’attribuer cette autorité exécutive.”). 
 181. 4 Jonathan Swift, The Sentiments of a Church-of-England Man, in The Works of 
Dr. Jonathan Swift 63, 87 (London, printed for C. Bathurst 1751). 
 182. See, e.g., William Jones, An Essay on the Law of Bailments 18 (Boston, Samuel 
Etheridge 1796) (“The constitution of Rome was originally excellent; but . . . C. Octavius 
[imposed a] new form of government [that] was in itself absurd and unnatural; and the lex 
regia, which concentrated in the prince all the powers of the state both executive and 
legislative, was a tyrannous ordinance . . . .”). 
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commentators—both British183 and Continental184—focused frequently 
on this separation as a principal cause for England’s celebrated liberty 
and prosperity.185 In Blackstone’s famous paraphrase of Montesquieu, 
England was “the only nation in the world where political or civil liberty 
is the direct end of it’s constitution.”186 
                                                                                                                           
 183. See Davies, Report of Cases in Ireland, supra note 120, at 5–6 (“[English law] 
doth excell all other Laws in upholding a free Monarchie, which is the most excellent form 
of Government, exalting the Prerogative Royall, and being very tender and watchfull to 
preserve it, and yet maintaining withall the ingenious Liberty of the Subject.”); Finch, 
supra note 88, at i (“If the Laws of England do deservedly surpass the Laws of all other 
Countries in the Perfection of their Nature, the Excellency of their Constitution, and 
especially in that Spirit of Freedom and Liberty which they breathe upon the Subject; . . . 
an unpleasing Peculiarity of Fate [still] attend[s] them . . . .”). In one example of the many 
North American celebrations of this point, “Curtius” wrote: 
[S]hould [the President] remind of a Government, once justly dear to 
us—then let us enquire, where, among foreign nations, are the people 
who may boast like Britons? In what country is justice more impartially 
administered, or the rights of the citizen more securely guarded? . . . 
[H]ad we been justly represented in the Parliament of Great-Britain; to 
this day we should have gloried in the peculiar, the distinguished 
blessings of our political Constitution. 
Curtius I, N.Y. Daily Advertiser, Sept. 29, 1787, reprinted in 19 Documentary History, supra 
note 70, at 63, 64. 
 184. See Francois Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Letter VIII on the Parliament, in Letters 
Concerning the English Nation 40, 42–43 (Lenox Hill reprt. 1974) (1926) (“The English 
are the only people upon earth who have been able to prescribe limits to the power of 
Kings by resisting them.”); see also 2 Burlamaqui, supra note 117, pt. II, ch. II, at 347 
(“[I]s not England at present a proof of the excellency of mixed governments? Is there a 
nation, every thing considered, that enjoys a higher degree of prosperity or reputation?” 
(footnote omitted)). Like many early modern commentators (and perhaps along with the 
British constitution itself), Burlamaqui sometimes conflated mixed government in the 
sense of social estates with separation of powers in the sense of a tripartite Lockean 
division. But in context, he is here clearly referencing the separation of powers. 
 185. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *143–145 (celebrating the “liberties of 
Englishmen,” the protections they enjoy against “every species of compulsive tyranny and 
oppression”). 
 186. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *145; see also 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, 
supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 237 (“Harrington, in his Oceana, . . . enquired into the ut-
most degree of liberty, to which [a] [state] constitution . . . may be carried. . . . [F]or want 
of knowing the nature of real liberty, he [pursued] an imaginary one; and that he built a 
Chalcedon, though he had a Byzantium before his eyes.”); 1 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des 
Lois, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 334 (“Arrington, [dans] Oceana, a aussi examiné quel 
étoit le plus haut point de liberté où la constitution d’un état peut être portée. Mais on 
peut dire de lui, qu’il n’a cherché cette liberté qu’après l’avoir méconnue; & qu’il a bâti 
Chalcédoine, ayant le rivage de Bisance devant les yeux.”). 
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III. LEGAL DOCTRINE 
A.  The Umbrella Term for the Crown’s Nonstatutory Powers Was “The Royal 
Prerogative” 
That brings us to the late eighteenth-century English constitution 
and the semantic conventions used by legal treatises and political theo-
rists alike to describe the powers of the Crown. Blackstone’s Commentaries 
make a useful expositional scaffold, both because they are so well written 
and because they were so important to the mainstream American under-
standing of English law. Published over four years beginning in 1765, 
Blackstone’s multivolume treatise was as influential in the United States 
as it was in England187—on constitutional questions, perhaps even more 
so. That’s not to say that it was influential in shifting the law; if anything, 
Blackstone was behind the times in his presumably willful silence about 
the Commons’s political dominance of the Crown.188 But for Americans 
like James Madison, Blackstone’s treatise was the “book which is in every 
man’s hand”—central to pedagogy, drafting, and litigation alike as the 
standard restatement of the formal constitutional law of England.189 
                                                                                                                           
 187. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 188. Some have suggested that the Founders’ reverence for Blackstone left them 
“unfamiliar[] with the English developments.” See Berger, supra note 55, at 9 n.45. This 
may have been true for the less sophisticated. But plenty knew the real state of affairs. For 
a mere sampling, see, for example, Notes of James Madison on the Convention (July 24, 
1787), reprinted in 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 99, 104 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention] (recording 
Gouverneur Morris’s contention that “the real King, [is] the Minister”); Marcus II, 
Norfolk and Portsmouth J., Feb. 27, 1788, reprinted in 16 Documentary History, supra 
note 70, at 242, 246 (“[E]very body knows that the whole movements of their government, 
where a Council is consulted at all, are directed by their Cabinet Council, composed entirely 
of the principal officers of the great departments . . . .”). Marcus II also distinguished “the 
constitutional ideas” of England from “what the present practice really is.” Id. at 244. For 
additional examples, see The Federalist No. 76, supra note 30, at 385–86 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (discussing the actual political relationship between Commons and the Crown); 
George Nicholas, Remarks at the Virginia Convention Debates (June 4, 1788), reprinted in 9 
Documentary History, supra note 70, at 915, 925 (“[T]he House of Commons . . . entirely 
controul the operation of government, even in those cases where the King’s prerogative 
gave him nominally the sole direction.”); A Farmer V (Part II), Balt. Md. Gazette, Mar. 28, 
1788, reprinted in 12 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 448, 449 (“I must insist that 
[the British government] was hardly a government at all, until it became simplified by the 
introduction and regular formation of the effective administration of responsible minis-
ters, on its present system . . . .”); Civis Rusticus, To Mr. Davis, Va. Indep. Chron., Jan. 30, 
1787, reprinted in 8 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 331, 337 (“The King of 
England can make peace or declare war; can make treaties, but, whenever the Commons 
disapprove of the measures by which these have been brought about, we know the conse-
quences . . . .”). For more on the robust transatlantic legal culture, see, for example, Mary 
Sarah Bilder, Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire 1–11 (2008); Daniel Hulsebosch, 
Constituting Empire 203–06 (2005). 
 189. See James Madison, Remarks at the Virginia Convention Debates (June 18, 
1788), reprinted in 10 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 1371, 1382. Even 
Blackstone’s sharpest critics acknowledged—indeed, were motivated by—the pervasiveness 
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The key to Blackstone’s conceptual structure is his careful division of 
two distinct issues. First, the timeless powers of government in the abstract. 
Second, the contingent and particular entities among which those powers 
happened to be divided in mid-eighteenth-century England. 
Blackstone thus begins by dividing the law-related powers of govern-
ance into two interlocking categories, each of which depends on the 
presence of the other to form a meaningful whole: 
1. The “legislative” authority, defined as the “right” of “mak-
ing . . . the laws”; and 
2. The “executive” authority, defined as the “right” of “enforc-
ing the laws.”190 
Paraphrasing Montesquieu, Blackstone then explains that the genius of 
the English constitution was to vest these conceptual powers in two sepa-
rate institutions: 
In all tyrannical governments the supreme magistracy, or 
the right both of making and of enforcing the laws, is vested in 
one and the same man, or one and the same body of men; and 
wherever these two powers are united together, there can be no 
public liberty. The magistrate may enact tyrannical laws, and 
execute them in a tyrannical manner, since he is possessed, in 
quality of dispenser of justice, with all the power which he as 
legislator thinks proper to give himself. But, where the legisla-
tive and executive authority are in distinct hands, the former 
will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a power, as 
may tend to the subversion of it’s own independence, and there-
with of the liberty of the subject. With us therefore in England 
this supreme power is divided into two branches; the one 
legislative, to wit, the parliament, consisting of king, lords, and 
commons; the other executive, consisting of the king alone.191 
With this roadmap in place, Blackstone proceeds to a consideration of 
the two politically distinct entities to which these two conceptually distinct 
powers were separately entrusted. 
                                                                                                                           
of his influence. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 17, 1826), in 
Thomas Jefferson: Political Writings 57, 58 (Joyce Appleby & Terrance Ball eds., 2004) 
(“[T]he honied Mansfieldism of Blackstone became the Student’s Hornbook, [and] from 
that moment, that profession (the nursery of our Congress) began to slide into toryism, 
and nearly all the young brood of lawyers now are of that hue.”). 
 190. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *146. This classification of two discrete conceptual 
powers of government persists as an organizing principle throughout the book. See, e.g., 
id. at *338 (“In a former chapter of these Commentaries we distinguished magistrates into 
two kinds; supreme, or those in whom the sovereign power of the state resides; and subor-
dinate, or those who act in an inferior secondary sphere.”). Blackstone continues, “We 
have hitherto considered the former kind only; namely the supreme legislative power or 
parliament, and the supreme executive power, which is the king: and are now to proceed 
to inquire into the rights and duties of the principal subordinate magistrates.” Id. 
 191. Id. at *146–147. 
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He starts with Parliament—the political entity vested with the 
legislative power. The treatise’s second chapter surveys the basic elements 
of that entity’s identity, structure, and powers.192 The structural discussion 
describes the entity’s constituent parts: King, Lords, and Commons.193 
Blackstone describes the varying process by which particular human 
beings were selected to fulfill the role of each part.194 He also explores 
the basic operations of the entity as a real-world decisionmaker: how 
Parliament was convened,195 the process by which it passed laws,196 and 
the process by which those laws were handed off for execution.197 In 
addition to surveying Parliament’s constitutional structure, Blackstone 
conducts a close review of its substantive authorities, entitlements, and 
privileges.198 First among these was, of course, the legislative power itself: 
the authority to enact forward-looking rules of legal compulsion.199 But 
the suite of powers and authorities held by Parliament also included the 
legislators’ right to speak freely on the floor of Parliament200 and a more 
general immunity from arrest while actively engaged in parliamentary 
service.201 
With Parliament sorted, Blackstone then turns in his third chapter to 
the political entity vested with the executive power: “The Person of the 
King.” 202  Over the next two hundred pages, Blackstone conducts a 
methodical analysis of the structural and institutional characteristics of 
the Crown. First, he describes the process by which “the English 
nation . . . mark[s] out with precision, who is that single person”—i.e., the 
rules of “the royal succession.”203 Then he describes the constitution, 
legal rights, and juridical relations of the individuals and institutions 
appurtenant to the Crown: in particular “The King’s Royal Family”204 and 
“The Councils Belonging to the King,” from “the high court of 
parliament” and “the peers of the realm” to “the judges of the courts of 
law” and the “privy council.”205 The treatise then turns to “The King’s 
Duties,” especially “the duty . . . to govern his people according to law,” 
with close attention to the historical evolution of the coronation oath.206 
                                                                                                                           
 192. See id. at *146–189. 
 193. See id. at *153–160. 
 194. See id. at *170–180. 
 195. See id. at *150–153. 
 196. See id. at *181–185. 
 197. See id. at *185–186. 
 198. See id. at *160–170. 
 199. See id. at *160–162. 
 200. Id. at *164. 
 201. Id. at *164–165. 
 202. See id. at *190–347. 
 203. See id. at *190–217. 
 204. Id. at *219–226. 
 205. Id. at *227–232. 
 206. Id. at *233–236. 
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Only after this lengthy discussion of the Crown’s institutional characteris-
tics does Blackstone finally arrive at the question of most interest for 
modern purposes: a discussion of the substantive “rights and capacities 
which the king enjoys alone.”207 
This suite of substantive authorities had a name: “The King’s 
Prerogative.”208 As discussed above, by Blackstone’s time, the prerogative 
had long since been consigned in its entirety to what American 
constitutional lawyers would call Youngstown Zone Two.209 That is to say, it 
represented a residual and defeasible authority for Crown action in areas 
that Parliament—or more precisely the “King-in-Parliament”—had not 
(yet) chosen to occupy. Like the common law more generally, the 
prerogative as described by Blackstone thus provided the default rule of 
decision for questions of Crown authority—until Parliament chose, by 
contrary or supplementary legislation, to displace it.210 
The first royal authority was—as we have already seen—the 
“supreme executive power,” specifically defined as “the right of enforcing 
the laws.”211 The full list of Crown prerogatives, however, goes on (and 
                                                                                                                           
 207. Id. at *237–337. 
 208. Id. at *237; see also id. at *190 (“[I]t matters not to which sex the crown de-
scends; but the person entitled to it, whether male or female, is immediately invested with 
all the ensigns, rights, and prerogatives of sovereign power; as is declared by statute.”). 
Blackstone further classifies the direct royal prerogative into three principal subcategories: 
those that pertain to “the king’s royal character”; those that pertain to “his royal authority”; 
and those that pertain to “the royal income.” Id. at *240. The middle category in turn 
includes two aspects: those that “respect . . . this nation’s intercourse with foreign nations” 
and also those that “respect . . . this nation’s . . . own domestic government and civil polity.” 
Id. at *252; see also id. at *260. The last category includes the king’s “ordinary revenue.” 
Id. at *281–306. Blackstone also includes his discussion of the king’s “extraordinary 
revenue” in the same chapter but makes clear that the latter references nonprerogative 
powers of taxation that are granted by statute. Id. at *306–337.  
Other writers similarly distinguished between different categories of prerogative. See, 
e.g., Coke, Speech in the Committee of Grievances, supra note 98, at 1199–200 
(distinguishing “prerogative indisputable” and “prerogative disputable”); Thomas 
Egerton, Chancellor Ellesmere, A Coppie of a Wrytten Discourse Concerning the Royall 
Prerogative (c. 1604), in Louis A. Knafla, Law and Politics in Jacobean England: The Tracts 
of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere 197, 197–201 (1977) (treating the judicial power as an 
“absolute prerogative” that could be delegated, unlike discretionary royal powers); Hale, 
Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 145 (drawing a distinction between the king’s 
“powers” and “prerogatives,” with the latter defined as those which conduce to his “sup-
port and dignity”). 
 209. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing Youngstown Zone Two in 
relation to the Royal Residuum Thesis). 
 210. For more on parliamentary supremacy, see supra section II.A. 
 211. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *146–147. Blackstone’s chapter-opening for-
mulation for this particular authority was strikingly similar to the Executive Power Clause: 
“The supreme executive power of these kingdoms is vested by our laws in a single person, 
the king or queen . . . .” Id. at *190. Blackstone was not the only prominent writer who 
prefigured the Founders’ various formulations in Article II. See, e.g., Obadiah Hulme, An 
Historical Essay on the English Constitution 29 (London, printed for Edward & Charles 
Dilly 1771) (“There were three things essentially necessary, to form a Saxon 
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on). It’s worth setting out the full inventory. As the footnotes to the list 
will attest, Blackstone was not innovating. He was just the latest consolida-
tor of Anglo-American constitutional commonplaces: 
• the sovereign and sacred nature of the royal person;212 
• a personal immunity from suit;213 
• a personal exemption from the rules of laches and negli-
gence;214 
• the “sole power of sending [a]mbassadors to foreign states, 
and receiving [a]mbassadors at home”;215 
• the power “to make treaties, leagues, and alliances with for-
eign states and princes”;216 
• “the sole prerogative of making war and peace”;217 
• “the prerogative of granting safe-conducts”;218 
• the right to be “a constituent part of the supreme legislative 
power” with “the prerogative of rejecting such provisions in 
parliament, as he judges improper”;219 
                                                                                                                           
government[:] . . . a court of council, a court of law, and a chief magistrate . . . [who] . . . 
was vested with the executive authority to administer the constitution . . . and . . . to take 
care that every man, within his jurisdiction paid . . . obedience to law.”). Some writers 
suggested that the power to execute the law was a separate branch of authority from those 
powers denoted as royal prerogative. See e.g., Bolingbroke, Remarks on the History of 
England, supra note 71, at 82 (“A King of Great Britain is that supreme Magistrate, who has 
a negative Voice in the Legislature. He is entrusted with the executive Power; and several other 
Powers and Privileges, which we call Prerogatives, are annex’d to this Trust.”). That 
distinction makes no analytical difference for present purposes; either way, “executive 
power” meant the execution of laws rather than a shorthand for the full suite of royal 
authorities. 
 212. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *242; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the King, 
supra note 101, at 15 (“[T]he king in case of such acts done contrary to the directive 
power of the law is not subject to the coercive power of the law in respect of the sacredness 
and sublimity of his person . . . .”). 
 213. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *242; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the King, 
supra note 101, at 15 (“This is one of the principal reasons of the maxim in law that the 
king can do no wrong . . . .”); A Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants, and the Seizure of 
Papers 6 (London, printed for J. Almon 2d ed. 1764) (“The King can do no wrong . . . .” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 214. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *247; see also John Surrebutter, The Pleader’s 
Guide: A Didactic Poem bk. I, at 12 (London, printed for T. Cadell 1796) (“How long 
soe’er a Cause is stay’d / By Orders, Rules, and Motions Made / On Points by learned 
Counsel mooted / The KING can never be nonsuited.”). 
 215. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *253. 
 216. Id. at *257. 
 217. Id.; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 169 (“power of 
peace and war”); A Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants, and Seizures, supra note 213, at 6 
(“treaties of peace and war”). 
 218. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *259. 
 219. Id. at *261; see also Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 76 (“[N]ever any Bill passed in 
Parliament for a Law (the King being within the Realme) by the Lords and Commons 
alone, without the Kings personall assent in Parliament to the Bill, as he that gave life and 
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• the role of “the generalissimo, or the first in military com-
mand”;220 
• the “sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies”;221 
• “the prerogative of appointing ports and havens”;222 
• “the erection of beacons, light-houses, and sea-marks”;223 
• “the power . . . of prohibiting the exportation of arms or 
ammunition out of this kingdom, under severe penalties”;224 
• “the right of erecting courts of judicature”;225 
• the ultimate role of prosecutor;226 
• the power of “pardoning offenses”;227 
• the “prerogative of issuing proclamations” that “enforce the 
execution of such laws as are already in being, in such man-
ner as the king shall judge necessary”;228 
• “the sole power of conferring dignities and honors”;229 
                                                                                                                           
being to the Law . . . .”). Hale flipped the formulation, though to the same practical effect. 
See Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 171 (concluding that “the power 
legislative resides in the king alone, though so qualified that he cannot enact a new law 
without the advice and assent of the three estates assembled in parliament”); cf. Parker, 
supra note 110, at 7 (“[T]he Law had trusted the King with a Prerogative to discontinue 
Parliaments . . . .”). 
 220. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *262; see also Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 113–14 
(noting the king’s “chief command of the Militia”); Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra 
note 101, at 117–32 (discussing the king’s powers under martial law and jus belli). 
 221. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *262. 
 222. Id. at *263–264; see also Coke, Preface to Part Nine of the Reports, supra note 
128, at 290 (“chief Ports of the Sea”); Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286 
(“[C]oncerning the customs of the king, for maintaining . . . ports and havens, and the 
power of appointing, opening and shutting of them.”). 
 223. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *264. 
 224. Id. at *265. 
 225. Id. at *267; see also 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 166 (“Also justice and judgment 
[and everything] connected with jurisdiction, that, as a minister and vicar of God, he may 
render to each his due.” (footnote omitted)). 
 226. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *268; see also A Letter Concerning Libels, Warrants, 
and Seizures, supra note 213, at 6 (explaining “the direction of crown-prosecutions”). 
 227. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *269; see also Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 113–14 
(describing “the pardoning of Offences”). 
 228. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *270; see also Case of Proclamations (1610) 77 
Eng. Rep. 1352, 1353; 12 Co. Rep. 74, 75 (KB) (“[A] thing which is punishable by the 
Law, . . . if the King prohibit it by his proclamation, before that he will punish it, and so 
warn his subjects . . . there if he commit it after, this as a circumstance aggravates the 
offence; but he by proclamation cannot make a thing unlawful . . . .”); Hale, Prerogatives 
of the King, supra note 101, at 172 (“[I]t is the [king’s] prerogative . . . and those only who 
derive it from him, either as his ministers or by custom, to make open proclamation. The 
king nevertheless cannot by these make or introduce a new law or add a new penalty to an 
old law or abrogate any law.” (citation omitted)). 
 229. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *271; see also Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 114 (“the 
giving of Honour”); Coke, Preface to Part Nine of the Reports, supra note 128, at 290 
(“[h]onors”). 
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• “the prerogative of erecting and disposing of offices”;230 
• “the prerogative of conferring privileges upon private per-
sons”;231 such as converting aliens into citizens, or “erecting 
corporations”;232 
• “the establishment of public marts, or places of buying and 
selling, . . . with the tolls thereto belonging”;233 
• “the regulation of weights and measures”;234 
• the power to coin money and “give it authority or make it 
current”;235 
• the role of “supreme governor of the national church”;236 
                                                                                                                           
 230. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *272; see also, e.g., Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 114 
(“the making of Judges and Officers”); 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 306–07 (“[S]ince he 
cannot unaided determine all causes [and] jurisdictions, that his labour may be lessened, 
the burden being divided among many, he must select from his realm wise and God-
fearing men . . . who will judge the people of God equitably . . . .” (second alteration in 
original)); cf. Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 105 (“[T]he weight, 
multiplicity and variety of the occasions and emergencies of a kingdom doth necessarily 
require assistances adhiberi saltem in regiae sollicitudinis adminiculum, [dum] licet non in 
imperii participationem.”(second alteration in original)); id at 268–70 (noting that the king 
has the “power of commanding the person of any man . . . [i]n reference to the public 
service of the kingdom, and that in these three particulars: (1) In point of advice, (2) In 
point of office or service, [and] (3) In point of deference or safety”); A Letter Concerning 
Libels, Warrants, and Seizures, supra note 213, at 6 (“appointments to offices in the 
state”). 
This prerogative was the focus of Charles I’s answer to the Nineteen Propositions of 
Parliament: 
It is demanded, That Our Councellors, all chief Officers both of Law 
and State, Commanders of Forts and Castles, and all Peers hereafter 
made . . . be approved of (that is, chosen) by [Parliament] . . . . 
. . . . 
These being past, we may be waited on bare-headed; we may have 
Our hand kissed . . . . [B]ut as to true and reall Power We should remain 
but the outside, but the Picture, but the signe of a King. 
Charles I, His Majesties Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses of Parliament 
(June 18, 1642), reprinted in Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Struggle for Sovereignty 145, 161–
62 (Liberty Fund 1999) (emphases omitted). 
 231. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *272; see also Cowell, Institutes, supra note 117, at 
5 (noting that the king “may grant privileges at pleasure, as to single persons, as to 
Corporations and Colleges, provided they become not injurious to a third person”). 
 232. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *272. 
 233. Id. at *274; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286 
(“places of public trade, fairs and markets”). 
 234. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *274; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the King, 
supra note 101, at 173 (“weights and measures”). 
 235. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *276; see also Bagshaw, supra note 90, at 114 (“the 
coyning of Money”); Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 299–305 (“money 
and coin”). 
 236. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *279–280; cf. Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra 
note 101, at 11 (“[T]he king hath that supreme ecclesiastical power in him.”); 1 Hawkins, 
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• the right to “all the lay revenues, lands, and tenements . . . 
which belong to an archbishop’s or bishop’s fee”;237 
• the right to “send one of his chaplains to be maintained by 
[each] bishop”;238 
• the right to “all the tithes arising in extraparochial places”;239 
• the right to a share of the profits of the lower clergymen;240 
• the right to all of “the rents and profits” of various types of 
Crown lands;241 
• all “profits arising from the king’s ordinary courts of justice”;242 
• the right to all whale and sturgeon caught near the English 
shore;243 
• the right to certain goods washed up on the land from ship-
wrecks;244 
• the right to silver or gold mines245 and various other catego-
ries of “treasure-trove” that are discovered;246 
• the right to “goods stolen, and waived or thrown away by the 
thief in his flight”;247 
• the right to “valuable animals as are found wandering” with-
out an apparent owner;248 
                                                                                                                           
Pleas of the Crown, supra note 145, ch. 19, at 49 (recognizing “appealing to Rome from 
any of the King’s Courts” as a praemunire felony “against the Prerogative of the Crown”). 
 237. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *282. 
 238. Id. at *283. 
 239. Id. at *284. 
 240. See id. at *284–285. 
 241. Id. at *286. 
 242. Id. at *289. 
 243. See id. at *290; see also The Case of Swans (1592) 77 Eng. Rep. 435, 435–36; 7 
Co. Rep. 15 b, 15 b–16 a (KB) (“All white Swans not marked, having gained their natural 
liberty . . . may be seised to the King’s use by his prerogative . . . as a Swan is a Royal fowl; . . . 
and so [] whales and sturgeons are Royal Fish, and belong to the King by his 
prerogative.”); 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 167 (“great fish, sturgeon, waif, things said to 
belong to no one”); Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286 (“[animals] 
ferae naturae” (alteration in original)). 
 244. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *290; see also 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 167 
(“wreck”); Coke, Preface to Part Nine of the Reports, supra note 128, at 290 (“[w]reck”); 
Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286 (“[b]ona vacantia, wreck”). 
 245. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *276–277; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the 
King, supra note 101, at 286 (describing the king’s right to “mines and minerals, and 
therein his seignory in case of royal mines, tin and lead”). 
 246. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *295; see also 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 167 
(“treasure trove”); Coke, Preface to Part Nine of the Reports, supra note 128, at 290 
(“[t]reasure found”) Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286 (“[b]ona 
vacantia, . . . treasure trove”). 
 247. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *296–297. 
 248. Id. at *297–298; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286 
(“[animals] ferae naturae” (alteration in original)). 
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• the right to any other “goods in which no one else can claim 
a property”;249 
• the right to lands and goods forfeited in punishment for var-
ious offenses;250 
• the right to lands escheated for a defect in either the testa-
ment or the heirs;251 and 
• “the custody of idiots” and their estates.252 
The royal prerogative, as it was understood in the Founding Era, 
thus comprised a long list of separate and highly particularized legal 
authorities within a well-understood framework of English constitutional 
law. There was no overarching theoretical coherence to it; it was just “stuff 
the king can do,” so long as Parliament didn’t tell him otherwise. 
Nor did the authorities on this list originate with Blackstone. He was 
just describing, in the fashion of a modern nutshell, his own generally 
unremarkable take on what amounted to black letter administrative law. 
The particular authorities varied somewhat from summary to summary, 
but the gist was remarkably consistent, as was the use of the legal term 
“prerogative” to name this grab bag of powers that originated in the 
Crown itself rather than from some parliamentary grant of authority.253 
To be sure, eighteenth-century writers regularly used “prerogative” in the 
same loose sense we use it today—as a generic power, privilege, 
                                                                                                                           
 249. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *298–299; see also 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 
167 (“Also . . . [things] . . . by occupation and apprehension, [as] of another’s property, as 
where a thing is cast away and taken to be abandoned.” (alterations in original)); Hale, 
Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286. 
 250. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *299–300; see also Coke, Preface to Part Nine of 
the Reports, supra note 128, at 290 (“[c]hattels of Felons and Fugitives”); Hale, Prerogatives 
of the King, supra note 101, at 286 (“Bona confiscata et forisfacta, (i) per exigent, (ii) per 
utlary, (iii) per fugam, (iv) per false appeal, ou omission in appeal, (v) per premunire, (vi) 
per felony de se vel de alio.”). 
 251. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *303. 
 252. Id. at *303–306; see also Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 286 
(“Custodiae, (i) infantium, (ii) fatuorum, (iii) temporalium.”). 
 253. See, e.g., Francis Bacon, Cases of Treason (1641), reprinted in Lord Bacon’s Law 
Tracts, supra note 129, at 178–81 (cataloguing a list of prerogative powers); 2 Bracton, 
supra note 98, at 166–67 (“It is clear that the lord king [has all] dignities, [it is the lord 
king] himself who has ordinary jurisdiction and power over all who are within his realm.” 
(alterations in original) (citation omitted)); Camden, supra note 139, at 205–15 (catalogu-
ing a list of prerogative powers); Coke, Preface to Part Nine of the Reports, supra note 
128, at 288, 290–91 (listing the royal prerogatives as part of a constitutional law discus-
sion of “the whole frame of the ancient Common Laws of this Realm”); de Lolme, The 
Constitution of England, supra note 105, bk. I, chs. IV–VI, at 71–84 (describing the 
prerogative powers of the king); James Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and the 
Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament 33 (Philadelphia, William & 
Thomas Bradford 1774) (outlining the powers of the king, who was “entrusted with the 
direction and management of the great machine of government”). 
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entitlement, or even just a general id-like willfulness.254 But as a term of 
art in the context of constitutional law, “prerogative” had a very specific 
meaning: “all powers, preheminences, and priviledges, which the law 
giveth to the crowne.”255 The writers are both precise and explicit about 
what was for them a schoolboy distinction between “the prerogative” as 
the basket category for royal power and “the executive power” as one 
specific authority among a great many in that basket.256 They even used 
                                                                                                                           
 254. Compare Bobby Brown, My Prerogative, on Don’t Be Cruel (MCA 1988) (“They 
say I’m crazy / I really don’t care / That’s my prerogative / . . . Why don’t they just let me 
live (Tell me why) / I don’t need permission / Make my own decisions (Oh) / That’s my 
prerogative / It’s my prerogative”), with, e.g., William Staunford, An Exposition of the 
King’s Prerogative fol. 5 (London, Rychard Tottel 1567) (“[P]rerogative is as much to saye 
as a privilege or preeminence that any person hath before another whiche as it is tollerable 
in some, so it is most to be permitted and allowed in a prince or, soveraine governor of a 
realme.”). For an infinitely more serious survey of the various ways the word was used in its 
more abstract and colloquial senses, including during the ratification debates, see gener-
ally Matthew Steilen, How to Think Constitutionally About Prerogative: A Study of Early 
American Usage, 66 Buff. L. Rev. 557 (2018) (canvassing Revolutionary- and Founding-Era 
uses of “prerogative” to discuss entitlements to, inter alia, personal authority, political 
sovereignty, self-determination, property protection, and “order, peace, and the preserva-
tion of existing . . . hierarchies,” as well as the power not just to break but even to make 
the laws). Steilen effectively “challenges the view of ‘prerogative’ as a discretionary 
authority to act outide the law,” rightly concluding, regarding the less technical uses, that 
“[i]t is enough to make one’s head spin.” Id. at 557, 547. His findings match mine: The 
term most assuredly was used in many ways other than as a legal term of art. But its 
technical meaning was the same for transatlantic lawyers in that era as it is for U.K. lawyers 
now: “the residue of powers which remain vested in the crown.” R (Miller) v. Sec’y of State 
for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [44]. 
 255. 1 Coke on Littleton, supra note 143, bk. 2, ch. 5, § 125, at 90b; see also, e.g., 
Francis Bacon, An Essay of a King 5 (London, printed for Richard Best 1642) [hereinafter 
Bacon, Essay of a King] (describing the prerogatives of the king); Bagshaw, supra note 90, 
at 83–84 (using “prerogative” in a way that suggests Coke’s definition); Cowell, Institutes, 
supra note 117, at 238–39 (“But there are some [actions] which . . . are inherent in the 
Crown by reason of the Kings Priviledg and Prerogative.”); Staunford, supra note 254, at 
fol. 5 (offering a similar perspective on prerogative). For case law on this point, see, for 
example, Case of Convocations (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 1350, 1350; 12 Co. Rep. 71, 72 (KB) 
(describing four sources of legally binding authority: “prerogative of the king,” “the 
common law,” “statute law,” and “custome of the realm”). 
 256. See, e.g., Bolingbroke, Remarks on the History of England, supra note 71, at 82 
(“He is entrusted with the executive Power[] and several other Powers and Privileges, which 
we call Prerogatives, are annex’d to this Trust.”); Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Present 
Discontents (1770), reprinted in 2 The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke 242, 258, 
277 (Paul Langford & William B. Todd eds., 1982) (canvassing “the discretionary powers 
which are necessarily vested in the Monarch” after noting that “[t]he power of the crown, 
almost dead and rotten as Prerogative, has grown up anew, with much more strength, and 
far less odium, under the name of Influence”); 5 Hume, History of England, supra note 
71, at 349 (stating that Parliament had “gradually encroach[ed] on the executive power of 
the crown, which forms its principal and most natural branch of authority”); Aequus, 
From the Craftsman, Mass. Gazette & Bos. Newsl., Mar. 6, 1766, reprinted in 1 American 
Political Writing During the Founding Era, 1760–1805, at 62, 65–66 (Charles S. Hyneman 
& Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983) [hereinafter American Political Writing] (cataloguing powers 
wielded by the Crown and Parliament over the colonies, including “the executive power of 
government” as one item in a long list of authorities including many of the typical 
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the same terminology when describing the chief magistrates of other 
nations.257 
Before we transition to a closer focus on the executive power as a single 
element of the royal prerogative, it’s worth stepping back to recall the big-
picture structure of Blackstone’s analysis. First he discussed the entity 
that possessed the legislative power: Parliament.258 His discussion covered 
both the structural law of that entity’s formation and constitution259 and 
also the entity’s substantive authorities and entitlements—including but 
not limited to the legislative power.260 Next, he walked through the exact 
same steps in analyzing the entity that possessed the executive power: the 
Crown.261 Once again, he began with a detailed discussion of the struc-
tural constitutional law of that entity.262 And once again he then turned 
to a detailed discussion of the substantive authorities and entitlements of 
that entity—including but not limited to the executive power.263 
B. “The Executive Power” Was the Power to Execute the Laws 
So “the executive power” was a discrete subset of the Crown preroga-
tive, which was itself a long list of substantive authorities ranging from 
the consequential (the right to participate in lawmaking and the power 
of war and peace) to the mundane (the power to erect lighthouses and 
the right to claim whale carcasses). Within this suite of powers, though, 
what exactly did the executive power entail? 
                                                                                                                           
prerogatives); see also William Guthrie, A New Geographical, Historical, and Commercial 
Grammar 162 (London, printed for Charles Dilly & George Robinson 7th ed. 1782) (“The 
king of Scotland had no negative voice in parliament; nor could he declare war, . . . or con-
clude any other public business . . . without the advice and approbation of parliament. The 
prerogative of the king was so bounded, that he was not even entrusted with the executive 
part of the government.”); id. at 477 (noting that the Spanish privy-council has “the direc-
tion of all the executive part of government,” while the Spanish council of war “takes 
cognizance of military affairs only”). 
 257. See, e.g., Joel Barlow, A Letter to the National Convention of France on the 
Defects in the Constitution of 1791 and the Extent of the Amendments Which Ought to 
Be Applied 7 (London, printed for J. Johnson 1792) (cataloguing the French King’s 
constitutional powers with a similar distinction between “the executive . . . power” and a 
number of other distinct authorities including “much of the legislative power,” the ability 
to require various revenues, and the war powers); Walter Moyle, Democracy Vindicated: 
An Essay on the Constitution and Government of the Roman State 5 (Norwich, J. March 
1796) (“[Romulus] founded his dominion[] . . . [upon] his standing body of guards; his 
great revenue in lands; the sole power of the executive, and part of the legislative; and last 
of all, the administration of justice, and the command of the armies, which were the great 
branches of the royal prerogative.”). 
 258. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra notes 193–197 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra notes 203–206 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
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We already know Blackstone’s answer: It was simply “the right . . . of 
enforcing the laws.”264 In keeping with the nutshell quality of his constitu-
tional discussion more generally, this was just the rote recitation of a 
terminological commonplace. Locke was but one in a long line of com-
mentators who contrasted the “legislative power” as “a right to direct how 
the force of the commonwealth shall be employed” with the “executive 
power,” which “see[s] to the execution of the laws that are made, and 
remain in force.”265 According to Whig politician Algernon Sidney’s mar-
tial formulation, “[t]he Sword of Justice comprehends the legislative and 
the executive Power: the one is exercised in making Laws, the other in 
judging Controversies according to such as are made.”266 And using “exec-
utive power” as the word for law-implementation was no Anglo-American 
idiosyncrasy. As the seminal international law theorist Emmerich Vattel 
explained: 
The executive power naturally belongs to the sovereign[]—
to every conductor of a people: he is supposed to be invested 
with it, in its fullest extent, when the fundamental laws do not 
restrict it. When the laws are established, it is the prince’s prov-
ince to have them put in execution. To support them with 
vigour, and to make a just application of them to all cases that 
present themselves, is what we call rendering justice.267 
                                                                                                                           
 264. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *146; see also supra note 190 and accompanying 
text. 
 265. Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, §§ 143–144, at 164. Remember that this is 
precisely how Blackstone defined “executive power” as well—as the rule-implementing 
counterpart to legislative power’s capacity to create rules in the first place. See supra note 
190 and accompanying text. 
 266. Sidney, supra note 96, ch. III, § 10, at 295; see also James Harrington, The 
Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), reprinted in The Political Works of James Harrington 
155, 174 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1977) [hereinafter Political Works of 
Harrington] (“[T]he hand of the magistrate is the executive power of the law, so the head 
of the magistrate is answerable unto the people that his execution be according unto the 
law; by which Leviathan may see that the hand or sword that executes the law is . . . not 
above it.”). 
 267. Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied 
to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns bk. I, ch. XIII, § 162 at 187 (Knud 
Haakonssen et al., eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1797). Other Continental commentators 
were to the same effect. De Lolme began his chapter titled “Of the Executive Power” by 
defining it as “[t]he first prerogative of the King, in his capacity of Supreme Magistrate, 
[which] has for its object the administration of Justice.” de Lolme, The Constitution of 
England, supra note 105, bk. I, ch. IV, at 72. De Lolme characterized the executive power 
in terms of its role in implementing legislative enactments. See id. at 71 (“When the 
Parliament is prorogued or dissolved, it ceases to exist; but its laws still continue to be in 
force: the King remains charged with the execution of them, and is supplied with the 
necessary power for that purpose.”). In the original French, in his chapter titled “Du 
pouvoir executif,” de Lolme wrote: “Lorsque le parlement est prorogé ou dissous, il cesse 
d’exister; mais les loix subsistent: le roi est chargé de l’exécution, est muni du pouvoir 
nécessaire pour la procurer.” 1 de Lolme, Constitution de l’Angleterre, supra note 105, at 
65. Indeed, de Lolme relied on this understanding of executive power to explain why the 
monarch could not himself be subject to coercive judicial process. See de Lolme, The 
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Nor was the terminology ideologically inflected or otherwise concep-
tually contested. To the contrary, even arch-royalists like the man known 
to Founding-Era Americans as “the prostituted, rotten Sir Robert 
Filmer”268 knew that the “executive power” was limited to law execution. 
That’s why Filmer and other critics of parliament resisted a description of 
the king’s power that was limited to those terms: 
By these words of legislative, nomothetical and architectonical 
power, in plain English, [is understood] a power of making laws. 
And by gubernative and executive, a power of putting those laws 
in execution by judging and punishing offenders.269 
It’s hard to overstate the uniformity of this point. As Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau explained almost a hundred years later, it just wasn’t that 
complicated a concept: “[T]he executive power . . . is only the instru-
ment for applying the law.”270 
                                                                                                                           
Constitution of England, supra note 105, bk. I, ch. VIII, at 93 (“It is true, the King himself 
cannot be arraigned before Judges; because, if there were any that could pass sentence 
upon him, it would be they, and not he, who must finally possess the executive 
power . . . .”); 1 de Lolme, Constitution de l’Angleterre, supra note 105, at 86. (“Le roi lui-
même est, il est vrai, hors de l’atteinte des tribunaux, parce que, s’il en étoit un qui put le 
juger, ce seroit ce tribunal & non pas lui, qui auroit finalement le pouvoir exécutif . . . .”). 
Rousseau likewise conceptualized the executive and legislative powers as interlocking and 
complementary functions. See Rousseau, supra note 120, bk. II, ch. 2, at 70 (“[A] 
declaration of [the general] will is an act of sovereignty and constitutes law . . . . [O]ur 
political theorists, unable to divide the principle of sovereignty, divide it in its purpose; 
they divide it into power and will, divide it, that is, into executive and legislative . . . .”). 
 268. A Farmer I, supra note 157, at 309; see also, e.g., John Adams, The Letters of 
Novanglus, to the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay (Jan. 23, 1775), re-
printed in 2 The Adams Papers 226, 231 (Sarah Martin ed., 2008–2019) (excoriating an 
opposing pamphleteer as a “foul mouthed scold, deserv[ing] [only] silent contempt” for 
“mak[ing] no scruples to advance the principles of Hobbs and Filmer, boldly”). Despite 
his role as designated boogeyman, Filmer was fourth on James Madison’s shopping list of 
political writers for the library of the Continental Congress. See Report on Books for 
Congress (Jan. 23, 1783), reprinted in 6 The Papers of James Madison 62, 84–85 (J.C.A. 
Stagg ed., 2010). 
 269. Filmer, The Anarchy, supra note 12, at 136. Not once does the greatest 
theoretician of royal power describe the full suite of royal powers as “the executive power.” 
Along with all well-socialized Englishmen, his word for the king’s full suite of authorities 
was “the royal prerogative.” Id. Hunton relied on the same conceptual categorization in 
noting that “[i]n respect of its degrees [government is] Nomothetical or Architectonical, and 
Gubernative or Executive. And in respect of the subject of its residence, there is an ancient 
and usual distinction of it into Monarchical, Aristocratical, and Democratical.” Hunton, A 
Treatise of Monarchy, supra note 96, pt. I, ch. I, § 3, at 5–6. Hunton distinguished between 
the conceptual executive power of government and the entity called a monarchy, and 
criticized both parliamentarian resistance theory and divine-right absolutism. Id.; see also 
Philip Hunton, A Vindication of the Treatise of Monarchie, ch. V, § 2, at 39 (London, G. 
M. 1644) (noting that “[the King] is the sole Principle and fountaine from whence the 
execution of all Law and Justice flowes to his people by inferiour Officers and Courts, all 
whose Authoritie is derivatively from him as its head,” but asking rhetorically, “is not the 
Legislative Power the supreame?”). 
 270. Rousseau, supra note 120, bk. III, ch. 15, at 142. For other examples, see William 
Mollyneux, The Case of Ireland Being Bound by Acts of Parliament in England 43–44 
2019] ARTICLE II VESTS THE EXECUTIVE POWER 1233 
 
In the most significant sense, Rousseau’s “only” was completely accu-
rate: “[T]he executive power” didn’t encompass other authorities. In 
another way, though, it might mislead modern ears—because, let’s be 
clear, this was a hugely important authority. As discussed at length above, 
the execution problem may have been the single greatest concern of 
political and legal thinkers over the course of English history. In recog-
nizing this power as perhaps the king’s defining authority, Blackstone was 
thus once again following an illustrious list of predecessors. From 
Bracton271 to Hume272—with a chorus of thinkers as diverse as Bacon,273 
James I, 274  Milton,275  and Filmer276  in between—English law had for 
centuries recognized the king’s coercive power to “punish and compel 
wrongdoers”277 as his “principal and most natural branch of authority.”278 
                                                                                                                           
(London, printed for J. Almon & M. Hingeston 1770) (explaining “the judiciary and 
executive Parts of the Law, and the Ministers and Process thereof”); Samuel Rutherford, 
Lex Rex: The Law and the Prince question xxi, at 178–79 (London, printed for John Field 
1644) (discussing “[a] Power executive of Laws more in the King, a Power legislative more 
in the Parliament”). 
 271. See 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 166–67. 
 272. See 5 Hume, History of England, supra note 71, at 349 (stating that Parliament 
had “been gradually encroaching on the executive power of the crown, which forms its 
principal and most natural branch of authority”). 
 273. See Bacon, Essay of a King, supra note 255, at 3 (explaining the prerogative to 
“animate[] the dead letter [of the law], making it active toward all his Subjects praemio & 
poena [such as by reward and by punishment]”). 
 274. James I publicly admonished his son, “[T]hat as yee are a good Christian, so yee 
may be a good King . . . in establishing and executing, (which is the life of the Law) good 
Lawes among your people . . . .” James I, Basilikon Doron bk. 2 (1616), reprinted in The 
Political Works of James I, at 3, 18 (Charles Howard McIlwain ed., 1918). Over the course 
of the brief pamphlet, James returned to his exhortations about “executing . . . Lawes” 
sixteen times. See id. at 18–42. The record does not reflect whether he also advised his son 
neither to borrow nor to lend. 
 275. See Milton, Defence of the English People, supra note 139, at 106 (“[T]he king 
was created to put . . . laws in execution.”). 
 276. See Filmer, The Free-holders Grand Inquest, supra note 96, at 114 (“[T]here be a 
power in kings both to judge when the laws are duly executed, and when not; as also to 
compel the judges if they do not their duty.”). 
 277. See 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 166. 
 278. See 5 Hume, History of England, supra note 71, at 349. For a mere sample of this 
kind of celebration of the king’s law enforcement power—in both its judicial and 
executive guises—see, for example, 2 Bracton, supra note 98, at 166–67; Cowell, Institutes, 
supra note 117, at 2; Ellesmere, supra note 208, at 197 (discussing the king’s absolute but 
delegable prerogative to “punish the guiltie”); Hobbes, supra note 117, at 126 (“[T]o the 
Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding . . . and of Punishing with corporall, or 
pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Law he hath for-
merly made . . . .”); John Nalson, The King’s Prerogative and the Subject’s Privileges 
Asserted According to the Laws of England 108 (London, printed for J. Walthoe 1684) 
(relying on a close analysis of Magna Carta to infer the Crown’s power and obligation to 
deliver “[e]xecution of [j]ustice”); James Otis, The Rights of the Colonies Asserted and 
Proved 71 (London, reprinted for J. Almon 1764) (“The supreme legislative, and the 
supreme executive, are a perpetual check and balance to each other. . . . Here, the King 
appears, as represented by his judges, . . . as supreme executor of the commonwealth; and 
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This “power to compel the parties to come to judgment and to execute 
the judgment given”279 was celebrated especially in judicial opinions, 
which saw “a King’s Crown [as] an hieroglyphic of the laws, where justice, 
&c. is administered,”280 and public law treatises, which “take it for grant-
ed, [t]hat the King, being the supreme Magistrate of the Kingdom, [is] 
intrusted with the whole executive Power of the Law.”281 
It was precisely because the Crown’s defining authority was “the sole 
exercise of the executive power” that the king was “therefore by our 
English lawyers called ‘the universal judge of property’—‘the fountain of 
justice’—‘the supreme magistrate of the kingdom, intrusted with the 
whole executive power of the law.’”282 And it was for that same reason that 
the Crown’s implementation of this particular prerogative was the princi-
pal measure of its performance: If a legislature is “denominated good, 
from the goodness of its laws,” then “[t]he goodness of executive gov-
ernment” for its part “consists in [the] due administration of the laws 
already made.”283 
C.  This Power to Execute Was an Empty Vessel, both Subsequent and 
Subordinate to the Power to Legislate 
The singular feature of this constitutionally indispensable authority 
was its derivative and subsequent character—and therefore its conceptual 
subordination ab initio. Certainly as a matter of the specific constitutional 
law of England, the executive power was subject to plenary control and 
instruction by parliamentary legislation.284 But conceptually speaking, 
this wasn’t a merely contingent feature of Parliament’s political and 
                                                                                                                           
he never shines brighter, but on his throne, at the head of the supreme legislative.”); see 
also Edmund Plowden, The Commentaries or Reports of Edmund Plowden 237 (London, 
Catharine Lintot & Samuel Richardson 1761) (reporting Willion v. Berkley, 3 Eliz.) 
(“[T]he King has in him three Things, viz. Power, Justice, and Mercy; Power to do, Justice 
to enforce him to do, and Mercy to restrain him from doing  . . . so that every Subject may 
claim from him Justice, and the King is forced by Justice to do that which he ought.”). 
 279. Hale, Prerogatives of the King, supra note 101, at 179; see also id. at 191 (discuss-
ing the power of “coercion” as “that whereby the judicative power is acted” and the king 
“may enforce the person complained of to come to judgment and to execute it”). 
 280. Calvin’s Case, or the Case of the Postnati (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 390; 7 Co. 
Rep. 1 a, 1 b (KB). 
 281. 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, supra note 145, ch. 1, § 1, at 2  (London, Eliz. 
Nutt & R. Gosling 1721) (pivoting from Book I’s discussion of the substantive “nature of 
criminal offenses” to Book II’s procedural–structural discussion of “in what manner the 
offenders are to be brought to punishment”). 
 282. Letter by J., Bos. Evening Post (May 23, 1763), reprinted in 1 American Political 
Writing, supra note 256, at 25–26; see also, e.g., Noah Webster, The Revolution in France 
15–16 (New York, George Bunce & Co. 1794) (“[P]roperty must be placed under the 
protection of law; and the laws must receive an energy from a well-constituted executive 
power, that shall ensure a due execution.”). 
 283. Nathaniel Niles, Two Discourses on Liberty (June 5, 1774), reprinted in 1 
American Political Writing, supra note 256, at 270. 
 284. See supra section II.A (discussing the emergence of parliamentary sovereignty). 
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military supremacy. Rather, the subordinacy of “executive power” was 
one of its constitutive features: Without some preexisting intention or 
instruction, that power is an empty vessel that has nothing to execute.285 
This conceptual point was nowise a tendentious claim of Whigs, republi-
cans, or commonwealthmen. It was simply intrinsic to the concept in 
eighteenth-century vocabulary—both in the governance context and in 
the world at large. 
1. The “Empty Vessel” Nature of Executive Power in General. — To begin 
with, the conceptual subservience of executive power to legislative power 
was just a special case of executive power in general. While law was 
certainly the default object of execution in political theory, “executive 
power” in its most generic sense referenced the ability and authority to 
take a plan, intention, or instruction, and bring that mentally formulated 
state of affairs into actual being.286  
This distinction was central to eighteenth-century theories of human 
perception and cognition.287 Rousseau’s account, for all its naiveté by the 
standards of modern neuroscience, beautifully captures the standard 
eighteenth-century framework: 
Every free action has two causes which concur to produce 
it, one moral—the will which determines the act; the other 
physical—the strength which executes it. When I walk towards 
an object, it is necessary first that I should resolve to go that way 
and secondly that my feet should carry me. When a paralytic  
resolves to run and when a fit man resolves not to move, both 
stay where they are. The body politic has the same two motive 
powers—and we can make the same distinction between will 
and strength—the former is legislative power and the latter 
executive power.288 
                                                                                                                           
 285. As Hunton wrote: 
[P]ower being either the Legislative or the Gubernative. In a mixed 
Monarchy, sometimes the mixture is the seat of the Legislative power, 
which is the chief of the two. . . . For if the Legislative be in one [body], 
then the Monarchy is not mixed but simple, for that [that is, the legisla-
tive power] is the superior, if that be in one, all else must needs be so 
too: By Legislative, I mean the power of making new Laws . . . . 
Hunton, A Treatise of Monarchy, supra note 96, pt. I, ch. IV, § 2, at 26. 
 286. As more than one dictionary explained, “To Execute” meant “to put a law, or any 
thing planned, in practice.” See Francis Allen, A Complete English Dictionary (London, 
printed for J. Wilson & J. Fell 1765) [hereinafter Allen, Complete English Dictionary]; see 
infra Part V for more dictionary definitions than you can shake a stick at. 
 287. See, e.g., Locke, On Human Understanding, supra note 149, bk. II, ch. 21, § 47, 
at 263 (“For the mind [has] in most cases . . . power to suspend the execution and satisfac-
tion of any of its desires . . . .”); see also David Hume, A Dissertation on the Passions § 1, in 
2 Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects 178 (London, printed for T. Cadell 1777) (“The 
Will exerts itself, when either the presence of the good or absence of the evil may be 
attained by any action of the mind or body.”). 
 288. Rousseau, supra note 120, bk. III, ch. 1, at 101; see also id. ch. 4, at 112 (“He who 
makes the law knows better than anyone how it should be executed and interpreted. So it 
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The notion of an “executive power” as the enacting force which 
transforms intentions into reality was as pervasive among theologians as it 
was among philosophers of the mind: “It is the distinguishing Character 
of a rational Creature, to propose to himself an End, and then to pursue 
that End in proper Methods; hence Logicians tell us, the End is first in 
the Intention, and last in the Execution . . . .”289 And so it was, according 
to Saint Thomas Aquinas, that “operation belongs to the executive power; 
and the act of the will does not follow the act of the executive power, on 
the contrary execution comes last.”290 
The act of execution thus often had a rote or even marionette qual-
ity, with the influential treatise writer William Hawkins describing 
“[c]onjurers, who by force of certain Magick Words endeavor to raise the 
Devil, and compel him to execute their Commands”291 and Francis Bacon 
describing officers who “execute the experiments so directed” by another 
officer.292 Not for nothing did the phrases “executors and administrators”293 
                                                                                                                           
might seem that there could be no better constitution than one which united the execu-
tive power with the legislative; in fact, this very union makes that form of government 
deficient . . . .”). 
 289. Gilbert Tennent, Sermon on Corinthians 10:31 (1743), in Twenty Three Sermons 
upon the Chief End of Man 40 (Philadelphia, William Bradford 1744) [hereinafter 
Tennent Sermons]. In a separate sermon, Tennent made this comparison to the two great 
powers of government explicit: “The Law must be enacted by competent Power and Authority; 
because Legislation, as well as the Execution thereof, are Acts of Government.” Gilbert 
Tennent, Sermon on Deuteronomy 32:4 (1743), in Tennent Sermons, supra, at 278; see 
also Samuel Davies, The Good Soldier: Extracted from a Sermon Preached to a Company 
of Voluntiers, Raised at Virginia, August 17, 1755, at 3 (London, n. pub. 2d ed. 1755) 
(“[T]rue Courage . . . will render Men vigilant and cautious against Surprizes, prudent 
and deliberate in concerting their Measures, and steady and resolute in executing them.”). 
 290. Aquinas, supra note 111, at pt. I–II, question 16, art. 1 Objection 2, at 1475; see 
also id. pt. III supp., question 32, art. 6, at 6027 (“Now there are in us three principles of 
action; the first is the directing principle, namely, the cognitive power; the second is the 
commanding principle, namely, the appetitive power; the third is the executive principle, 
namely, the motive power.”). Aquinas also observed: 
Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And 
the last act that belongs to the first relation of the will to the means, is 
choice . . . . Use, on the other hand, belongs to the second relation of 
the will, in respect of which it tends to the realization of the thing willed. 
Wherefore it is evident that use follows choice; provided that by use we 
mean the will’s use of the executive power in moving it. 
Id. pt. I–II, question 4, art. 4, at 1479. 
 291. 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, supra note 145, ch. 3, § 1, at 5. 
 292. Bacon, New Atlantis, supra note 130, at 456. 
 293. See, e.g., Slade’s Case (1602) 76 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1077; 4 Co. Rep. 91 a, 94 b (KB) 
(“executors or administrators”); Bacon, The Common Law, supra note 129, at 142 
(“executors or administrators” of a principal); John Cowell, A Law Dictionary: Or, the 
Interpreter of Words and Terms (London, printed for D. Browne et al. 1708) (using 
“executor or administrator” in the definitions of “Administration” and “Inventory”); 
Stewart Kyd, A Treatise on the Law of Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes 24 
(London, printed for J. Johnson et al. 3d ed. 1795) (noting the “executors, administrators, 
and assigns” of a principal). The formulation recurred in statutes as well. E.g., 1605–1606, 
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and “execution and administration” 294  become formulaic. Indeed, 
Justinian’s Institutes taught that if you went beyond your instructions, you 
were no longer engaged in execution: You could no longer intelligibly 
speak of your actions as a manifestation of executive power.295 Execution 
also had a significant association with success: not merely an attempt to 
perform the plan but the actual consummation thereof.296 In this vein, 
three standard objects of “execution” were a judicial writ,297 a legal 
judgment,298 and a creative work.299 
1. The “Empty Vessel” Nature of Executive Power in a Constitutional 
Context. — Applying “executive power” to the special case of state action 
was thus pretty straightforward. It was the implementing power: the 
authority to deploy the massed force of the state to bring legislated inten-
tions into effect, especially the laws and their intended consequences. 
Notably, this concept of bringing-into-being extended to all decisions 
                                                                                                                           
3 Jac. 1 c. 5, § 14 (Eng.) (“[S]uch Recusants . . . shall be disabled to be Executor[s] or 
Administrator[s] . . . .”); 1697–1698, 9 Will. 3 c. 35, § 1 (Eng.) (noting that the second 
conviction for “deny[ing] the Christian Religion” resulted in being “disabled . . . to be [a] 
Guardian[,] . . . Executor, or Administrator). 
 294. Finch, supra note 88, bk. I, ch. III, at 32 (discussing the “constituting [of] a new 
Sheriff, viz. for the Execution and Administration of Justice”). 
 295. See Justinian, supra note 136, bk. III, ch. XXVII, § 8, at 89–90 (“He, who executes 
a mandate ought not to exceed the bounds of it . . . .”); see also Finch, supra note 88, bk. 
II, ch. IX, at 77 (discussing “[o]fficers negligent or corrupt, who do not execute their 
office as of right they ought”). 
 296. Writers sometimes played on an obvious double meaning: “If, upon judgment to 
be hanged by the neck till he be dead, the criminal be not thereby killed, but revives, the 
sheriff must hang him again: for the former hanging was no execution of the 
sentence . . . .” Richard Burn, New Law Dictionary 287 (Dublin, Brett Smith 1792) 
[hereinafter Burn, New Law Dictionary]; see also Beccaria, supra note 117, at 153 (“The 
importance of preventing even attempts to commit a crime sufficiently authorises a 
punishment; but, as there may be an interval of time between the attempt and the 
execution . . . .”); Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, Letters on the Study and Use of 
History 182 (n.p., JJ. Tourneisen 1791) (“The emperor . . . attempted little against France, 
and the little he did attempt was ill ordered, and worse executed.”); 2 Edward Hyde East, 
A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 509 (Philadelphia, printed for P. Byrne 1806) (“The 
breaking and entry of the mansion in the night must be with intent to commit some felony 
therein . . . whether the felonious intent be executed or not.”); The Grand Remonstrance, 
supra note 148, para. 81, at 218 (“[S]uch violent intentions were not brought into 
execution.”); id. para. 176, at 228 (“[I]f by God’s wonderful providence their main 
enterprise upon the city and castle of Dublin had not been detected and prevented upon 
the very eve before it should have been executed.”). 
 297. See generally Anthony Fitz-Herbert, The New Natura Brevium (London, A. 
Strahan & W. Woodfall 9th ed. 1794) (1534) (describing various types of judicial writs). 
 298. Examples are ubiquitous. For a specific dictionary definition, see Burn, New Law 
Dictionary, supra note 296, at 280 (“EXECUTION (in civil cases), signifies the obtaining 
of actual possession of any thing acquired by judgment of law.”); see also, e.g., Matthew 
Hale, The History of the Common Law of England 23–24 (Charles M. Gray ed., 1971) 
(1713) (discussing the “Coertion or Excution” of an ecclesiastical court judgment). 
 299. See, e.g., Hobbes, supra note 117, at 275 (discussing “the execution of some 
supernaturall work”); Plowden, Preface, supra note 278, at v (“And in order that I might 
execute this Work with the utmost Sincerity and Truth . . . .”). 
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about state action of any sort—which for their part could only be 
designated by an exercise of legislative power. That’s why Locke begins 
with the broadest possible definition of legislation: “The legislative power 
is that, which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth 
shall be employed . . . .”300 The implementation of authoritatively formu-
lated intent was intrinsic to the very concept of the executive function, 
both grammatically and in principle. 
By the Founding, the implementatory essence of executive power 
was most often expressed in terms of Locke’s vision of law as an interlock-
ing tripartite phenomenon: First the law must be legislated, then in at 
least some cases it must be adjudicated, and then its requirements must be 
executed. While this trinitarian scheme still dominates our modern under-
standing of the law-related functions of government, it’s worth noting 
that many joined Blackstone in describing the essential powers of govern-
ment as two interlocked halves of a whole: the “legislative . . . authority” 
as “the right . . . of making . . . the laws,” and the “executive authority” as 
“the right . . . of enforcing” them.301 This uncertainty about whether to 
classify judicial power as a distinct authority or as a subset of executive 
power ran deep,302 but for present purposes it doesn’t matter in the 
slightest. That’s because all formulations were identical on the crucial 
point: Exercising “the executive power” meant bringing the legislated 
intentions of society into being. As Obadiah Hulme put it in his much-
praised Historical Essay on the English Constitution: “The king, who is in the 
constant exercise, of the executive power, in the state, always did the 
business of the state; and therefore, it immediately falls within his prov-
ince, to see any plan, of national utility, put into execution . . . .”303 
In its famous 1774 Appeal to the Inhabitants of Quebec, the Continental 
Congress described the standard framework in similar terms: 
                                                                                                                           
 300. Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, § 144, at 164. 
 301. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *146; see also supra note 190 and accompanying 
text. 
 302. As a colonial pamphlet explained: 
Government is generally distinguished into three parts, Executive, 
Legislative and Judicial; . . . [but] however we may refine and define, 
there is no more than two powers in any government, viz. the power to 
make laws, and the power to execute them; for the judicial power is only 
a branch of the executive, the CHIEF of every country being the first 
magistrate. 
Letter IV, supra note 88, at 21; see also, e.g., A Farmer of New Jersey, Observations on 
Government, New York, Nov. 3, 1787, reprinted in 19 Documentary History, supra note 70, 
at 181, 183 (proposing “[t]hat the [draft Constitution’s] executive be divided into THREE 
GRAND DEPARTMENTS,” headed by “The President . . . The Chief Justice . . . [and] 
[t]he Superintendent of Finance”); Speech of Nathaniel Fiennes (Feb. 9, 1640), in 4 
Historical Collections, supra note 99, at 174, 178 (London, printed for Richard Chiswell & 
Thomas Cockerill 1692) (“And here, Mr. Speaker, give me leave to lament the Condition of 
this our Church of England . . . . As to the Executive part, which consisteth in the exercise of 
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, therein I note also two Disorders, Confusion and Corruption . . . .”). 
 303. Hulme, supra note 211, at 182. 
2019] ARTICLE II VESTS THE EXECUTIVE POWER 1239 
 
You have a Governor, it may be urged, vested with the executive 
powers or the powers of administration. In him and in your 
Council is lodged the power of making laws. You have Judges who 
are to decide every cause affecting your lives, liberty or property. 
Here is, indeed, an appearance of the several powers being 
separated and distributed into different hands for checks one upon 
another . . . .304 
To put it mildly, such constitutional formulations about the “execution” of 
“law” were pervasive, including both those that used the specific phrase 
“executive power” and those that did not.305 
This definition of executive power necessarily entailed both its 
subsequence and its subordination to the legislative power. As pastor Gad 
Hitchcock explained in his famous 1774 Election Day sermon—before an 
audience that included the British military governor for Massachusetts—
“the executive power is strictly no other than the legislative carried forward, 
and of course, controlable by it.”306 Scottish philosopher David Hume summa-
rized the matter as an uncontroversial and fully generalizable point of politi-
cal theory: “[T]he executive power in every government is altogether subor-
dinate to the legislative . . . .”307 A long and diverse list of commentators—
                                                                                                                           
 304. Cont’l Cong., Appeal to the Inhabitants of Quebec (Oct. 26, 1774), reprinted in 1 
American Political Writing, supra note 256, at 231, 236. The Americans continued by 
helpfully explaining to their northern neighbors that this was just an illusion, a 
“tinsel’d . . . ‘sepulchre’ for burying your lives, liberty and property.” Id. 
 305. For a tiny inlet in the vast sea of such usages, see, for example, Beccaria, supra 
note 117, at 117 (“a magistrate, the executor of the laws”); id. at 176 (“Clemency is a 
virtue which belongs to the legislator, and not to the executor of the laws . . . . Let, then, 
the executors of the laws be inexorable, but let the legislator be tender, indulgent, and 
humane.”); Cowell, Institutes, supra note 117, at 2 (“[I]t is requisite likewise, [t]hat there 
be Magistrates ordained, . . . [so that] the Lawes may be put in execution . . . .”); 2 Hugo 
Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace 1031 (Richard Tuck ed., Liberty Fund 2005) (1625) 
(“[I]n a Civil State [religion’s function] is partly supplied by the Laws, and the easy 
Execution of the Laws; whereas . . . in the universal Society of Mankind, the Execution of 
Right is very difficult . . . and the Laws are very few, . . . [deriving] their Force chiefly from 
the Fear of a Deity . . . .”); Hobbes, supra note 117, at 231 (“[T]he procuration of the safety 
of the people . . . should be done . . . by a generall Providence, contained in publique 
Instruction, both of Doctrine, and Example; and in the making, and executing of good 
Lawes . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Voltaire, Commentary, supra note 154, at xvii (“[T]his 
law, like many others, remained unexecuted . . . .”); The Grand Remonstrance, supra note 
148, at 205 (pleading for the “due execution of those good laws which have been made for 
securing the liberty of [the King’s] subjects”). 
 306. Gad Hitchcock, An Election Sermon (Boston 1774), reprinted in 1 American 
Political Writing, supra note 256, at 281, 295 (“Legislators . . . should know how to give 
force, and operation to their laws . . . . This, indeed, is to be done by means of the execu-
tive part . . . .”). For more on the context of this annual sermon series, see generally Lindsay 
Swift, The Massachusetts Election Sermons: An Essay in Descriptive Bibliography (Cambridge, 
John Wilson & Son Univ. Press 1897). 
 307. Hume, Independency of Parliament, supra note 95, at 44 (emphasis added). 
Hume clarified that this was a global point, distinct from the English Crown’s practical 
need for money. See id.; see also David Hume, Essay XVI: Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth 
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including but not limited to parliamentary partisans like William Prynne,308 
Philip Hunton,309 and John Locke310—were in accord.311 That’s why the 
great eighteenth-century historian Catherine Macaulay could call it 
                                                                                                                           
(1777), reprinted in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, supra note 95, at 512, 526 
(stating that “the legislative power [is] always superior to the executive”). 
 308. Prynne explored the point at some length: 
Military Affaires of the kingdome heretofore, have usually, even of right, 
(for their originall determining, counselling, and disposing part) beene 
Ordered by the Parliament; the executive, or ministeriall part onely, by the 
King . . . . To instance in particulars.  
First, the denouncing of warre against forraine enemies, hath been 
usually concluded and resolved on by the Parliament, before it was pro-
claimed by the King . . . .  
. . . . 
Secondly, All preparations belonging to warre by Land and or Sea, 
have in the grosse and generall, beene usually ordered, limited and 
setled by the Parliaments . . . . 
William Prynne, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes (1643), reprinted 
in 1 David M. Hart, Tracts on Liberty by the Levellers and Their Critics (1638–1659) 315, 
323, 328 (David M. Hart & Ross Kenyon eds., 2015) (emphasis added). 
 309. See Hunton, A Treatise of Monarchy, supra note 96, pt. I, ch. IV, § 2, at 26 
(“[S]upreme power [is] either the Legislative, or the Gubernative  . . . [and] the Legislative 
power . . . is the chief of the two.”). 
 310. See Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, §§ 149–150, at 166 (“[T]here can be 
but one supreme power, which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be 
subordinate . . . . In all cases, whilst the government subsists, the legislative is the supreme 
power: for what can give laws to another, must needs be superior to him . . . .”). 
 311. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“If . . . a government[] . . . were established, by a Constitution, which 
imposed no limits on the legislative power, the consequence would inevitably be, that 
whatever the legislative power chose to enact, would be lawfully enacted, and the judicial 
power could never interpose to pronounce it void.”); 2 Burlamaqui, supra note 117, at 
394, pt. III, ch. I, at 403–04 (“Among the essential parts of sovereignty, we have given the 
first rank to the legislative power . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Charles Chauncy, Civil 
Magistrates Must Be Just, Ruling in the Fear of God (1747), reprinted in 1 Political 
Sermons of the American Founding Era, 1730–1805, at 148 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1998) 
[hereinafter Political Sermons] (“[T]he laws are the rule for the executive powers in the 
government.”). Consider also pastor Samuel Sherwood’s entreaty in his famous Revolutionary 
War sermon: 
[R]ulers considered either in their legislative or executive capacity . . . 
must be just. Particularly,  
1. There is justice to be observed in making laws. The legislative 
authority is usually stiled supreme. The power of making laws is un-
doubtedly the highest in every society. The executive officers are obliged 
to observe the rule prescribed them by the legislators . . . . 
. . . . 
2. Rulers considered in their executive capacity as putting laws in 
executive, must be just. Executive officers are obliged to proceed accord-
ing to the received and established laws of their country. 
Samuel Sherwood, A Sermon, Containing Scriptural Instructions to Civil Rulers, and All 
Free-born Subjects (Aug. 31, 1774), reprinted in 1 Political Sermons, supra, at 375, 387, 
389. 
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“absurd”—strictly as a matter of logic—for Charles I to claim sovereignty 
over the estates, “since no power can be superior to the legislative; and if 
the King is not part of the legislative, he can be only the executive, which 
is a power subordinate to the legislative.”312 And that’s likewise why 
writers seeking to limit magistrates to the executive power could describe 
the “executive branch of government” as being charged “only to 
perform, (without a will of their own), what the constitution and 
representation enacts.”313 
Far from disagreeing, even the most royalist writers emphasized—
often with some disdain—that “the executive power” by definition “de-
rived from” the legislative power. The divine right theorist Filmer was 
especially contemptuous: “When the law must rule and govern the 
monarch, and not the monarch the law, he hath at the most but a 
gubernative or executive power.” 314  It was precisely because of the 
subsequent and subordinate nature of this power that Filmer rejected it as 
the basis for the English king’s powers: “[A] limited monarch must 
govern according to law only. Thus is he brought from the legislative to 
the gubernative or executive power only.”315 Other writers sympathetic to 
the monarchy were similarly dismissive of “executive power” as a 
factotum’s charge. The German jurist Samuel Pufendorf observed that it 
“is characteristic of a minister or a bare executor” to “have the strength 
by which you may compel others, but only if another decides that it 
should be brought to bear.”316 Old Whig parliamentarian Edmund Burke 
scolded “many on the continent” who “altogether mistake the condition 
of a King of Great Britain” as “an executive officer.”317 To the contrary, 
Burke explained, “[h]e is a real King,” certainly “if he will not trouble 
himself with contemptible details, nor wish to degrade himself by 
becoming a party from little squabbles.”318 The less-categorizable Adam 
Smith captured a similarly dismissive flavor: “The leading men of 
                                                                                                                           
 312. See 3 Macaulay, supra note 71, at 6 n*. 
 313. See Of the Distribution of Authority, in Rudiments of Law and Government Deduced 
from the Law of Nature (1783), reprinted in 1 American Political Writing, supra note 256, 
at 565, 585, 587. 
 314. Filmer, The Anarchy, supra note 12, at 136. For the same point in a more neutral 
register, see Bolingbroke’s observation that “the executive power [is] trusted to the prince, 
to be exercised according to such rules and by the ministry of such officers as are pre-
scribed by the laws and customs of this kingdom.” Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, 
A Dissertation upon Parties: Letter XIII (1734), reprinted in Bolingbroke: Political 
Writings 1, 124 (David Armitage ed., 1997). 
 315. Filmer, The Anarchy, supra note 12, at 136 (“When the law must rule and govern 
the monarch, and not the monarch the law, he hath at the most but a gubernative or exec-
utive power.”). 
 316. Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, supra note 117, bk. VII, ch. 4, at 223. 
 317. Letter from Edmund Burke to a Member of the [French] National Assembly 
(1791), reprinted in 8 The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, supra note 256, at 
294, 331 (L.G. Mitchell & William B. Todd eds., 1989). 
 318. Id. at 332. 
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America . . . feel, or imagine, that if their assemblies . . . should be so far 
degraded as to become the humble ministers and executive officers of 
[the British] parliament, the greater part of their own importance would 
be at an end.”319 
At times, Burke was even more explicit about the narrow scope of 
executive power, not only recognizing its “mere” implementatory nature 
but going out of his way to emphasize that it did not include the authority 
to make decisions about foreign and military affairs. Listen to his mock-
ery of the revolutionary French government: “[I]n their hurry to do every 
thing at once,” he jibed, “[they] have forgot one thing that seems essen-
tial, and which, I believe, never has been before, in the theory or the 
practice, omitted by any projector of a republic.”320 What was it? “[A] 
Senate, or something of that nature and character.”321 And why did the 
omission matter? Burke thought a government with only legislative and 
executive officers might forget to designate anyone to conduct foreign 
affairs: 
Never, before this time, was heard of a body politic composed of 
one legislative and active assembly, and its executive officers, 
without such a council; without something to which foreign 
states might connect themselves; something to which, in the 
ordinary detail of government, the people could look up; 
something which might give a bias and steadiness, and preserve 
something like consistency in the proceedings of state. Such a 
body kings generally have as a council. A monarchy may exist 
without it; but it seems to be in the very essence of a republican 
government. It holds a sort of middle place between the supreme 
power exercised by the people, or immediately delegated from 
them, and the mere executive.322 
Note that Burke had no problem believing in precisely the “constitu-
tional gap” that modern Residuum theorists find unthinkable. He knew 
what practicing lawyers and statesmen have never forgotten: Drafting is 
hard. 
All of this is to say that Blackstone was neither confused nor idiosyn-
cratic when he described the executive power as the power to enforce the 
                                                                                                                           
 319. 2 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
bk. IV, ch. VII, at 231 (London, printed for W. Strahan and T. Cadell 1776). For a similar 
rhetorical flavor from an American Revolutionary, see Letter from James Mitchell Varnum 
to William Greene (Apr. 1781), in 17 Letters of Delegates to Congress: March 1–August 
31, 1781, at 115, 117 (Smith et al. eds., 1990) (“Our Time is consumed in trifling executive 
Business, while Objects of the greatest Magnitude are postponed, or rejected as subversive 
in their Nature, of democratical Liberty.”). 
 320. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) [hereinafter 
Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France], reprinted in 8 Writings and Speeches of 
Edmund Burke, supra note 256, at 53, 245. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 245–46, 273 (summarizing Burke’s “few remarks on the constitution of the 
supreme [that is, legislative] power, the executive, the judicature, the military, and on the 
reciprocal relation of all these establishments”). 
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law. Here as in most other respects, the eighteenth century’s greatest law 
treatise was just reciting a relatively bland restatement of conventional 
wisdom.323 Even at the most royalist stage of the political story traced in 
section II.A, and even according to the most royalist writers, this concep-
tual understanding of “the executive power” was common currency—
simply a special case of the same phrase when applied to human affairs in 
general. It was the power to execute a law or project that had been sepa-
rately authorized by some other source of government authority: perhaps 
a statute; perhaps the common law; perhaps a royal decree issued 
pursuant to a different branch of prerogative. The key conceptual point 
was that “executive power” referred to the downstream implementing 
authority, not to its upstream authorization. Without a source, you can’t 
have a fountain;324 without a planet, the idea of a satellite makes no 
sense.325 
IV. WHY HAVE RESIDUUM PROPONENTS MISUNDERSTOOD THIS EVIDENCE? 
We are left with a puzzle. In the face of such overwhelming evidence, 
how did the Royal Residuum Thesis come to conflate the overarching 
category of royal prerogative with a single sub-item on the incredibly 
long list of authorities that it included? How could a Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                           
 323. See, e.g., 4 Goldsmith, supra note 71, at 338–39 (explaining that the Commons 
was “armed with no legal executive powers to compel obedience”); Letter from Abbé de 
Mably to John Adams, in Remarks Concerning the Government and Laws of the United 
States of America 41, 65 (Dublin, printed for Moncrieffe et al. 1785) (“Let us now come to 
the executive power, without which it were a[] useless task to frame a law.”). Daniel Shute, 
a Congregationalist minister and delegate to the Massachusetts convention, espoused a 
similar view in an election sermon to the Massachusetts governor and house of 
representatives: 
The wellfare of the province . . . [is the] purpose [for which] the 
legislative and executive powers are to be exercised. But laws are useless 
in a state, unless they are obeyed; nor will putting the executive power 
into the best hands avail to the designed purpose, if there is not proper 
application made to it . . . for in proportion to the want of this applica-
tion the most excellent code of laws will be a dead letter. It is neces-
sary . . . to give life and energy to the laws in producing the designed 
happy effects. 
We [thus] have good laws; and magistrates appointed to put those 
laws into execution . . . . 
Daniel Shute, An Election Sermon (Boston 1768), reprinted in 1 American Political 
Writing, supra note 256, at 109, 132. 
 324. See Davies, Report of Cases in Ireland, supra note 120, at 21 (“[W]hat is the King 
himself, but the clear Fountain of Justice? [A]nd what are the Professors of the Law but 
the Conduit-pipes deriving and conveying the streams of his Justice to all the subjects of 
his several Kingdoms?”). 
 325. See Peres [Perez] Fobes, An Election Sermon (Boston 1795), reprinted in 2 
American Political Writing, supra note 256, at 990, 1003 (developing a metaphor of 
government as a solar system to note that “a number of secondaries perform their judicial 
circuits in periodical times” and “are attended with satellites of executive power”). 
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Justice wind up writing the following, catastrophically incorrect summary 
of the evidence: 
Founding-era evidence reveals that the “executive Power” 
included the foreign affairs powers of a sovereign State. . . . 
. . . William Blackstone, for example, described the execu-
tive power in England as including foreign affairs powers . . . . 
. . . . 
This view of executive power was widespread at the time of 
the framing of the Constitution. . . . Given this pervasive view of 
executive power, it is unsurprising that those who ratified the 
Constitution understood the “executive Power” vested by Article 
II to include those foreign affairs powers not otherwise allo-
cated in the Constitution.326 
Not one sentence in that excerpt is right. For the moment, though, focus 
only on Justice Thomas’s claim about the Founding Generation’s “pervasive 
view of executive power.”327 How could he have gotten it so wrong? 
This Part will focus on three reasons, starting with mistakes in the 
scholarship on which Justice Thomas relies.328 First and most important, 
while looking for evidence in the historical materials, Royal Residuum 
theorists have systematically confused two different things: (1) the use of 
the phrase “executive power” to reference a conceptual power capable of 
being “vested,” and (2) the use of the phrase “the executive” as a meto-
nym for the political entity in which that conceptual power was vested. 
Second, Royal Residuum theorists have misread an idiosyncratic taxon-
omy adopted by the eighteenth-century authors Thomas Rutherforth 
and Montesquieu, who didn’t actually contradict the fundamental 
conceptual structure described above at all. The third reason is a little 
different. It has to do not with errors made by the theory’s champions 
but with the ready audience they find in many lawyers and academics. 
Some listeners’ receptivity may of course result from what they want 
                                                                                                                           
 326. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2098–99 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). I did try to warn him. See Julian Davis Mortenson, 
The Supreme Court Should Stay Far Away from the Vesting Clause in Zivitofsky [sic], 
Lawfare (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-should-stay-far-
away-vesting-clause-zivitofsky [https://perma.cc/B2AL-94AB] (“My only point here is to 
urge any Justice who considers the Vesting Clause argument to take a couple of hours and 
read Blackstone—or at least assign the first nine chapters of Book I of the Commentaries to a 
clerk.”). 
 327. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2099. 
 328. Royal Residuum theorists are surely influenced, it must be said, by an ambiguous 
passage from Alexander Hamilton’s multi-essay defense of the Washington Administration’s 
right to state out loud its interpretation of various treaty obligations. See supra note 7 
(citing Hamilton’s first Pacificus pamphlet). I don’t think Hamilton erred so much as he 
sought to wring a meaning from Article II that he was famously unable to win at the 
Convention itself. Not for nothing was he known as “one of the best legal minds in the 
country.” Martin S. Flaherty, Restoring the Global Judiciary: Why the Supreme Court 
Should Rule in U.S. Foreign Affairs (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 120) (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). 
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presidential power to be—a bias to which none of us is immune. The 
more significant reason, however, seems to be a common misunderstand-
ing of what the Founders meant by a “separation” of powers in the first 
place. 
A.  The First Scholarly Error: Attributing the Whole to the Part 
By far the most important mistake of the Royal Residuum Thesis is 
its systematic conflation of two different things: (1) the Constitution’s use 
of “executive” to describe a particular power of government with (2) the 
historical sources’ use of “executive” as metonymy for the political entity 
that possesses both that particular power and also many others. It’s hard to 
overstate the pervasiveness of this error.329 So far as I can tell, every single 
piece of evidence from pre-Framing commentary cited in support of the 
Thesis—other than the misunderstanding of Rutherforth and Montesquieu 
discussed below—is a trivially demonstrable conflation of these two 
meanings. 
At bottom, the point is simple. The eighteenth-century practice of 
referring to presidents, governors, prime ministers, stadtholders, and 
emperors as “the executive” was an everyday metonymy:330 the use of 
something associated with the referent as a name for the referent itself, 
like talking about “head” of cattle or “boots” on the ground. This was 
neither semantically confused nor substantively controversial: Today, we 
likewise use “the executive” as shorthand for our governors, presidents, 
and prime ministers because they all count the executive power as one of 
                                                                                                                           
 329. It is worth noting that, while unmistakable, the error is perhaps understandable. 
It is akin to the linguistic phenomenon of semantic drift, which describes the process by 
which a word or phrase evolves to mean something very different from its original 
meaning over time. Consider, for example, the path of words like “terrible” and “awful,” 
where widespread error by prescriptive lights eventually changed the meaning of both 
terms. Cf. J.D. Sadler, Semantics: The Ups and Downs, 68 Classical J. 262 (1973). Certainly, 
scholars on both sides of the Executive Power Clause debate have been tempted by this 
error. In addition to the examples below, see, for example, Flaherty, Most Dangerous 
Branch, supra note 59, at 1774 (“[T]he [Northwest] Ordinance . . . accord[ed] the gover-
nor an absolute veto over legislation [and] the ‘power to convene, prorogue, and dissolve 
the general assembly when, in his opinion, it shall be expedient.’ This was arguably 
‘executive’ authority; British monarchs and royal colonial governors possessed these 
powers into the eighteenth century.” (quoting The Northwest Territorial Government, 1 
Stat. 50, at § 11 (1789)). Without wading into the debates over corpus linguistics—which 
doubtless has its uses—the metonymy error’s persistence even among those who have 
looked closely at the texts leaves me skeptical that database corpus techniques could shed 
much light on the Executive Power Clause. 
 330. I sometimes think that this use of “executive” is better characterized as synec-
doche than metonymy, the former being a more specific example of the latter. If we think 
of “the executive power” as being a constituent element of the political entity, then calling 
the President the executive is synecdoche in the same way as “all hands on deck.” If we 
think of “the executive power” as something related but not physically integral to the 
political entity, then it is a metonymy in the same way as “the pen is mightier than the 
sword.” Nothing substantive rides on this difference. Replace every reference to “meton-
ymy” in this Article with “synecdoche” and the analysis works precisely as written. 
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their authorities. But not even the most aggressive Residuum theorist 
would claim that all authorities held by “an executive” in this metonymic 
sense are part of “the executive power” in the relevant conceptual sense. 
Partly that’s because the claim is obviously wrong: Everyone agrees, for 
example, that the President’s veto is a quintessentially legislative act.331 
More profoundly, however, the problem is that this would turn the lin-
guistic logic of metonymy upside down. Rather than using the part as 
shorthand for the whole, this move crams all the features of the whole 
into the part. And that’s exactly backward. 
Think, for example, of referring to a seventeen-year-old boy as “a 
youth.” We do that because one attribute of the boy is his youth—his 
young age. So far, so uncontroversial. But in addition to his young age, the 
boy surely has other abilities and characteristics as well. Probably he can 
read and run. Probably he has ears and elbows. But even if in these 
respects this particular boy is pretty representative of boys in general, it 
would be incorrect to reason as follows: 
1. This boy is called a youth. 
2. This boy has ears. 
3. Therefore, it is an intrinsic feature of youth to have ears.332 
For an example closer to the political context, consider the practice 
of referring to an army as “a force.” The semantic logic of this metonymy 
is that the army has the capacity to be forceful—to compel, especially in a 
violent or kinetic fashion. And yet it would be nonsensical to include 
other characteristics of this army (even if shared by many other armies) 
in the dictionary definition of the word “force.” Probably this army is 
wearing uniforms. Probably its members carry rifles rather than halberds. 
Surely some of its members are qualified to deliver skilled medical care. 
But that would hardly lead us to conclude that it is a constituent element 
of “force” to be wearing a uniform, carrying any particular weapon, or 
wielding an EMT certification. 
And yet that is exactly what virtually all of the evidence for the Royal 
Residuum Thesis involves. There are far too many examples to list. But 
the error comes in two different versions. The first involves (1) accurately 
flagging an author’s metonymic reference to the king as “the executive” 
or “the executive authority,” and then (2) mistakenly concluding that all 
of the royal powers later described by the author are therefore 
                                                                                                                           
 331. See supra note 26 (outlining the President’s powers). 
 332. I have used the metonymic noun as the principal example. But the point applies 
with equal force to the use of metonymy in its adjective form. That is to say, it would be 
equally incorrect to reason as follows: 
1. This boy is the young person in our group. 
2. This boy has ears. 
3. Therefore, it is an intrinsic feature of being “young” to have ears. 
I am grateful to Henry Monaghan for pointing out that this is a version of the fallacy of the 
undistributed middle. 
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conceptually “executive.” The leading scholarly argument for the Royal 
Residuum Thesis, for example, states:  
According to Blackstone, the executive power ‘is the dele-
gate or representative of his people’ who transacts with ‘another 
community’ because it is impossible for individuals of one 
community to transact directly ‘the affairs of that state’ with 
another.333 
What Blackstone actually says in the cited text, however, is: “[T]he king is 
the delegate or representative of his people,” and “the king therefore, as 
in a center” must “transact the affairs of that state.”334 It’s only (much) 
earlier that Blackstone uses the shorthand “executive power”—in its 
metonymic sense—to refer to the king.335 
A second version of the error involves (1) accurately flagging an 
author’s observation that the king has the “executive power” of govern-
ment, but then (2) mistakenly suggesting that the all the other preroga-
tives later described by the author are therefore part of that “executive 
power” as well. So, for example, the leading modern Royal Residuum 
theorists assert: “Emmerich de Vattel, a leading European writer on the 
law of nations, said that the ‘conductor’ or ‘sovereign’ of a nation had 
the ‘executive power’ and consequently could enter into treaties, send 
emissaries, engage in war, and control the nation’s ambassadors.”336 But 
what Vattel actually wrote in the quoted passages was that: 
The executive power naturally belongs to the sovereign—to 
every conductor of a people: he is supposed to be invested with 
it, in its fullest extent, when the fundamental laws do not 
restrict it. When the laws are established, it is the prince’s prov-
ince to have them put in execution. To support them with 
                                                                                                                           
 333. Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 44, at 269 
(quoting 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *252). 
 334. 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *252. The relevant excerpt reads in its entirety as 
follows: 
With regard to foreign concerns, the king is the delegate or repre-
sentative of his people. It is impossible that the individuals of a state, in 
their collective capacity, can transact the affairs of that state with another 
community equally numerous as themselves. Unanimity must be wanting 
to their measures, and strength to the execution of their counsels. In the 
king therefore, as in a center, all the rays of his people are united, and 
form by that union a consistency, splendor, and power, that make him 
feared and respected by foreign potentates . . . . 
Id. 
 335. See, e.g., id. at *136, *141, *154, *164. Of course, the king did have these powers. 
But that doesn’t mean that they were part of “the executive power.” Indeed, Blackstone later 
refers to the king’s absolute negative as “a constituent part of the supreme legislative power.” 
Id. at *261. And no one, least of all Blackstone, sees the veto as “executive” in the concep-
tual sense. 
 336. Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 44, at 270 
(emphasis added) (quoting E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural 
Law 69, 100, 160–61, 235–36, 393 (photo. reprint 1993) (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 
Carnegie Inst. 1916) (1758)). 
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vigour, and to make a just application of them to all cases that 
present themselves, is what we call rendering justice. And this is 
the duty of the sovereign, who is naturally the judge of his 
people.337 
This is, of course, the textbook definition of executive power ex-
plained at length above; indeed, Vattel turned immediately from this 
point to an extended discussion of the judicial function, which had his-
torically been associated with the executive power in its law enforcement 
sense.338 It was only much later in Vattel’s discussion that he turned to the 
chief magistrate’s authority to enter treaties and send ambassadors.339 
And in those contexts, Vattel doesn’t use any variant of “executive” to 
describe the magistrate; rather, he refers to “the sovereign.”340 Far from 
suggesting that the latter powers are “consequent[]” to the “executive 
power,” Vattel makes clear that they have nothing to do with it—they are 
simply different branches of what the English called prerogative.341 
Make no mistake: Blackstone (and many others) did say that—in 
addition to the executive power—the king claimed a range of foreign 
affairs powers as part of his prerogative.342 And Blackstone (and many 
others) did variously refer to the Crown as “the executive,” “the executive 
magistrate,” “the executive part of government,” and sometimes even “the 
                                                                                                                           
 337. Vattel, supra note 267, bk. I, ch. XIII, § 162, at 187. Vattel used the phrase 
“executive power” only one other time in the work. See id. bk. II, ch. XVII, § 282, at 418. 
That use, too, was in the proper, conceptual sense. And that use, too, was obviously in 
reference to the execution of law: “[W]ise and free people have too often seen, by the 
experience of other nations, that the laws are no longer a firm barrier and secure defence, 
when once the executive power is allowed to interpret them at pleasure.” Id. Prakash and 
Ramsey cite to the 1916 Classics of International Law translation of Vattel’s text, but the 
substance of the two translations is identical in this respect. 
 338. See id. §§ 163–168, at 187–91. 
 339. See id. bk. II, ch. XII, §§ 154–156, at 338–40. 
 340. See id. 
 341. For a similar example, consider the leading Royal Residuum advocates’ claim that 
“Jean De Lolme . . . described the King’s executive power as including the ability to serve 
as ‘the representative and depository of all the power and collective majesty of the nation; 
he sends and receives ambassadors; he contracts alliances; and has the prerogative of 
declaring war and making peace.’” Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, supra note 44, at 270 (quoting J.L. De Lolme, The Constitution of England 50 
(photo. reprint 1999) (London, A. Hancock 1821)). But de Lolme didn’t say that at all. 
His chapter “Of the Executive Power” (“Du pouvoir exécutif”) follows his chapter “Of the 
Legislative Power” (“Puissance legislative”). In the first paragraph, it notes that “[w]hen 
the Parliament is prorogued or dissolved, . . . its laws still continue to be in force: the King 
remains charged with the execution of them, and is supplied with the necessary power for that 
purpose.” De Lolme, Constitution of England, supra note 105, bk. I, ch. IV, at 71 (emphasis 
added). De Lolme then goes on to catalogue the king’s other prerogatives, starting with the 
unequivocally legislative right to veto proposed enactments: “the share allotted to him in 
the legislative authority” by way of “giv[ing] or refus[ing] his assent to the bills presented 
to him.” Id. De Lolme’s reference to foreign affairs powers comes about eighth in a list of 
additional authorities that he discusses after the king’s executive power. Id. at 73. 
 342. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, at *252–261. 
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executive power.”343 But neither of those facts, nor both in combination, 
supports the erroneous claim that “William Blackstone . . . described the 
executive power [in its conceptual sense] . . . as including foreign affairs 
powers.”344 Instead, Blackstone described the Crown as having various for-
eign affairs powers, in addition to the distinct power to execute the laws. 
And he used “the executive” as a shorthand for the political entity, rather 
than as an umbrella category for the activity or function. So long as you 
bear this simple grammatical distinction in mind, the bookshelf evidence 
offered for the Royal Residuum Thesis simply evaporates as you read it. 
                                                                                                                           
 343. See id. at *336 (“We have therefore now chalked out all the principal outlines of 
this vast title of the law, the supreme executive magistrate, or the king’s majesty . . . [and] 
the power of the executive magistrate, or prerogative of the crown . . . .”); id. at *336–337 
(“[The post-Restoration reforms] put together give the executive power so persuasive an 
energy with respect to the persons themselves . . . as will amply make amends for the loss 
of external prerogative . . . . The stern commands of prerogative have yielded to the 
milder voice of influence.”). De Lolme deployed the same usage: 
But all these general precautions to secure the rights of the 
Parliament, that is, those of the Nation itself, against the efforts of the 
executive Power, would be vain, if the Members themselves remained 
personally exposed to them. Being unable openly to attack, with any 
safety to itself, the two legislative bodies, and by a forcible exertion of its 
prerogatives, to make, as it were, a general assault, the executive power 
might, by subdividing the same prerogatives, gain an entrance, and 
sometimes by interest, and at others by fear, guide the general will, by 
influencing that of individuals. 
De Lolme, Constitution of England, supra note 105, bk. I, ch. VIII, at 96–97. For an 
American example, consider Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, prohibiting states 
from “enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power” without the 
permission of Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
There is one sentence in which Blackstone could be read to refer casually to the king’s 
powers as “constitu[ing] the executive power of the government.” See 1 Blackstone, supra 
note 78, at *281 (“[H]aving . . . considered at large those branches of the king’s preroga-
tive, which contribute to his royal dignity, and constitute the executive power of the gov-
ernment . . . .”). In context—not least since the subset of powers referenced include the 
Crown veto, id. at *250, *261, which everyone including Blackstone agreed was legislative 
under his classification—this seems best read as a metonymic reference to the constitution 
of the entity of the Crown. To read it as a considered conceptual reference to a function of 
government would require rejecting the entire organization of Blackstone’s constitutional 
framework, see supra notes 192–207 and accompanying text, ignoring Blackstone’s own 
repeated definitions of “executive power,” see supra note 190 and accompanying text, 
ignoring his unvarying use of “prerogative” rather than “executive power” to describe the 
conceptual authorities throughout the referenced section, see 1 Blackstone, supra note 78, 
at *236–279, and contradicting every other contemporary treatment of the question, see 
supra notes 253–257 and accompanying text. Even if it’s semantically possible to misread 
the sentence in isolation, the Founders would have to be shown to have done so for the 
error to be relevant to Article II. I can find no reference to this sentence—let alone a mis-
reading of it—anywhere in the Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution. 
 344. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2099 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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B.  The Second Scholarly Error: Misunderstanding “Internal Executive” and 
“External Executive” 
The second source of confusion is rooted in the idiosyncratic taxon-
omy of two eighteenth-century writers—the minor Rutherforth and the 
major Montesquieu. Modern advocates of the Royal Residuum Thesis 
have relied on snippets from Montesquieu345 and Rutherforth346 in a 
way that is both inaccurate and also disproportionate to their taxonomy’s 
contemporary significance.347 In this section I will show that the Royal 
                                                                                                                           
 345. E.g., Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 44, at 
268 (“Montesquieu . . . helped usher in the late eighteenth-century view that the execu-
tive power had domestic and foreign affairs components.”); Prakash & Ramsey, The 
Jeffersonian Executive, supra note 10, at 1632–35, 1637 (“Montesquieu categorized 
foreign affairs powers as executive powers.”). 
 346. E.g., Prakash & Ramsey, Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 44, at 
269–70 (identifying Rutherforth as a “prominent eighteenth-century writer[] [who] 
identified foreign affairs power as executive power”); Prakash & Ramsey, The Jeffersonian 
Executive, supra note 10, at 1638–39 (“Rutherforth . . . confirms the conventional descrip-
tion of powers, and the conventional definition of foreign affairs powers as executive.”). 
 347. Modern Royal Residuum authors have also relied on a set of resolutions passed by 
a county assembly in Essex County, Massachusetts. See Theophilus Parsons, The Essex 
Result (1778), reprinted in 1 American Political Writing, supra note 256, at 480; Prakash & 
Ramsey, The Jeffersonian Executive, supra note 10, at 1643–44; John C. Yoo, The 
Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 
Calif. L. Rev. 167, 231–32 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo, The Continuation of Politics]. That 
reliance seems quite mistaken. 
As a substantive matter, the Essex Result simply adopts the taxonomic distinction 
introduced by Rutherforth and Montesquieu, with the same focus on actions taken—a 
reading underscored by its author’s comments at the Massachusetts ratifying convention a 
decade later. See Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, supra note 13, at 46 (describing 
Theophilus Parsons’s discussion of “executive power” in the Massachusetts convention). 
That said, I leave it in a footnote here because, so far as I can tell, the Essex Result seems 
to have had no impact outside of Massachusetts. I have yet to see a single contemporane-
ous source supporting the proposition that it was any more influential on the national 
debate than the hundreds of other pamphlets that appeared in the second half of the 
eighteenth century. (The 1859 remembrance of the author’s son—almost eighty years 
later—is neither contemporaneous nor exactly neutral.) So far as I can tell, it is not cited 
even once—by author, by town of origin, or by paraphrase—in the documents collected 
during almost five decades of work by the team responsible for The Documentary History of 
the Ratification of the Constitution. Besides the 1859 memoir of Parsons fils, see Theophilus 
Parsons, Memoir of Theophilus Parsons, Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts 454 (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 1859), the earliest citation appears to be in 
Charles Thach’s 1922 description of the Result as a “document, from the pen of a future 
State chief justice, [which] may be fairly considered as representative of conservative 
Massachusetts opinion.” Thach, supra note 29, at 44 (providing no citation other than the 
memoir of Theophilus Parsons’s son). 
To be clear, the Essex Result is a terrific piece of work, and well worth study. Substan-
tively, though, it is even less relevant to the Royal Residuum Thesis than Montesquieu or 
Rutherforth, because it expressly declares the external executive beyond its scope of 
discussion. That said, it is indeed “a most remarkable document.” Vile, supra note 37, at 
165; see also Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions 21 (Rita Kimber & 
Robert Kimber trans., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. expanded ed. 2001) (1940) 
[hereinafter Adams, The First American Constitutions]. I cannot find the slightest indica-
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Residuum Thesis’s heavy reliance on these two writers is substantively 
mistaken.348 Not only was the taxonomy of Montesquieu and Rutherforth 
idiosyncratic, but even taken on its own terms, their framework does not 
actually support a royal residuum at all. To the contrary, their discussion 
necessarily rejects it, for exactly the same reasons that the rest of the 
literature does too. 
But first, what did Montesquieu and Rutherforth say? For them, it 
was taxonomically important to distinguish between the application of 
“the executive power” to internal objects and its application to external 
objects. In his Institutes, Rutherforth wrote: 
[T]he executive power is either internal or external. We may 
call it internal when it is exercised upon objects within the soci-
ety; when it is employed in securing the rights[,] or enforcing 
the duties of the several members, in respect either of one 
another or of the society itself. And we may call it external exec-
utive power, when it is exercised upon objects out of the society; 
when it is employed in protecting either the body or the several 
members of it against external injuries . . . .349 
Montesquieu said something similar: “In every government there are 
three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive [la puissance exécutrice], 
in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive, 
in regard to things that depend on the civil law.”350 Note that his definition 
was even narrower than Rutherforth’s, identifying both forms of execu-
tive power as involving the authority to implement strictly legalized entitle-
ments and authorizations. 
1. Montesquieu’s Taxonomy of “Executive Power” Was Just an Expositional 
Tool to Organize His Otherwise Standard Use of the Concept. — First and most 
important, the substance of Rutherforth and Montesquieu’s discussion 
reflected an entirely standard understanding of “the executive power” as 
a general concept. Their taxonomic wrinkle was no conceptual revolu-
tion. It served simply to highlight the rather mundane point that govern-
ment force can be directed in one of two directions: inward or outward. 
In both realms, “the executive power” is the power to execute—the power 
to follow through on a plan, desire, or instruction. It is just that the 
                                                                                                                           
tion, however, that Parsons’s work registered in, let alone influenced, the national 
discussion. I would be grateful to be alerted to any evidence I have missed. 
 348. Cf. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 37, at 563–64 (2004) (suggesting that 
Montesquieu’s discussion is unclear and self-contradictory); see also Vile, supra note 37, at 
93–101 (making similar points). 
 349. 2 Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law 59 (Philadelphia, printed for 
William Young 3d ed. 1799) [hereinafter Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law]. 
 350. 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 221. In the 
original French, Montesquieu wrote, “Il y a, dans chaque état trois sortes de pouvoirs; la 
puissance législative, la puissance exécutrice des choses qui dépendent du droit des gens, 
& la puissance exécutrice de celles qui dépendent du droit civil.” 1 Montesquieu, De 
l’Esprit des Lois, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 311. 
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power is “internal” when performed internally; “external” when per-
formed externally. 
If you read Rutherforth’s entire discussion of government powers, 
the point is not subtle:  
The legislative is the joint understanding of the society, 
directing what is proper to be done, and is therefore naturally 
superior to the executive, which is the joint strength of the soci-
ety exerting itself in taking care that what is so directed shall be 
done.351 
A leading review of his Institutes zeroed in on precisely this point: The 
internal and external versions were conceptually indistinguishable aspects 
of the same power to carry out an a priori instruction or plan. “It may be 
called internal,” the reviewer wrote, “when exercised upon members of 
the society; external, when exercised upon persons neither belonging to 
the society, nor residing in it . . . .”352 
Montesquieu likewise left no doubt that the “legislative power” was 
the content-giving font of instructions to be carried out by the external 
“executive [power].” He could scarcely have been more specific—the leg-
islative power and the external executive power may each: 
be given . . . to magistrates or permanent bodies, because they 
are not exercised on any private subject; one being no more than 
the general will of the state, and the other the execution of that general 
will.353 
It’s for that reason that his account so tightly associated the separation of 
powers with the protection of liberty: “There would be an end of every 
thing, were the same man, or the same body, . . . to exercise those three 
powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, 
                                                                                                                           
 351. 2 Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, supra note 349, at 79. Rutherforth 
argued that “legislative power is thus found to be superior to executive, when they are con-
sidered in the abstract.” Id. In other words, the legislative power controls the executive 
power when both terms are used in the sense of functions of government rather than as 
metonymic references to the political entities to which they are contingently vested. 
 352. Rutherforth’s Institutes of Natural Law, Monthly Rev., July 1756, at 217, 219 
[hereinafter Review of Rutherforth’s Institutes]. For another political theorist’s reference 
to executive power as the motive force or the power of action, see, for example, Nathaniel 
Bacon, The Continuation of an Historical and Political Discourses of the Laws and 
Government of England 18 (London, printed for John Starkey 1682) (noting that privy 
councilors’ obligation to “do right in Judgment” concerns “immediately the King in his 
politick capacity, but trencheth upon all Laws of the Kingdom, in the executive power; and 
all the motions in the whole Kingdom, either of Peace or War”). 
 353. 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 225 
(emphasis added). For the original French, see 1 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois, supra 
note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 315–16 (“Les deux autres pouvoirs pourroient plutôt être 
donnés à des magistrats ou à des corps permanens, parce qu’ils ne s’exercent sur aucun 
particulier, n’étant, l’un, que la volonté générale de l’état; & l’autre, que l’exécution de 
cette volonté Générale.”). 
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and [that] of trying the [crimes] of individuals.”354 Every single example 
in Montesquieu’s weirdly celebrated sentence about the “law of nations” 
executive355 thus relates to the implementation of a plan—a plan that he 
has just finished telling us is defined in its entirety by an exercise of the 
relevant legislative power, wherever that happens to be vested.356 
Understanding the conceptual subordinacy of execution to legisla-
tive intention, however, doesn’t even require this close a reading of their 
respective accounts. This is because both authors go out of their way to 
insist that the executive power is conceptually every bit as subordinate to 
                                                                                                                           
 354. 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 222. In the 
original French: “Tout serait perdu, si le même homme, ou le même corps des principaux, 
ou des nobles, ou du peuple, exerçaient ces trois pouvoirs: celui de faire des lois, celui 
d’exécuter les resolutions publiques, & celui de juger les crimes ou les différents des par-
ticuliers.” 1 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 312–13. 
Montesquieu further wrote: 
In the republics of Italy, where these three powers are united, . . . 
[t]he same body of magistrates are possessed, as executors of the laws, of 
the whole power they have given themselves in quality of legislators . . . .  
. . . [T]hey have likewise the judiciary power in their hands, every pri-
vate citizen may be ruined by their particular decisions. 
1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 223. In the original 
French: 
Dans les républiques d’Italie, où ces trois pouvoirs sont réunis , . . .  
. . . [l]e même corps de magistrature a, comme exécuteur des lois, 
toute la puissance qu’il s’est donnée comme législateur. Il peut ravager 
l’etat par ses volontés générales; & comme il a encore la puissance de 
juger, il peut détruire chaque citoyen par ses volontés particulieres. 
1 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 313–14. 
 355. See infra section IV.B.2; see also 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 
179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 222 (“By the [executive power,] [the magistrate] makes peace or 
war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against inva-
sions.”); 1 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 311 (“Par la 
seconde, il fait la paix ou la guerre, envoie ou reçoit des ambassades, établit la sureté, 
prévient les invasions.”); cf. James Harrington, A Discourse Upon This Saying: The Spirit 
of the Nation is Not Yet to be Trusted With Liberty; Lest It Introduce Monarchy, or Invade 
the Liberty of Conscience (1659), reprinted in Political Works of Harrington, supra note 
266, at 735, 740 (highlighting the use of “executive power . . . in the management . . . of a 
war or treaty with foreign States” (emphasis added)). 
 356. Rousseau is almost identical in this respect: 
The mistake comes from having no precise notion of what 
sovereign authority is, and from taking mere manifestations of authority 
for parts of the authority itself. For instance, the acts of declaring war 
and making peace have been regarded as acts of sovereignty, which they 
are not; for neither of these acts constitutes a law, but only an applica-
tion of law, a particular act which determines how the law shall be inter-
preted—and all this will be obvious as soon as I have defined the idea 
which attaches to the word ‘law.’ 
Rousseau, supra note 120, bk. II, ch. 2, at 71. As he later explains, “The public force thus 
needs its own agent to call it together and put it into action in accordance with the 
instructions of the general will, . . . and in a sense to do for the public person what is done 
for the individual by the union of soul and body.” Id. bk. III, ch. 1, at 102. 
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the legislative power when acting on foreign objects as it is when acting 
domestically. Again, Rutherforth couldn’t be more explicit: 
[T]he external executive power, in its own nature, is no more 
an independent power of acting without being controlled by 
the legislative, than the internal executive power is. Even in 
those civil societies, where the particular constitution has left 
this power discretionary in some instances, it does not suffer it 
to be so in all.357 
This is exactly how Rutherforth’s eighteenth-century contemporaries 
understood him: “The Doctor is of opinion, that the executive power is 
derived from, and ought always to be held, as, in a very great measure, 
dependent upon, and originally subordinate to, the legislative.”358 And 
again Montesquieu is to the same effect: Not only was the external executive 
power just “the execution of [the] general will” as defined by the 
legislative power, but the terms of that execution could be dictated totally 
by the entity possessing the legislative power.359 
Here Montesquieu and Rutherforth were on common ground with 
every other commentator I have encountered. Everyone agreed that an 
exercise of the conceptual function of legislative power would define the 
scope of every other function of government, including the federative: 
We act as a nation, when, through the organ of the legisla-
tive power, which speaks the will of the nation, and by means of 
the executive power which does the will of the nation, we enact 
laws, form alliances, make war or peace, dispose of the public 
money, or do any of those things which belong to us in our col-
lective capacity.360 
Certainly that had been the constitutional law of England since at least 
the 1701 Act of Settlement,361 and as expressed more saliently for the 
                                                                                                                           
 357. 2 Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, supra note 349, at 66. 
 358. Review of Rutherford’s Institutes, supra note 352, at 219. Note that final 
formulation: “[O]riginally” here means not “at first” but “as a matter of its origin.” The 
subsequence and subordinacy of executive power were as true when applied to external 
objects as they were to internal objects. 
 359. See Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 225. 
Montesquieu twice emphasized that, unless the head magistrate had the right to 
participation in lawmaking, his conduct of foreign affairs could be entirely stripped away 
by legislative prescription. See id. at 231 (“Were the executive power not to have a right of 
restraining the encroachments of the legislative body, the latter would become despotic; 
for as it might arrogate to itself what authority it pleased, it would soon destroy all the 
other powers.”); id. at 233 (“The executive power, pursuant to what has been already said, 
ought to have a share in the legislature by the power of rejecting, otherwise it would soon 
be stripped of its prerogative.”). 
 360. Anna Letitia Barbauld, Sins of Government, Sins of the Nation; or, a Discourse 
for the Fast 3 (London, printed for J. Johnson 1793). 
 361. See An Act for the Further Limitation of the Crown and Better Securing the 
Rights and Liberties of the Subject (Act of Settlement) 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2, § 3 
(Eng.) (prohibiting monarchs not born in England from engaging “in any Warr for the 
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Revolutionaries in cases like the 1774 decision in Campbell v. Hall, which 
barely paused on the point in discussing the Crown’s foreign affairs pre-
rogative as the basis for a peace treaty with France in the Caribbean.362 
This was likewise true in the realm of theoretical commentary, where 
writers observed without fear of contradiction that the various foreign 
affairs powers were fully subject to direction by legislative power.363 
                                                                                                                           
Defence of any Dominions or Territories which do not belong to the Crown of England, 
without the Consent of Parliament”). 
 362. See Campbell v. Hall (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1048; 1 Cowp. 204, 209 (KB). 
The opinion observed that: 
[I]f the King (and when I say the King, I always mean the King without 
the concurrence of Parliament,) has a power to alter the old and to 
introduce new laws in a conquered country, this legislation being sub-
ordinate, that is, to his own authority in Parliament, he cannot make any 
new change contrary to fundamental principles: he cannot exempt an 
inhabitant from that particular dominion . . . from the power of 
Parliament . . . ; and so in many other instances which might be put. 
Id. Note that Campbell, like all eighteenth-century questions of prerogative authority, is a 
Youngstown Zone Two case. See id. at 1048; 209–10 (“It is left by the constitution to the 
King’s authority to grant or refuse a capitulation . . . . [N]o man ever said the Crown could 
not do it.”). On the contemporary salience of Campbell v. Hall, see 1 John Philip Reid, 
Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Rights 158 (1986) 
(noting “the discussion it generated during the months leading up to the American 
Revolution”). 
The colonists might also have been struck by reports of the parliamentary debate 
about King George III’s introduction of Hessian mercenaries into Gibraltar and Minorca 
without parliamentary approval in 1776. See 18 William Cobbett, Cobbett’s Parliamentary 
History of England, from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, at 798–824 (London, T.C. 
Hansard 1813). The opposition claimed that this violated the Bill of Rights’ prohibition on 
keeping a standing army within the kingdom, the Mutiny Bill’s limitation on the size of 
British army, and the Act of Settlement’s prohibition aganst placing foreigners in any 
military “office, or place of trust.” Id. at 799–800, 825. Supporters of the government 
responded by arguing that the statutes did not apply under the circumstances, and by 
suggesting that an Act of Indemnity be passed to immunize any illegal behavior. But none 
of them argued that the Crown was legally entitled to ignore the statute. Id. at 801–12. 
 363. See Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, § 149, at 166, § 153, at 168 (“[T]here 
can be but one supreme power, which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must 
be subordinate,” such that “the federative power [is] both ministerial and subordinate to 
the legislative”). Compare in this respect the Antifederalist “Federal Farmer’s” logical 
extension of Rutherforth’s geographical subdivision of executive power to the other two 
powers of government: 
In the second place it is necessary, therefore, to examine the extent, 
and the probable operations of some of those extensive powers pro-
posed to be vested in this [national] government. These powers, legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial, respect internal as well as external objects. 
Those respecting external objects, as all foreign concerns, commerce, 
imposts, all causes arising on the seas, peace and war, and Indian affairs, 
can be lodged no where else, with any propriety, but in this [national] 
government. 
Federal Farmer, Letter III, Letters to the Republican, Oct. 10, 1787, reprinted in 19 
Documentary History, supra note 70, at 203, 224. 
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2. Montesquieu’s Taxonomy of Executive Power Was Odd and 
Unrepresentative. — Notably, Montesquieu and Rutherforth’s presenta-
tional choice to divide the universe of executive power into these 
taxonomic categories was highly unrepresentative. Certainly as a matter 
of English law, “the executive power” was a completely distinct branch of 
royal authority from the military and foreign affairs powers—a point by 
itself decisive in a Constitution so thoroughly steeped in Anglo-American 
legal concepts. But so far as I can tell, Rutherforth and Montesquieu 
stood alone among political theorists in this taxonomy more generally. 
Indeed, both thinkers acknowledged that “[t]hese two branches of the 
executive power may, if we like these names better, be called civil and 
military.”364 So they may. And so they typically were: The standard way to 
incorporate foreign affairs into governance theory was as a subject 
matter—a competence, to borrow a term from modern European Union 
law—no different in principle from building lighthouses, or coining 
money, or conferring honors.365 
                                                                                                                           
 364. See 2 Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, supra note 349, at 59; see also 1 
Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch.XIX, at 264–65 (comparing 
how “in a commonwealth the same magistrate ought to be possessed of the executive 
power, as well civil as military[,]” whereas in a monarchy “some [officers that have] the 
civil executive, and others the military executive power, which does not necessarily imply a 
despotic authority”). Besides the Essex Result, I have come across only one other 
contemporary author who comes close to using their taxonomy. See John Brand, An 
Historical Essay on the Principles of Political Associations in a State 126 (London, printed 
for T.N. Longman & J. Owen 1796) (“The remaining heads of this comparison will relate 
to the executive power of the Crown, judicial and military . . . .”). 
 365. See Althusius, supra note 121, at 53 (listing as distinct portfolios “the executive 
functions and occupations necessary and useful to the provincial association [that is, leg-
islature;]” “the distribution of punishments and rewards by which discipline is preserved 
in the province;” “the provision for provincial security;” “the mutual defense . . . against 
force and violence;” and many others); cf. Vile, supra note 37, at 16–17 (distinguishing 
between the “‘tasks’ of government” and the “‘functions’ of government”). Althusius goes 
on to distinguish at great length between what he repeatedly refers to as the administra-
tor’s executive function as to general right and what he describes as the separate and dis-
tinctive function of “arms and war” among many other “special right[s].” Althusius, supra 
note 121, at 182–83. Compare these special rights with id. at 175–76 (“General right, in 
turn, involves . . . the enactment and execution of useful laws, and the administration of 
justice . . . .”).  
For other examples, see Beccaria, supra note 117, at 119 (distinguishing between “the 
interior power, which defends the laws, and the exterior, which defends the throne and 
kingdom”); Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, supra note 320, at 273 
(describing “the supreme [that is, legislative] power, the executive, the judicature, [and] 
the military” as separate branches of government authority); 2 Cornelius Van 
Bynkershoek, Quaestionum Juris Publici bk. II, ch. XIII, at 211 (James Brown Scott ed., 
Tenney Frank trans., Clarendon Press 1930) (1737) (“[T]he counsellors of the States-
General who have charge of the state treasury and the exaction of the contributions . . . do 
not possess executive power in the several provinces, nor any jurisdiction, nor any military 
authority without permission of the Estates.”); Hobbes, supra note 117, at 166–70 
(discussing “publique ministers” whose portfolios involve “speciall Administration; that is 
to say, charges of some speciall businesse, either at home, or abroad,” and describing 
departments for the economy, the armed forces, the judiciary, the execution of judgments, 
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To be sure, many thought that the various foreign affairs 
competences ought usually to be vested in the same hands that held the 
executive power.366 But that was all contingent political dickering—such 
debates had nothing to do with essentialist claims about the “executive” 
nature of such competences. To the contrary, the same people often as-
serted that similar practical considerations meant that the chief magistrate 
should also hold powers that were on nobody’s account “executive”: the 
veto or negative,367 the power to raise money,368 and in some cases the 
power to enact law itself.369 
                                                                                                                           
and the wielding of diplomatic power); Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, §§ 146–148, 
at 165 (describing the “distinct” and “natural” power called “federative,” which “contains 
the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions, with all 
persons and communities without the commonwealth”). 
In a similar vein, see 2 Burlamaqui, supra note 117, pt. I, ch. VII, at 320 (“[T]he body 
of the nation reserves to itself the legislative power . . . [and] it gives the king the military 
and executive powers . . . .”). Burlamaqui’s chapter “Of the Parts of Sovereignty” left no 
doubt that he was distinguishing here between a Lockean executive power and a Lockean 
federative power. See id. ch. VIII, at 322–25. He there describes “the legislative power,” 
“the coercive power,” “the judiciary power,” and an unnamed assortment of foreign affairs 
powers to “guard the people against strangers, and to procure to them, by leagues with 
foreign states, all the necessary aids and advantages.” Id. at 323–24. And de Lolme likewise 
distinguished between the executive, federative, and legislative powers. See de Lolme, The 
Constitution of England, supra note 105, bk. I, ch. V, at 74 (“The [English] King not only 
unites in himself all the branches of the Executive power,—he not only disposes, without 
controul, of the whole military power in the State,—but he is moreover . . . Master of the 
Law itself, since he calls up, and dismisses, at his will, the Legislative Bodies.”).  
 366. See Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 99, § 148, at 165 (“Though . . . the 
executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in themselves, yet 
they are hardly . . . separated, and placed at the same time in the hands of distinct persons: 
for both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost 
impracticable . . . .”). Pufendorf likewise wrote: 
[I]t follows that in a state there ought necessarily to be in the hands of 
some one person the authority to unite and arm as many citizens in any 
peril or occasion, as shall seem to be needed for the common defence, 
in view of the enemy’s force, and again, to make peace with the enemy, 
as often as it shall be profitable to do so. This power will rest with the 
same one also who has the authority to exact punishments, since no one 
can of right force citizens to arms and to the expense of war, except the 
one who can also punish the recalcitrant. 
Samuel Pufendorf, Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence bk. II, at 384 
(Thomas Behme & Knud Haakonssen eds., William Abbott Oldfather trans. 1931, Liberty 
Fund 2009) (1672) [hereinafter Pufendorf, Elements of Universal Jurisprudence]. 
 367. See 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 222 
(“Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and 
executive powers.”). 
 368. See Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, supra note 117, bk. VII, ch. 4, at 223–
24 (“[I]t is obvious that the right of war and peace, and the right to impose taxes, cannot be 
separated from [punitive power]. . . . [N]o one can . . . compel citizens to take up arms, or to 
assume the expenses of war and peace, unless he can . . . punish those who do not comply.”). 
 369. See id. at 223 (“For if the legislative authority belongs in the end to one part and 
the punitive power to another, fundamentally and independently to each, either the for-
mer will necessarily be without substance or the latter will minister to it.”); see also Hobbes, 
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The Founders rightly declined to confuse this distinction between 
subject matter (competence) and conceptual function (power).370 There 
is much more to say on this score, but for the moment, let some statistics 
refute the claim that we should treat the Rutherforth–Montesquieu 
presentational taxonomy as anything other than idiosyncratic. The most 
comfort their writings offer to the Royal Residuum Thesis is a single sen-
tence by Montesquieu that—shorn completely of context and squeezed 
for every conceivable semantic ambiguity—reads as follows: “By the 
[executive power][,] [the magistrate] makes peace or war, sends or 
receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against 
invasions.”371 This quote from Montesquieu is littered throughout the 
modern commentary, invoked as a shibboleth by those who claim a pres-
idential power to ignore the law in the realm of national security and 
foreign affairs.372  
                                                                                                                           
supra note 117, at 117–21 (describing sovereign power); Pufendorf, Elements of Universal 
Jurisprudence, supra note 366, bk. I, at 204 (“[A] pact gives the civil laws their origin, 
because by it there is established a supreme sovereignty, in whose hands is the authority to 
enact laws in a gathering subject to it.”). 
 370. We do not treat executive power as having subject matter subcategories: an envi-
ronmental executive power, and a criminal executive power, and a postal executive power, 
and an international armed conflict executive power, and so on. Certainly in each case, the 
conceptual power (that of bringing a desire into being) is applied to a topic area, or 
competence. But it’s all executive power, and the subdivisions are thoroughly unilluminating.  
Montesquieu got a lot right. But—as some of the Founders pointed out—his concep-
tual structure wandered. See, e.g., Americanus V, N.Y. Daily Advertiser (Dec. 12, 1787), 
reprinted in 19 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 397, 397–98 (“Tho’ the Spirit of 
Laws contains a fund of useful and just observations on Government, . . . it is evidently 
defective. His general divisions of Government into different species . . . do not convey to 
the mind clear and distinct ideas of different qualities really existing in the nature of 
things.”); A Farmer V (Part I), Balt. Md. Gazette, Mar. 25, 1788, reprinted in 12 Documentary 
History, supra note 70, at 431, 431 (“[I]t is much to be questioned whether the full and 
free political opinion of any one great luminary of science, has been fairly disclosed to the 
world—Even when the great and amiable Montesquieu had hazarded a panegyric on the 
English constitution, he shrinks back with terror . . . .”); cf. The Federalist No. 47, supra 
note 30, at 246–50 (James Madison) (glossing Montesquieu’s views with reference to the 
actual operation of English law, so that “we may be sure then not to mistake his meaning 
in this case”). 
 371. 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 222. For the 
original French: 
Il y a dans chaque état trois sortes de pouvoirs, la puissance 
législative, la puissance exécutrice des choses qui dépendent du droit 
des gens, & la puissance exécutrice de celles qui dépendent du droit 
civil. . . . Par la seconde, [le prince ou le magistrat] fait la paix ou la 
guerre, envoie ou reçoit des ambassades, établit, la sûureté, prévient les 
invasions. 
1 Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois, supra note 179, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 311. 
 372. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting this sentence); Prakash & Ramsey, 
Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 44, at 265–66, 268 (paraphrasing this 
sentence); Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the 
Constitution: A Review Essay of John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility, 34 Va. J. Int’l L. 
2019] ARTICLE II VESTS THE EXECUTIVE POWER 1259 
 
If the quote were as central to the founding generation’s conception 
of the executive power as these commentators believe, surely the 
Founding generation would have mentioned it. Yet they did not—not 
once, not even in passing, and surely not to assert that an executive could 
ignore duly enacted law. 
The gargantuan-though-still-unfinished Documentary History of the 
Ratification of the Constitution of the United States has compiled all archival 
records relating to the Constitution’s drafting and ratification from every 
state except North Carolina.373 None of these documents contain the 
phrase “internal executive,” “external executive,” or their cognates. For his 
part, Montesquieu is cited by name 166 times. But not one of these 
citations quotes, paraphrases, or even mentions the quote on which 
more or less the entire intellectual pedigree for the Royal Residuum 
Thesis hangs. To the contrary: Every single citation to Montesquieu’s dis-
cussion of the separation of powers invokes the portion of his discussion 
where “the executive power” unambiguously means the execution of domes-
tic law.374 (I suspect this is because that passage is the one paraphrased by 
                                                                                                                           
903, 931 n.106 (1994) (quoting this sentence); Yoo, The Continuation of Politics, supra 
note 347, at 174, 201 (quoting this sentence). 
 373. See generally Documentary History, supra note 70. 
 374. For one Royal Residuum theorist agreeing that Montesquieu’s separation of 
powers nostrum must be read as using “executive power” in the law execution sense, see 
Prakash, Essential Meaning, supra note 41, at 747 (“[O]ne can only make sense of 
Montesquieu’s famous separation maxim if one regards him as subscribing [in that 
passage] to a modern conception of executive power—as all powers to execute the law 
except for the judicial power.”). Blackstone’s reference is likewise to one of Montesquieu’s 
unambiguous uses of the phrase “executive power” in the standard sense of executing the 
legislative will as to internal law. Even uncredited, this Blackstonian paraphrase surfaced 
regularly. See, e.g., Cont’l Cong., supra note 304, at 236 (citing “the authority of a name 
which all Europe reveres” for the proposition that “[t]here is no liberty, if the power of 
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers”). 
Montesquieu himself rarely deployed the taxonomy created in his chapter on the 
government of England. I have found very few occasions in his work where he does so to 
refer to the conceptual power rather than as metonymy for the entity which possesses that 
power. Most are simply indeterminate. See, e.g., 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, supra 
note 179, bk. XI, ch. XV, at 250 (noting that the decemvirate controlled all powers of 
government, including “the whole legislative, the whole executive, and the whole 
judicial”); id. ch. VI, at 227 (noting that both the people and the Senate had a “part of the 
executive”); id. bk. II, ch. III, at 18 (stating that rulers in aristocracy “are invested both 
with the legislative and executive authority”); id. bk. IX, ch. I, at 186 (observing that a 
captured town is “deprived not only of the executive and legislative power, but moreover 
of all human property”). 
Those references that do not just gesture at a general anticentralization principle are, 
frankly, confused even on Montesquieu’s own taxonomy. One such reference relates to the 
scope of the Roman Senate’s powers. Montesquieu notes that “[s]o great was the share the 
senate took in the executive power that . . . foreign nations imagined that Rome was an 
aristocracy.” Id. ch. XVII, at 254. The next sentence then lists a series of what could be 
read as examples that begin with acts that not even Montesquieu would understand as 
executive: “dispos[ing] of the public money” and “farm[ing] out the revenue.” Id. Further 
confusing things, Montesquieu seems later to define even the implementation of foreign 
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Blackstone, who a great many Founders actually read in some depth.375) 
As for Rutherforth, he’s cited one single time in the ratification discus-
sions—for the proposition that adopting the Constitution would not 
absolve debtors of their obligations to the United States.376 Publius didn’t 
even spell the guy’s name right.377 
C. Fertile Ground Among Nonspecialists: Conflating the “Separation” and the 
“Distribution” of Powers 
Besides the misreadings described above, the Royal Residuum Thesis 
offers no other support for its claims about Madison’s bookshelf or the 
intellectual foundation on which the Revolutionary and Founding 
debates took place.378 But there’s something else worth saying about the 
success of the Thesis—a more speculative observation that has less to do 
                                                                                                                           
affairs intentions as “legislative”—which certainly cannot be the case either under his 
taxonomy or anyone else’s. See id. at 254 (“In the earliest times, when the people had 
some share in the affairs relating to war or peace, they exercised rather their legislative 
than their executive power.”). In the same vein, Montesquieu seems to define the “grant-
ing . . . of permission [to] borrow[]” as conceptually executive in nature. See 2 id. bk. 
XXII, ch. XXII, at 128–30. It is ambiguous as to whether this connection described the 
motivation for the Senate’s permission (it had a government to run!) or the essence of the 
Senate’s permission. If the latter it is confused on Montesquieu’s own account, since he 
explains that the Senate did so by “enact[ing] decrees,” which is unequivocally legislative 
on his earlier taxonomy. See id. at 129. 
 375. The better-educated Founders can be found commenting condescendingly on 
their peers’ lack of genuine familiarity with Montesquieu. There are more literate exam-
ples, but one of my favorites is “The News-Mongers’ Song for the Winter of 1788,” which 
ran in part: “Write something at randum, you need not be nice / Public spirit, Montesquieu, 
and great Dr. Price.” The News-Mongers’ Song for the Winter of 1788, Alb. Gazette (Nov. 
15, 1787), reprinted in 14 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 117.  
Blackstone, by contrast, was to American lawyers what the Bible was to Prostestants. A 
petty drama illustrating the point played out at the Pennsylvania Convention when 
Representative William Findley produced the third volume of  Blackstone’s Commentaries 
to show “incontrovertibly” that “the learned Chief Justice [Thomas McKean] and 
Counselor [James Wilson] from the city” had made errors the previous day for which “if 
[Findley’s] son had been at the study of the law for six months  . . , [Findley] should be 
justified in whipping him.” William Findley, Remarks at the Pennsylvania Convention 
(Dec. 10, 1787), reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 532; see also 
Bailyn, supra note 61, at 24 (noting that most writers’ citations to nonlegal sources were 
poorly understood “window dressing”). 
 376. See Federalist No. 84, supra note 30, at 487 n.4 (Alexander Hamilton) (citing 
“Vide Rutherford’s Institutes, Vol. 2, Book II, Chapter X, Sections XIV and XV”). 
 377. See id. It’s unlikely that Publius’s spelling can be explained as a matter of variable 
eighteenth-century orthography. Rather, it seems to be a slip of the pen for a completely 
different person: Samuel Rutherford, a seventeenth-century parliamentarian who wrote a 
well-known defense of limited monarchy called Lex Rex. For an unrelated citation to that 
work, see supra note 270. 
 378. Royal Residuum theorists do have other arguments grounded on political 
practice during the Revolution, the Founding, and the Early Republic. Those will be taken 
up in subsequent work. For the moment, suffice it to say that I do not believe Residuum 
theorists make any arguments about background political and legal theory that have been 
left unaddressed in this Article. 
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with the errors of Royal Residuum champions, and more to do with the 
mistaken premises of some in their audience. Specifically, many non-
specialists—that is to say, lawyer-generalists who have no expertise in 
either constitutional history or eighteenth-century political theory—have 
confused intuitions about what the constitutional “separation” of powers 
actually entails. 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison is a classic example. It begins: 
It is the proud boast of our democracy that we have “a gov-
ernment of laws, and not of men.” Many Americans are familiar 
with that phrase; not many know its derivation. It comes from 
Part the First, Article XXX, of the Massachusetts Constitution of 
1780, which reads in full as follows: 
“In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative 
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial 
powers, or either of them: The executive shall never exercise 
the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: The judi-
cial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or 
either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws, and 
not of men.” 
The Framers of the Federal Constitution similarly viewed the 
principle of separation of powers as the absolutely central guar-
antee of a just Government.379 
Justice Scalia thus equates the Federal Constitution’s allocation of 
powers with the Massachusetts Constitution’s statement that only the 
chief magistrate may exercise any portion of the executive power. He then 
bolsters the case—without noticing that he has shifted from conceptual 
powers to institutional organization—by noting that “the Founders 
conspicuously and very consciously declined to sap the Executive’s 
strength . . . by dividing the executive power. Proposals to have multiple 
executives . . . were rejected.”380 This shows, Scalia says, that Article II’s 
vesting of “the executive power” in the President “does not mean some of 
the executive power, but all of the executive power.”381 
As a historical statement about the Founding, this is a howler. Oppo-
nents of the Constitution savaged the document—at length and with 
great relish—precisely because of its failure to impose the kind of clean 
separation between legislative, judicial, and executive powers that is 
sketched in Scalia’s excerpt of the Massachusetts Constitution. Far from 
                                                                                                                           
 379. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Mass. 
Const. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XXX, reprinted in 3 Federal and State Constitutions, supra note 
34, at 1888, 1893). 
 380. Id. at 698–99. 
 381. Id. at 705; see also id. at 709 (“It is not for us to determine . . . how much of the 
purely executive powers of government must be within the full control of the President. 
The Constitution prescribes that they all are.”); cf. Flaherty, Most Dangerous Branch, 
supra note 59, at 1734 (“The Court’s formalist cases teach what ‘every schoolchild learns,’ 
at least those schoolchildren who are headed to the Office of Legal Counsel. Formalist 
catechism posits three discrete branches, each exercising one of three distinct powers.”). 
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being embarrassed by this feature of the Constitution, Federalists em-
braced it: 
Is there any one branch, in which the whole legislative and 
executive powers are lodged? No. The legislative authority is 
lodged in three distinct branches properly balanced: The 
executive authority is divided between two branches; and the judicial 
is still reserved for an independent body, who hold their office 
during good behaviour.382 
As Hamilton explained, this distribution of powers “is so complex, so 
skillfully contrived, that it is next to impossible that an impolitic or wicked 
measure should pass the great scrutiny with success.”383 Madison agreed 
that while “[i]t is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging 
to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely 
administered by either of the other departments,” it is likewise true that 
“the degree of separation which the maxim requires . . . can never in 
practice be duly maintained” “unless these departments be so far con-
nected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the 
others.”384 
                                                                                                                           
 382. Alexander Hamilton, Remarks at New York Convention Debates (June 27, 1788) 
[hereinafter Hamilton, Remarks at New York Convention Debates (June 27, 1788)], 
reprinted in 22 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 1921, 1953 (emphasis added) 
(Childs’s notes). Madison’s discussion of the point in Federalist 47 is canonical, at least 
among historians of the period: 
The constitution of Massachusetts . . . declares “that the legislative 
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or 
either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and 
judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the 
legislative and executive powers, or either of them.” This declaration 
corresponds precisely with the doctrine of Montesquieu . . . . In the very 
Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture of powers has been 
admitted. The executive magistrate has a qualified negative on the 
legislative body, and the Senate, which is a part of the legislature, is a 
court of impeachment for members both of the executive and judiciary 
departments. The members of the judiciary department, again, are 
appointable by the executive department, and removable by the same 
authority on the address of the two legislative branches. Lastly, a number 
of the officers of government are annually appointed by the legislative 
department. As the appointment to offices, particularly executive offices, is 
in its nature an executive function, the compilers of the [Massachusetts] 
Constitution have, in this last point at least, violated the rule established 
by themselves. 
The Federalist No. 47, supra note 30, at 248 (James Madison). 
 383. Hamilton, Remarks at New York Convention Debates (June 27, 1788), supra note 
382, at 1953. 
 384. The Federalist No. 48, supra note 30, at 251 (James Madison). As Federalists 
never tired of pointing out, this was perfectly consistent with Montesquieu. See Adams, 
The First American Constitutions, supra note 347, at 40 (explaining that “[a] complete 
tyranny is established by [] a combination of powers,” which “Montesquieu . . . had 
warned against”); cf. Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership 33 
(1960) (describing “separated institutions sharing power”). 
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For present purposes, however, Justice Scalia makes an even more 
significant mistake. And that’s the methodology he announced for deciding 
what kinds of power count as “executive.” He asks: 
In what other sense can one identify “the executive Power” that 
is supposed to be vested in the President (unless it includes every-
thing the Executive Branch is given to do) except by reference to 
what has always and everywhere—if conducted by government 
at all—been conducted never by the legislature, never by the 
courts, and always by the executive?385 
Scalia thus suggests an inductive analysis based on empirical observations 
about institutional practice of actual political entities: If the thing called 
“the executive branch” does X, then that means that X is an exercise of 
“executive power.” As an evidentiary matter, this is a version of the gram-
matical error described above, conflating the metonym with its referent. 
And at least by the lights of Madison’s bookshelf, it’s simply incorrect. 
To Scalia’s credit, he was later persuaded to reject the Royal Residuum 
Thesis as yielding “a presidency more reminiscent of George III than 
George Washington.”386 But his confusion in Morrison exemplifies the 
mistaken mental shorthand that makes some audiences such fertile 
ground for claims about such a thesis. If you move from the (correct) 
observation that each branch is associated primarily with one power to 
the (incorrect) conclusion that all acts by that branch represent an 
exercise of that power, then the Royal Residuum Thesis might seem quite 
intuitive. But that doesn’t make it any less wrong, at least as a matter of 
history. 
V. DICTIONARIES 
In light of the sources canvassed above, it should come as no 
surprise that the literally uncontradicted dictionary definition of execu-
tive power in the Founding Era was “the power to execute.” For someone 
immersed in the historical materials, this makes perfect sense. The words 
“execute” and “execution” were commonly used in the eighteenth cen-
tury for the act of bringing an intention into being, often in places where 
it would now be more typical to say “do” or “finish” or “perform.” And 
yet seeing the definitions below may startle people who have read only 
Royal Residuum Thesis scholarship. That’s because it’s central to Royal 
Residuum claims that eighteenth-century readers shared some special, 
counterintuitive-by-modern-lights understanding of “executive” that 
involved more than just the power to execute law. There was obviously 
more to the word: It would disrespect the President to confine him to his 
                                                                                                                           
 385. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706. 
 386. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2126 (2015) (Scalia, J. dissenting). I certainly 
do not mean to suggest that Justice Scalia’s conclusion here was affected by purposive 
reasoning or legislative history. He may well have conducted in camera textual analysis not 
reflected on the face of his opinion. 
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enumerated powers, supplemented only by the role of executing legisla-
tive commands. Or so the instinct goes—and it’s quite misguided. 
In 1808, the first edition of Noah Webster’s dictionary made a 
typical distinction between “executive” as an adjective and “executive” 
as a noun.387 As a noun, “executive” meant “the person or council 
administering a government.”388 Other dictionaries agreed: When used 
as a noun, “executive” meant “the person or body in the administration 
of a country who puts the laws in force—thus distinguished from the 
legislative and judicial bodies.”389 The Executive Power Clause obviously 
uses executive in the adjectival sense, and it is that sense on which the 
remainder of this Part focuses.390 
                                                                                                                           
 387. Noah Webster, A Compendious Dictionary of the English Language 109 (Conn., 
Sidney’s Press 1806) [hereinafter Webster, Dictionary]. For other dictionaries that take the 
same care with this distinction, see, for example, Caleb Alexander, The Columbian 
Dictionary of the English Language (Boston, Isaiah Thomas & Ebenezer T. Andrews 1800) 
(“Executive, eks-’ek’u-tiv, n. the chief magistrate; Executive, eks-e’u-tiv, a. having power to 
act, or to carry laws into execution”); James Stormonth, A Dictionary of the English 
Language 338 (New York, Frank F. Lovell & Co. 1800) (“n. egz-ek-u-tiv, the person or body 
in the administration of a country who puts the laws in force . . . distinguished from the 
legislative and judicial bodies; the governing person or body; adj. pert. to the governing 
body: having the power to put the laws in force; not legislative or judicial . . .”). 
 388. Or the “executive power” for short. Webster also listed another synonym for this 
entity: “Execútioner, n. a man who puts the law in force.” Webster, Dictionary, supra note 
387, at 109. 
A number of other dictionaries and encyclopedias defined the entity referred to as the 
executive power. They generally observed that the executive power-qua-entity possessed its 
homonym power-qua-authority, without elaboration on what the latter actually was. For 
example, the Encyclopedia Brittancia defined “EXECUTIVE POWER” as: 
The supreme executive power of these kingdoms is vested by our laws in 
a single person, the king or queen, for the time being. . . . 
The executive power, in this state, hath a right to a negative, in 
parliament, i.e., to refuse assent to any acts offered [by parliament], or 
otherwise the two branches of the legislative power would, or might, 
become despotic. 
4 Encyclopedia Brittanica (Edinburgh, J. Balfour & Co. et al. 2d ed. 1779) (citation 
omitted); see also Giles Jacob, A New Law Dictionary (London, W. Strahan & W. Woodfall 
10th ed. 1782) (almost verbatim). For shorter versions obviously cribbed from these longer 
entries, see, for example, 2 Ephraim Chambers, Cyclopaedia, or a Universal Dictionary of 
Arts and Sciences (London, printed for J. F. & C. Rivington et al. 1788) (“EXECUTIVE 
power, supreme, is by the constitution of these kingdom’s lodged in a single person, the 
king or queen, for the time being. See CROWN”); 2 William Henry Hall, The New Royal 
Encyclopaedia (London, printed for C. Cooke 1788) (almost verbatim); 2 George Selby 
Howard, The New Royal Cyclopaedia and Encyclopedia 853 (London, printed for Alex 
Hogg 1788) (almost verbatim). The Encylopaedia Perthensis was almost verbatim, though 
included a mention of the French Directorate. 9 Encyclopaedia Perthensis; or Universal 
Dictionary of the Arts, Sciences, Literature 215–16 (Edinburgh, John Brown 2d ed. 1816). 
 389. Stormonth, supra note 387, at 338 (“the governing person or body”). 
 390. It is grammatically impossible to parse the Executive Power Clause in any other 
way: Article II uses the word “executive” as an adjective, and in any event the President 
obviously wasn’t being vested with a political entity. 
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Here are the Founding-Era dictionary definitions I have found for the 
adjective “executive” as an attribute or characteristic in the most general 
sense. Each bullet represents a definition from a different dictionary. 
• “having the quality of executing or performing”391 
• “having power to act”392 
• “having power to act”393 
• “(adj from execute) having the quality of executing, having 
the power of execution”394 
• “that which may be done, or is able to do; . . . [exécutoire, F.] 
serving to execute”395 
• “[executoire, F.] that which may be done or is able to do, or 
pertaining to executing”396 
• “being invested with a Power to act”397 
• “that which may be done, or which is able to do”398 
• “that has the power of doing a thing, by virtue of a proper 
authority”399 
• “having power to act”400 
• “having a power, or tending, to act”401 
• “active, able to act”402 
• “having power to execute”403 
• “having power to act”404 
                                                                                                                           
 391. Allen, Complete English Dictionary, supra note 286. 
 392. A Dictionary of the English Language (London, W. Stewart 1794). 
 393. A General and Complete Dictionary of the English Language (London, printed 
for W. Peacock 1785). 
 394. John Ash, The New and Complete Dictionary of the English Language (London, 
printed for Edward Dilly et al. 1775). 
 395. Nathan Bailey, A Universal Etymological English Dictionary (Edinburgh, Neill & 
Co. 1783). 
 396. Nathan Bailey, Dictionarium Britannicum (London, printed for T. Cox 2d ed. 
1736). 
 397. A Vocabulary, or Pocket Dictionary (Birmingham, John Baskerville 1765). 
 398. Benjamin Norton Defoe, A Compleat English Dictionary (Westminster, printed for 
John Brindley et al. 1735). 
 399. Thomas Dyche & William Pardon, A New General English Dictionary (London, 
printed for C. & R. Ware et al. 13th ed. 1768). 
 400. William Enfield, A General Pronouncing Dictionary 103 (London, Plummer & 
Brewis 5th ed. 1816). 
 401. John Entick, Entick’s New Spelling Dictionary 138 (London, printed for Charles 
Dilly new ed. 1787). 
 402. Daniel Fenning, The New and Complete Spelling Dictionary (London, printed 
for S. Crowder 2d ed. 1773). 
 403. A. Fisher, An Accurate New Spelling Dictionary and Expositor of the English 
Language (London, printed for A. Fisher 6th ed. 1788). 
 404. George Fulton & George Knight, A General Pronouncing and Explanatory 
Dictionary of the English Language 124 (Edinburgh, Walter & Greig 4th ed. 1814). 
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• “having power to act”405 
• “having power to act406 
• “having the quality of executing or performing. They are the 
nimblest, agil, strongest instruments, fittest to be executive 
of the commands of the souls. Hale”407 
• “having the power to put in act the laws”408 
• “that serves to execute”409 
• “that which may be done, or is able to do”410 
• “having power to act”411 
• “that which may be done, or is able to do”412 
• “having power to act, active”413 
• “having the quality of executing or performing.—They are 
the nimblest, agil, strongest instruments, fittest to be executive 
of the commands of the souls. Hale”414 
• “[from execute or executoire, Fr.] . . . Having the quality of 
executing or performing. Executive of the commands of the 
soul. Hale”415 
• “having power to act”416 
• “[h]aving power to act”417 
                                                                                                                           
 405. A Dictionary of the English Language (London, J. Jarvis 1793). 
 406. The Philadelphia School Dictionary of the English Language 90 (Philadelphia, 
Benjamin Johnson 2d ed. 1806). 
 407. 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, printed for J. 
F. & C. Rivington et al. 6th ed. 1785) [hereinafter, Johnson, Dictionary of the English 
Language]. Johnson’s dictionaries were widely abridged by other editors. See, e.g., Joseph 
Hamilton, Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language in Miniature 79 (London, 
printed for Lee & Hurst 8th ed. 1797) (“Exec’utive, a. having power to act.”). I have not 
included such abridgments in this list. 
 408. Stephen Jones, A General Pronouncing and Explanatory Dictionary of the 
English Language (London, printed for Vernor & Hood 3d ed. 1798). 
 409. John Kersey, A New English Dictionary (London, printed for L. Hawes et al. 8th 
ed. 1772). 
 410. James Manlove, New Dictionary of All Such English Words (London, printed for 
J. Wilcox 1741). 
 411. A Pronouncing Dictionary of the English Language 97 (London, printed for J.W. 
Myers 1796). 
 412. A New Complete English Dictionary 218 (Edinburgh, David Paterson 2d ed. 1740). 
 413. William Perry, The Royal Standard English Dictionary 229 (Worcester, n. pub. 1st 
American ed. 1788). 
 414. 9 Encylopaedia Perthensis, supra note 388, at 215. 
 415. Joseph Nicol Scott, A New Universal Etymological English Dictionary (London, 
printed for T. Osborne et al. new ed. 1772) [hereinafter Scott, Etymological Dictionary]. 
 416. William Scott, A New Spelling, Pronouncing, and Explanatory Dictionary of the 
English Language 114 (Edinburgh, printed for C. Elliot et al. 1786). 
 417. John Walker, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, printed for T. 
Becket 1779). 
2019] ARTICLE II VESTS THE EXECUTIVE POWER 1267 
 
I have found no evidence for a specialized meaning that varied from 
this core transitive concept. If an unusual or specialized term of art exist-
ed, one would expect it to emerge in definitions of “executive” as applied 
to legal or governmental functions. But the notion of simple transitive 
implementation persists in full and without modification in such defini-
tions as well: 
• “having the quality of executing or performing. Active, or put-
ting into execution, opposed to deliberative or legislative”418 
• “having the quality of executing. Active, or putting into exe-
cution, opposed to deliberative or legislative”419 
• “having the quality of executing or performing. Active, or put-
ting into execution, opposed to deliberative or legislative”420 
• “having the quality of executing or performing. Active, or put-
ting into execution, opposed to deliberative, or legislative”421 
• “having the quality of executing or performing; active, not 
deliberative, not legislative”422 
• “having the quality of executing or performing. Active, or put-
ting into execution, opposed to deliberative or legislative”423 
Definitions that offer more detail about the object of execution in a 
government context are clearer still: It is the execution of law, precisely as 
you would expect from the commentators and theorists on whom these 
definitions drew. Here are the Founding-Era dictionary definitions of 
“executive” that offer a more particularized specification of what the 
“executive” power of governance meant: 
• “having power to act, or to carry laws into execution”424 
• “the being invested with a power to act, do, or execute, hav-
ing authority to put the laws in force”425 
• “having the quality of executing. Hale.—Not legislative, hav-
ing the power to put in act the laws. Swift”426 
 
                                                                                                                           
 418. James Barclay, A Complete and Universal English Dictionary on a New Plan 
(London, printed for John Rivington & Sons et al. 1782) (emphasis omitted). 
 419. Frederick Barlow, The Complete English Dictionary (London, printed for  
Frederick Barlow 1772). 
 420. Daniel Fenning, The Royal English Dictionary (London, printed for L. Hawes et 
al. 4th ed. 1771). 
 421. Charles Marriott, The New Royal English Dictionary (London, printed for J. 
Wenman 1780). 
 422. William Perry, The Synonymous, Etymological, and Pronouncing English 
Dictionary (London, T. Gillet 1805). 
 423. William Rider, A New Universal English Dictionary (London, W. Griffin 1759). 
 424. Alexander, supra note 387. 
 425. John Marchant, English Dictionary (London, n. pub. 1760). 
 426. Thomas Browne, The Union Dictionary (London, J.W. Myers 1800). 
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• “having the quality of executing or performing. Active; hav-
ing the power to put in act the laws”427 
• “having the quality of executing or performing. Active; hav-
ing the power to put in act the laws”428 
• “Active; not deliberative; not legislative; having the power to 
put in act the laws. The Roman emperors were possessed of 
the whole legislative as well as executive power. Addison. 
Hobbes confounds the executive with the legislative power, 
though all well instituted states have ever placed them in dif-
ferent hands. Swift”429 
• “[from execute.] Having the quality of executing or perform-
ing—Active; not deliberative; not legislative; having the 
power to put in act the laws”430 
• “Active; not deliberative; not legislative; having the power to 
put in act the laws.—The Roman emperors were possessed of 
the whole legislative as well as executive power. Addison’s 
Freeholder.—Hobbes confounds the executive with the legisla-
tive power, though all well instituted states have ever placed 
them in different hands. Swift”431 
• “Having the power of putting in act the laws, active, not 
legislative or deliberative. The legislative as well as executive 
power. Addison”432 
• “Having the quality of executing or performing; active, not 
deliberative, not legislative, having the power to put in act 
the laws”433 
• “pert. to the governing body; having the power to put the 
laws in force; not legislative or judicial; active”434 
Now the kicker. A handful of dictionaries do reference the full phrase 
“executive power” precisely as used in the Executive Power Clause: a 
term of art for a conceptual authority that is capable of being vested in a 
government entity. I have found five such definitions. Each of them 
                                                                                                                           
 427. An Universal Dictionary of the English Language (Edinburgh, Alexander 
Donaldson & John Reid 1763). 
 428. 1 J. Johnson, The New Royal and Universal English Dictionary (London, printed 
for A. Millard & R. Dorsley 1763). 
 429. Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 407 (citing the second 
definition). 
 430. William Kenrick, A New Dictionary of the English Language (London, printed 
for John & Francis Rivington et al. 1773). 
 431. 9 Encylopaedia Perthensis, supra note 388, at 215 (citing the second definition). 
 432. Scott, Etymological Dictionary, supra note 415. 
 433. Thomas Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of The English Language (London, C. 
Dilby 2d ed. 1789). 
 434. Stormonth, supra note 387, at 338. In the entry immediately previous, Stormoth 
makes clear he is using “governing” in the then-usual way, to refer to the “person or body” 
who “puts the laws in force.” See id. 
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defines “executive power” to mean exactly what an informed reader of 
Madison’s bookshelf would have expected: the power to execute plans, 
instructions, and authorities. 
• “EXE’CUTIVE Power, (S.) The power of putting in execu-
tion”435 
• “EXECUTORY or EXECUTIVE, that serves to execute; as 
The executive Power”436 
• “Exécutive Power, pouvoir d’executer, potestas executorialis, 
Die Vollmacht etwas zu vollstrecken”437 
• “Exécutive, a. Ex. Executive power, pouvoir ou authorité 
d’exécuter”438 
• “The executive power. Administratio; potestas aliquid adminis-
trandi”439 
Hidden meanings and counterintuitive findings are great when you 
find them. But sometimes simplest is best. 
CONCLUSION 
When a moderately educated eighteenth-century reader—or really 
any literate American with access to a dictionary—saw the phrase 
“executive power,” they would have understood it as the power to exe-
cute plans, instructions, and above all else the laws. They would have 
understood the power as an empty vessel whose authority in any particu-
lar case depended entirely on the substantive decisions of the entity 
(sometimes the same one that held the power to execute) which pos-
sessed the legislative power to direct executive action. 
That’s certainly not to say we’ve arrived at a comprehensive 
historical account of Article II as drafted. What settlement on 
presidential power did the drafting Framers think they had reached? 
What arrangement did the ratifying Founders think they were voting on? 
Doesn’t the “Law Execution” theory of the Executive Power Clause leave 
                                                                                                                           
 435. A Pocket Dictionary; or, Complete English Expositor (London, printed for J. 
Newbery 3d ed. 1765). A number of encyclopedia-style publications (including the 
Encyclopedia Brittannica) include an encyclopedia-style discussion of the political entity 
“Executive Power.” See supra note 388 and accompanying text. 
 436. Edward Phillips, The New World of Words: Or, Universal English Dictionary 272 
(London, printed for J. Phillips et al. 1706). 
 437. Nathan Bailey, A Compleat English Dictionary; Oder, Vollständiges Englisch-
Deutsches 281 (Leipzig, Waysenhaus- und Frommannische Buchhandlung 1783). 
 438. Abel Boyer, Boyer’s Royal Dictionary Abridged (London, printed for Pote et al. 
18th ed. 1794). The accent on the leading word indicates spoken stress. That is to say, this 
is from a list of definition of English terms in French. 
 439. Thomas Morell, An Abridgment of Ainsworth’s Dictionary (Philadelphia, Kimber 
& Conrad et al. 1st Am. ed. 1808). 
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a foreign affairs gap in the constitutional text?440 A detailed answer 
requires deep engagement with a completely different set of historical 
materials—and perhaps a sturdier sense of civic confidence than the 
Royal Residuum Thesis seems to possess. But it is surely worth saying 
something about the power besides its bare semantic meaning: namely, a 
word on its contemptuous reception by theorists who yearn for a king. 
Because, if mere execution is all there is to it, then wasn’t this a 
rather milquetoast role? When Chief Justice Vinson called the merely 
executive President an “impotent” “automaton” or “messenger-boy,”441 
and when the arch-royalist Filmer dripped with disdain about a mere exec-
utive power,442 weren’t they right? Didn’t at least some Founders think so 
too? Take Charles Pinkney who, at the Convention, “objected to the con-
temptible weakness & dependence of the Executive” that was created by 
Article II.443 That’s certainly Harvey Mansfield’s view: “[I]f any real presi-
dent confined himself to this definition, he would be contemptuously 
called an ‘errand boy,’ considered nothing in himself, a mere agent whose 
duty is to command actions according to the law.”444 
I don’t think so. Certainly it’s wrong today. The modern statutory 
framework conveys a staggering amount of discretionary policy power to 
the executive branch. Very few of the legal constraints imposed on these 
delegated authorities are so precise as to rule out a politically plausible 
policy option in the realm of national security and foreign affairs.445 But 
                                                                                                                           
 440. A full response to the “foreign affairs gap” anxiety requires engaging 
constitutional text and ratification debates that range far beyond Madison’s bookshelf. But 
because the “gap” argument features so centrally in the Royal Residuum Thesis, a few 
thoughts: As a matter of significance, such arguments-from-imperfection are misguided. 
They rely on assumptions about the Founding that contradict everything we know about 
human beings trying to draft complex text. As a matter of practice, the gaps suggested by 
Royal Residuum theorists are, in the main, minor and administrative. And, as a matter of 
practice, the Article I Necessary and Proper Clause provided a trivially constitutional basis 
for Congress to fill them in as they went along. As with so many other areas of national 
governance, this sort of gap-filling is exactly what happened in the early Republic. 
 441. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 682, 708 (1952) (Vinson, 
J., dissenting, joined by Reed & Minton, JJ.) 
 442. See supra note 315 and accompanying text. 
 443. Notes of James Madison on the Convention (Sept. 15, 1787) (statement of 
Charles Pinkney), in 2 Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 188, at 
621, 632. Pinkney had changed his mind, or at least his tune, by the time he was opening 
the South Carolina ratifying convention with a stirring speech on behalf of the Constitution. 
See Charles Pinckney, Speech to the South Carolina Convention (May 14, 1788), in 4 The 
Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, As 
Recommended By the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, at 318, 329 (Jonathan 
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) (“We have . . . endeavored to infuse into this department that degree 
of vigor which will enable the President to execute the laws with energy and despatch.”). 
 444. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern 
Executive Power 2–3 (1989). 
 445. See Andrew Kent & Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and National 
Security Power, in the Cambridge Companion to the United States Constitution 261, 291 
(Karen Orren & John W. Compton eds., 2018) (discussing constitutional and statutory 
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it was obtuse in the eighteenth century as well: The executive power has 
never been anything less than the nation’s force mustered in service of 
the nation’s will. That was why many authors saw England not only as 
being the freest and happiest of countries446 but also as the country 
whose ruler was in fact the most powerful. Indeed, and perhaps ironi-
cally, the Crown could direct the power of a peerlessly vigorous nation 
that flourished precisely because of the various formal limitations on 
royal authority. By this measure, the American President would soon be 
stronger still. At a minimum, James Wilson observed, the President’s 
powers were clearly “of such a nature as to place him above expressions 
of contempt.”447 Some Antifederalists made far less sanguine versions of 
the same point: “[T]hough not dignified with the magic name of King, 
he will possess more supreme power, than Great Britain allows her hered-
itary monarchs . . . .”448 
Even Madison (who, it turns out, had read the books on his 
bookshelf) saw what was coming. He warned that the President would 
likely wind up with tyrannical power in his executive capacity if Congress’s 
legislative authority were not limited: 
One consequence must be, to enlarge the sphere of 
discretion allotted to the executive magistrate. Even within the 
legislative limits properly defined by the [C]onstitution, the 
difficulty of accommodating legal regulations to a country so 
great in extent, and so various in its circumstances, has been 
much felt; and has led to occasional investments of power in the 
executive, which involve perhaps as large a portion of discre-
tion, as can be deemed consistent with the nature of the 
executive trust. In proportion as the objects of legislative care 
might be multiplied, would the time allowed for each be dimin-
ished, and the difficulty of providing uniform and particular 
regulations for all be increased. From these sources would 
necessarily ensue a greater latitude to the agency of that depart-
ment which is always in existence, and which could best mould 
                                                                                                                           
constraints on the President’s national security powers); see also, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, 
Total War and the Constitution 39–40 (1947) (describing the “delegation of vast 
discretionary powers to the President to deal with a broadly defined subject-matter in 
furtherance of objectives equally broad”); Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: 
Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies 269 (1948) (describing World War I– and 
World War II–era statutes that conferred “extreme discretionary authority upon the 
President or his administration”). 
 446. See supra notes 183–186 and accompanying text. 
 447. James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratification Debates (Dec. 11, 1787; morning 
session), reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 70, at 568. 
 448. Tamony, Va. Indep. Chron., Jan. 9, 1788, reprinted in 8 Documentary History, 
supra note 70, at 286, 287. “Tamony” expressly connected this presidential power to 
foreign affairs authorities conveyed pursuant to the legislative power. See id. 
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regulations of a general nature, so as to suit them to the 
diversity of particular situations.449 
Yes, the immediate post-Revolutionary period saw the executive power 
either mismanaged by committee or left under the thumb of a multi-
member legislature riven by squabbles. But once the executive power was 
conferred on a single President, and once that President was given a veto 
to influence the content of the legislative instructions he would effectu-
ate—watch out. Because the result was a massively powerful institution. 
Just not one with an indefeasible foreign affairs power, or indeed any 
other power not specifically listed in the Constitution. The particulars of 
that settlement and its implications for modern controversies, however, 
must wait for another day. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 449. Report of the Virginia Resolves 1800, reprinted in 17 The Papers of James 
Madison, supra note 268, at 316. 
